Manila, Philippines -- As dark clouds loomed on the horizon, various sectoral groups belonging to In Defense of Human Rights and Dignity movement (IDEFEND) prepared to march towards Congress this morning on the occassion of Duterte's second State of the Nation Address (SONA).  (photo by Joseph Purugganan)

Hyderabad, India -- People’s groups from across the country converged in Hyderabad from July 22-26 to unanimously reject the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). The RCEP is a proposed mega regional FTA, which 16 countries including India are negotiating. The countries include ASEAN countries plus ASEAN’s six FTA partners India, China and Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.

In a People’s Convention under the banner ‘People’s Resistance Forum against FTAs and RCEP’ on July 23, hundreds of  peasants, agricultural workers, animal rearers, women farmers, fishworkers, trade unions, women’s organisations, industrial and mining workers, hawkers and street vendors,  sex workers, public services employees, students, engineers, teachers, lawyers, environmental activists, HIV-positive persons, Dalits and Adivasis voiced apprehensions about RCEP.

“RCEP is taking away seeds from farmers. There can be no food sovereignty without seed sovereignty. Women farmers should unite to reject FTAs that trade away farmers’ rights and land rights.” BurnadFatima, Asia Pacific Forum on Women Law and Development (APWLD).

“The e-commerce chapter in RCEP will allow foreign technology corporations greater access to India data and threaten the protections to India’s digital industry.” Parminder Jeet Singh, IT for Change

“The stringent intellectual property proposals in RCEP will create monopolies, impact generic production and adversely affect access to affordable medicine.” Leena Menghaney, MSF

“Free trade agreements imply neither freedom nor are based on agreements.  Disclosure, transparency and open discussions are required on RCEP whose texts are couched in complicated legalese.” Yogendra Yadav, Swaraj Abhiyan and All India Kisan Sangharsh Coordination Committee.

Speakers expressed concern that the agreement was being negotiated in complete secrecy at the Hyderabad International Convention Centre. The RCEP chapters have been negotiated behind closed doors. Few texts under negotiation have been ‘leaked’ online and analysed which are the only source of information. The analysis indicates that the RCEP as the world’s largest mega-FTA will impact nearly every sector of the economy and all aspects of society and is an onslaught on people’s lives, livelihoods and human rights.

At a time when farmers are agitating for better crop prices and committing suicide In India, RCEP would remove import tariffs, throwing the farmers further into crisis with cheaper imports of crops and milk products. Local manufacturing will take a hit, with workers losing their jobs and wages, getting pushed into unorganised sector. With stronger patent rights for big pharma companies, RCEP will increase the costs of medicines and damage India’s manufacture of generic drugs. Public services such as health and education will be even more privatised, making it prohibitive for the masses to access.  Rules under RCEP will also facilitate free access to Indian data by global big business, giving them control over every sector.

The experiences of over the last two decades of corporate globalisation have shown that the already marginalised and most vulnerable sections such as Dalits, adivasis, small farmers, unorganised workers, denotified tribes, minorities and women stand to lose the most.

RCEP is only another face of corporate globalisation. It creates more rights for big corporations and grants investorsThe powerful tools like the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which obligates the government to protect the safety of investments of foreign companies at the cost of the rights and interests of its citizens. The agreements undermine the sovereignty of our governments to make its own laws and policies as per our needs.

It is shocking that such far-reaching agreements are being negotiated without discussion either with the public or in the Parliament, State legislatures and local self governments. In the above light, the following is demanded:

• We want democratic governments to retain the sovereignty to make laws and policies in the interests of the citizens, particularly the more vulnerable sections - whether on import tariffs, subsidies, minimum wages or protections for people and environment.
• India should immediately halt RCEP talks and negotiations on other FTAs.
• Indian government should place all details of the negotiations before the public and hold extensive and meaningful consultations on FTAs with people’s organisations including farmer unions and trade unions.
• The government should immediately debate RCEP and other FTAs in the Parliament, and hold consultations with state governments and local bodies.
• India should adopt a law that no international trade agreement should come into force without ratification by the Parliament of India.
• All state governments and political parties should make clear their position on RCEP and other FTAs.

A statement was issued from the July 23rd convention which expressed the sentiment that such a convergence of movements was the beginnings of a new coalition from the ground up. A rally was organised at People’s Plaza, Necklace Road on July 24^th where over 700 people came out in large numbers against RCEP. A press conference was organized at Press Club, Somajiguda on July 24 where individuals like Prof. Biswajit Dhar- JNU, Burnad Fatima- Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development, Shoko Uchida - Pacific Asia Resource  Centre (PARC) Japan, Niabdulghafar Tohming- FTA Watch Thailand, Kiran Vissa- People’s Resistance Forum Against FTAs and RCEP and Shalini Bhutani – legal researcher & policy analyst spoke to the press.

The People’s Summit will continue at the Sundarayya Vignana Kendram in Hyderabad with workshops on e-commerce, the agrarian crises, labour issues and social security, public services, fisheries, etc. till July 26th.

For analyses on different aspects of RCEP, please contact

tradetalks2017@gmail.com

Leaked RCEP ‘leaked’ texts available on:

www.bilaterals.org

Rceplegal.wordpress.com

For further information, please contact:

People’s Resistance Forum:

Kiran Vissa kiranvissa@gmail.com

Charles Meesa  nationalalliance2007@gmail.com

Forum Against FTAs:

Urvashi Sarkar urvashisarkar@gmail.com

Statement in Français 日本語 Portuguese Español

27 July 2017

We the undersigned have been inspired by Bolivia’s social movements that have shown that another world is possible. From the Water War in Cochabamba to the approval of a new constitution and a plurinational state in 2009, Bolivia has shown that it possible to challenge and present alternatives to post-colonialist states, neoliberalism, multinational power and US imperialism.

The election of Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales and the MAS government, heralded great hope for advancing not just a more socially just country, but a new international vision for a just society and a harmonious relationship with Nature rooted in the profound indigenous concept of ‘Buen Vivir’.   Bolivia rightly became recognised on the international stage for its advocacy of Mother Earth rights and for its prophetic voice at UN climate summits, and particularly for its hosting of the historic World Peoples Summit on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in 2010 in Cochabamba.

It is with profound disappointment, then, that we hear that one of the key organisers of the historic Cochabamba climate summit, Pablo Solón, along with Rafael Archondo, is being threatened by the Bolivian government with criminal charges and potential jail sentences of up to four years. The accusations six years on that allege Solón “illegally appointed” Archondo and that Archondo committed the crime of “prolonging functions in the Permanent Mission of Bolivia to the UN” can only be seen as attempts to silence Solón for his vocal criticism of the government and the construction of two giant hydroelectric projects, El Bala and El Chepete in the Amazonian region.

These mega-dams, if built, also run completely against any vision of ‘Buen Vivir’. According to the government’s own commissioned studies, done by the Italian firm Geodata, they would inundate an area five times larger than Bolivia’s city of La Paz, displace more than 5000 indigenous peoples, and deforest more than 100,000 hectares. The evidence is also that they are not even economically viable given the current prices of electricity in Brazil.

We also note that the accusations against Solón and Archondo are not isolated cases, but are part of a series of threatened and implemented legal actions against individuals as well as attempts to close organisations in Bolivia that have a proud record of advancing social and environmental justice. This attempt to silence dissent goes against the principles of Bolivia’s new constitution and is deeply troubling for the potential long-term success of Bolivia’s revolution. Participatory democracy depends on a rigorous and robust debate, while environmental justice can only happen if communities at the frontlines of extraction are supported and empowered rather than silenced and criminalised.

We therefore urge you to drop the false charges against Pablo Solón and Rafael Archondo and stop the hugely destructive El Bala and El Chepete mega-dam projects. Bolivia will have no credibility on climate change and the rights of Mother Earth if it invests in mega-dams and persecutes its principal environmental defenders. We urge the Bolivian government to show that its international rhetoric on ‘Buen Vivir’ and the defense of Mother Earth is not empty rhetoric, but is reflected in its policies and practices at home.

Organisations

Focus on the Global South

Transnational Institute

Global Justice Now

CIDSE

Indian Social Action Forum - INSAF

KRuHA, people's coalition for the right to water

Health of Mother Earth Foundation (HOMEF)

Bangladesh Krishok Federation

Coalition Against Trafficking in Women - Asia Pacific

CIDSE

Indigenous Perspectives

All India Forum of Forest Movements (AIFFM)

WomanHealth Philippines

Aksi! for gender, social and ecological justice

All India Forum of Forest Movements

Europe solidaire sans frontières (ESSF)

Mrinal Gore Interactive Centre for Social Justice and Peace in South Adia

TransformDanmark

Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino (Workers Solidarity Philippines)

National Rural Women Coalition

Transform Italia

Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum

Poets for the Peace

Green World Center

Asian Peoples Movement on Debt and Development

Migrant Forum in Asia

Indonesia for Global Justice

Migrant Forum in Asia

Philippine Movement for Climate Justice (PMCJ)

National Hawker Federation

Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP Workers Solidarity Philippines)

Socialist Party of Malaysia (PSM)

FIAN International

Ekologistak Martxan

Zaustavimo TTIP

Campaign for Climate Justice, Nepal

Morrocan forum for alternatives

FTDES

Alyansa Tigil Mina (Alliance Against Mining)

Fastenopfer, Swiss Catholic Lenten Fund

CETRI - Centre tricontinental

Justica Ambiental/FOEMozambique

Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC)--Philippines

Broederlijk Delen

Radical Socialist

Norwegian Social Forum

CGIL

CNCD-11.11.11

Re:Common

Member of the European Parliament, GUE/NGL group

Council of Canadians, Mtl chapter

CIDSE

Ecologistas en Acción

Terra Mater / Pachamama Alliance

Salva la Selva

Herramienta revista de critica y debate

FASE Brasil

Centro de estudios y apoyo al desarrollo local

Council of Canadians

Pinches Gringos

Colectivo Viento Sur

Colectivo de Género acción política

Observatorio de la Deuda en la Globalización (ODG)

soldepaz.pachakuti

GAMASO

Colectivo Árbol

AKISI

Comisión Justicia y Paz

Fundacion Chile Sustentable

Independiente

Ecologistas en Acción Suroeste de Madrid

PAPDA

Corporate Europe Observatory

Climate Justice Alliance

Ecologistas en Acción de Valladolid

Groupe de recherche sur les espaces publics et les innovations politiques

Individuals:

We the undersigned express our alarm and dismay at the Summons issued by Col Suebsakul Buarawong, deputy commander of the 33rd Military Circle in Chiang Mai, to Dr Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, Pakawadee Veerapatpong, Chaipong Samnieng, Nontawat Machai, and Thiramon Bua-ngam. They are accused of violating the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) chief's Order No.3/2015, Thailand’s military regime's ban on political gatherings of five or more persons. Conviction on the charges issued against these five scholars carries a potential six months in prison.

The International Conference on Thai Studies is the main international scholarly forum for presentation and discussion of research on Thailand. It has been held every three years since 1981, hosted by universities in Thailand, Australia, China, India, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. In July 2017 the conference was hosted by Chiang Mai University and achieved a record turnout of 1224 participants. The conference was a resounding success. It was marred only by the intimidating presence of uniformed and non- uniformed security personnel.

The intimidating presence of security personnel at ICTS13 and more generally at scholarly events is in direct contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Thailand is a party. It also contravenes the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which Thailand has also signed, and which guarantees academic freedom.

We call on the military government of Thailand to:

1.            Immediately withdraw the summons and implied charges against Dr Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, Ms Pakawadee Veerapatpong, Mr Chaipong Samnieng, Mr Nontawat Machai, and Mr Thiramon Bua-ngam. 


2.            Cease forthwith the intimidation of academics and students in their conduct of scholarly teaching, research, public discussion and debate, on- and off-campus. 


3.            Cease the restriction of free and open discussion on pressing issues of concern to the wider Thai public, in line with Thailand’s international commitments. 


Dated Friday 18 August


Signed by 291 ICTS13 participants (see attached) 

The following open letter has been issued and signed by scholars, academics, and civil society members from across the world in support of the five academics and researchers who have been summoned by the military following the International Conference of Thai Studies (ICTS13), and to object to attempts by the state to control spaces of learning.

Prominent signatories from the international academic community include James C. Scott of Yale University, Jayati Ghosh of JNU, India, Tania Li of University of Toronto, Walden Bello of State University of New York at Binghamton and Philip McMichael of Cornell University.

OPEN LETTER

To: General Prayut Chan-ocha, Prime Minister of Thailand, Government House, 1 Phitsanulok Road, Dusit 10300, Bangkok, Thailand

via Email: renu.tkg@thaigov.go.th

20 August 2017

Your Excellency,

We the undersigned – members of the international academic community and civil society organisations -- hereby express our alarm and dismay at the Summons issued by Col Suebsakul Buarawong, deputy commander of the 33rd Military Circle in Chiang Mai, to Dr Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, Pakawadee Veerapatpong, Chaipong Samnieng, Nontawat Machai, and Thiramon Bua-ngam. They are accused of violating the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) chief's Order No.3/2015, Thailand’s military regime's ban on political gatherings of five or more persons. Conviction on the charges against these five scholars entails imprisonment for up to one year. The summons seem to be a response to the organization of the International Conference on Thai Studies, the main international scholarly forum for presentation and discussion of research on Thailand and Southeast Asia more broadly. It has been held every three years since 1981, hosted by universities in Thailand, Australia, China, India, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. In July 2017 the conference was hosted by Chiang Mai University and achieved a record attendance of 1224 participants. The conference was a resounding success. It was chaired by Dr. Vaddhanaphuti.

Dr. Vaddhanaphuti is a highly respected academic in Thailand and internationally. He is a member of the international editorial advisory board of the leading academic journal, The Journal of Peasant Studies ; co-editor of the globally popular ICAS small book series on agrarian change and peasant studies that is available in 10 language editions including Thai; coordinating team member of the global network BRICS Initiatives for Critical Agrarian Studies (BICAS); and coordinator of a large international consortium of academics and civil society groups studying the relationship between climate change mitigation politics, resource grabbing and conflict in Cambodia and Myanmar. The project is funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID).

Perhaps more importantly, Dr. Vaddhanaphuti has carried out cutting-edge scientific work on critical rural issues in Thailand that have direct policy implications. This is the reason why he is a deeply respected academic within academia, civil society and within Thai government ministries. His leading scientific works include research on: (1) traditional knowledge and genetic resources in the context of policy deliberations on intellectual property rights and trade (Ministry of Commerce); (2) multiculturalism and the condition and rights of displaced peoples, especially children, across the Thai-Myanmar border (Ministry of Education and Health); (3) the Voluntary National Review (VNR) for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) implementation of Thailand for the United Nations last July 2017 (Foreign Ministry). Among his most recent research initiatives is his contribution to knowledge-policy work related to the ‘sea gypsies/nomads’ and some of the indigenous and native groups who have faced serious legal charges of encroaching into private tourist resorts and recently declared ‘national reservation parks’. His work on this issue has introduced new ways of securing evidence beyond legal title deeds, such as village histories and DNA testing, resulting in court decisions favourable to the sea gypsies in Rawai, Phuket.

We respectfully urge the government of Thailand to:

1.     Immediately withdraw the summons and implied charges against Dr Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, Ms Pakawadee Veerapatpong, Mr Chaipong Samnieng, Mr Nontawat Machai, and Mr Thiramon Bua-ngam.

2.     Facilitate and support academics and students in their conduct of scholarly teaching, research, public discussion and debate, on- and off-campus.

3.     Ease the restriction on free and open discussion on pressing issues of concern to the wider Thai public, in line with Thailand’s commitments to relevant international covenants.

The undersigned are international academics and civil society research organisations who have known, have worked with, or know the work of, Dr Vaddhanaphuti in various ways over the years.

We appreciate your attention and positive response to this matter that is very important not just to Dr Vaddhanaphuti and his colleagues, but to the international academic community as well.

Sincerely,

1. Prof James C. Scott, Political Science and Anthropology, Yale University, USA
2. Prof Kalyanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan, Yale University, USA
3. Prof. Christopher Goscha; History, Université du Québec à Montréal
4. Dr. Marc Edelman, City University of New York, USA
5. Dr. Nancy Peluso, University of California, Berkeley, USA
6. Dr. Amita Baviskar, Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, India
7. Fiona Dove, Director, Transnational Institute (TNI), Amsterdam
8. Dr. Max Spoor, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague
9. Dr. Carol Hunsberger, University of Western Ontario, Canada
10. Dr. Esteve Corbera, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain
11. Prof. Dr. Joan Martinez-Alier, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
12. Dr. Arnim Scheidel, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
13. Dr. Saturnino M. Borras Jr., International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
14. Dr. Courtney Work, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague
15. Sara Vigil, PhD Researcher, University of Liège, Belgium
16. Mads Barbesgaard, PhD Researcher, Lund University, Sweden
17. Dr. Veronika Goussatchenko , International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague
18. Yukari Sekine, PhD researcher, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
19. Eang Vuthy, Equitable Cambodia (EC), Phnom Penh, Cambodia
20. Dr. Li Hua, Taiyuan University of Technology, China
21. Dr. Jack Kloppenburg, University of Wisconsin, USA
22. Sharmini Bisessar, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague
23. Dr. Emily Yeh, University of Colorado Boulder, USA
24. Dr. Lynn Stephen, University of Oregon, USA
25. Dr. Mario Samper, independent scholar and international specialist in rural development, Central America
26. Dr. Derek Hall, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
27. Professor dr. ir. Jan Douwe van der Ploeg, Wageningen University, the Netherlands
28. Pierre Merlet, PhD Researcher, University of Antwerp, Belgium
29. Dr. Suraya Afiff, University of Indonesia
30. Dr Tania Li, University of Toronto, Canada
31. Prof Rodolphe De Koninck, Université de Montréal, Canada
32. Dr. Dominique Caouette, Université de Montréal, Canada
33. Dr. Sébastien Rioux, Université de Montréal, Canada
34. Salena Tramel, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Netherlands
35. Dr. Stéphanie Martel, University of British Columbia, Canada
36. Prof. Katherine Verdery, City University of New York Graduate Center, USA
37. Professor Philip McMichael, Cornell University, USA
38. Dr. Sayaka Funada Classen, International Peace Research Institute, Meiji Gakuin University, Japan
39. Dr. Shahra Razavi, Research & Data Section, UN Women
40. Dr. Sonja Luehrmann, Simon Fraser University, Canada
41. Julia, PhD Researcher, Universität Bonn, Germany
42. Professor Rob Cramb, University of Queensland, Australia
43. Professor Ben White (Emeritus), International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
44. Ryan Isakson, University of Toronto, Canada
45. Dr. Karen McAllister, McGill University, Canada
46. Wendy Wolford, Cornell University, New York, USA
47. Jerome Whitington, New York University, USA
48. Dr. Marvin Joseph F. Montefrio, Yale-NUS College, Singapore
49. Yan Hairong, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
50. Dr. Gabriel Fauveaud, University of Montreal, Canada
51. Dr. Liam Campling, School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, UK
52. Dr. Vanessa Lamb, University of Melbourne, Australia
53. Dr. Alice Beban, Massey University, New Zealand
54. Dr. Shapan Adnan, former Professor, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh
55. Dr. Gerardo Otero, Professor of International Studies and Sociology, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada
56. Professor Jonathan Rigg, National University of Singapore, Singapore
57. Dr. Peter Rosset, El Colegio de la Frontera Sur (ECOSUR), Mexico
58. Ataman Avdan, Simon Fraser University, Canada
59. Salomon Nahmad Sitton CIESAS PACIFICO SUR OAXACA MEXICO
60. Laura Schoenberger, York University, Canada
61. Dr. Jan Rus, Centro de Estudios Superiores de México y Centroamérica, México
62. Dr. Ian Baird, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA
63. Dr. Michael Hathaway, Simon Fraser University, Canada
64. Dr. Merle L. Bowen, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
65. Pamela X. Pareja, University of South Florida, USA
66. Cornelia Butler Flora, Iowa State University, USA
67. Leonilde Servolo de Medeiros, Rio de Janeiro Rural Federal University, Brazil
68. Dr. Gloria Rudolf, University of Pittsburgh, USA
69. Dr. Arratee Ayuttacorn , Chiang Mai University, Thailand
70. Dr. Laksmi Adriani Savitri, University of Gadjah Mada, Indonesia
71. Dr. Scott Simon, University of Ottawa, Canada
72. Prof. Yonariza, Universitas Andalas, Padang, Indonesia
73. Dr. Zander Navarro, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil
74. Dr. Sandra Hyde, McGill University, Quebec
75. Prof. James Putzel, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
76. Dr. Jean-Christophe Diepart, Gembloux Agro-Bio Tech, University of Liege, Belgium
77. Dr Geoff Goodwin, London School of Economics and Political Science
78. Dr. Hart N. Feuer, Kyoto University, Japan
79. Dr. Celia Lowe, Director, Southeast Asia Center, University of Washington, USA
80. Prof. Andreas Neef, The University of Auckland, New Zealand
81. Dr. Jacquelyn Chase, California State University, Chico, USA
82. Dr. Madeleine Fairbairn, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA
83. Dr. Takeshi Ito, Sophia University, Japan
84. Boaventura Monjane, PhD candidate. CES-University of Coimbra, Portugal
85. Dr. Roy Huijsmans, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands
86. Dr. Koichi Ikegami, Kindai University, Nara, Japan
87. Dr. Gabi Hesselbein, consultant, London
88. Dr. Manuel Diaz, coffee specialist and consultant, Mexico
89. Dr. Dianne Rocheleau, Clark University, Worcester MA USA
90. Dr. Luis Malaret, Community College of Rhode Island, USA (retired)
91. Dr. Aaron Pollack, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, Mexico
92. Dr. Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, Emeritus Professor, The Australian National University 
93. Clara M. Park, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands
94. Christopher J Chanco, Graduate Student, York University, Canada
95. Andrew Paul, Graduate Student, York University, Canada
96. Dr. Robin Roth, Associate Professor, Geography, University of Guelph, Canada.
97. Professor Philip Hirsch, University of Sydney, Australia
98. Neera Chandhoke, formerly professor of political science, Delhi University, India
99. Dr. Pedro Antonio Ortiz Báez Universidad Autónoma de Tlaxcala, México
100. Dr. Augusta Molnar, Trustee, The Mountain Institute, Washington DC, USA
101. Dr. Andrew Orta, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
102. Peter Swift, PhD candidate, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA
103. Prof. A.R.Vasavi, formerly Professor of Sociology and Social Anthropology, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru, India
104. Dr. Carl Middleton, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand 
105. Dr. Keith D. Barney, Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific The Australian National University
106. Dr. Yvonne Underhill-Sem, Development Studies, University of Auckland
107. Jessica Clendenning, PhD Candidate, National University of Singapore
108. Dr. Bascom Guffin, Simon Fraser University, Canada
109. Nandini Sundar, Professor, Dept of Sociology, Delhi University, India
110. Dr Christian Castellanet, GRET, Paris
111. Dr Phuc To Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific The Australian National University
112. Dr Rini Astuti, Research Fellow, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
113. Dr Pujo Semedi, Department of Anthropology, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia
114. Dr. Michael Dwyer, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA
115. Dr. Sai Latt, Toronto, Canada
116. Professor Robert Costanza, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University
117. Dr. Dayabati Roy, CSSSC, Calcutta, India
118. Dr. Pablo Lapegna, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA
119. Dang Bao Nguyet, PhD researcher, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands
120. Adwoa Yeboah Gyapong, PhD Researcher, International Institute of Social Studies, Netherlands
121. Dr. Lambrecht Hans, Lancaster University, UK
122. Dr. Myrdene Anderson, Purdue University (Indiana, USA)
123. Marie Joyce Godio, University of the Philippines
124. Dr. M. Vijayabaskar, Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai
125. Dr. Sharachchandra Lele, Senior Fellow, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology & the Environment, Bangalore (India)
126. Abidin Kusno, Professor, Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University
127. Professor A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi, Department of International Development Studies, Trent University, Peterborough, Canada
128. Suddhasattwa Barik, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, Netherlands
129. Dr. Frédéric Landy, professor, University of Paris Nanterre (France), director of the French Institute of Pondichérry, India
130. Prof. Kyoko Kusakabe, Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand
131. Nokonwaba May, PhD Candidate, University of Fort Hare, South Africa
132. Elyse Mills, PhD Researcher, International Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands
133. Ajit Menon, Professor, Madras Institute of Development Studies, India
134. Dr. Thanh-Dam Truong, retiree, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands
135. Dr. Karen Coelho, Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India
136. Prof. Asmita Kabra, School of Human Ecology, Ambedkar University Delhi
137. Sita Venkateswar, School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University, New Zealand
138. Professor Christian Lund, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
139. Ratha Thuon, PhD researcher, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Netherlands
140. Jostein Jakobsen, PhD Candidate,University of Oslo
141. Professor Tor A. Benjaminsen, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway
142. Dr. Sudhir Kumar Suthar, Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, JNU, New Delhi, India
143. Prof Nivedita Menon, Centre for Comparative Politics and Political Theory, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, India
144. Dr Anne Hennings, Research Fellow University of Muenster, Muenster, Germany
145. Dr. Anamitra Roychowdhury, Assistant Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
146. Prof. Carlota Perez, London School of Economics, UK
147. Subhankar Chakraborty, All India People’s Science Network, India
148. Prof Cherryl Walker, Stellenbosch University, South Africa
149. Dr Ariane Goetz, Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies, Potsdam
150. Janina Dannanberg, PhD researcher, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Germany
151. Professor Philip Kelly, York University, Toronto, Canada
152. Professor Emeritus Cristóbal Kay, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), Quito, Ecuador
153. Dr Sarah Ruth Sippel, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany
154. Nora McKeon, Rome 3 University and International University College of Turin
155. Claudia Schur, PhD Researcher, Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
156. Sofía Monsalve Suárez - FIAN International, Germany
157. Giuseppe Mastruzzo, International University College of Turin, Italy
158. Dr. Tomaso Ferrando, University of Warwick School of Law
159. Dr. Laura Tejada, Centre for Development and Environment, Berne - Switzerland
160. Professor E.A. Brett, London School of Economics UK
161. Prof. Dr. Christoph Antweiler, University Bonn, Germany
162. Prof. Laurence Roudart, Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
163. Dr Katharine McKinnon, La Trobe University, Australia
164. Dr Habib Ayeb, Associate Professor, Paris 8 University. France
165. Dr Bridget O’Laughlin, International Institute of Social Studies (ret), Netherlands
166. Prof Jayati Ghosh, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), India
167. Prof Deniz Kandiyoti, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), UK
168. Dr Graham Woodgate, Institute of the Americas, University College London (UCL), UK
169. Dr Natalia Mamonova, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University, The Netherlands
170. Prof Michael Lipton, Sussex University, Brighton, UK
171. Dr Hue Le, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, Vietnam
172. Huei-Ling Lai, PhD researcher, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
173. Dr Joseph Hanlon, Visiting Senior Fellow, International Development, London School of Economics
174. Professor Iwan Morgan, Commonwealth Fund Professor of American History, University College London, UK
175. Dr. Alessandra Corrado, University of Calabria, Italy
176. Dr. Muhammad Zulfiqar, Professor, Climate Change Centre, UAP Pakistan
177. Dr. Wolfram Dressler, Future Fellow, Geography, University of Melbourne, Australia
178. Prof Kevin Middlebrook, Institute of the Americas, University College London (UK)
179. Dr. Tony Weis, University of Western Ontario, Canada
180. Dr. Annu Jalais, National University of Singapore
181. Dr. Padmini Swaminathan, Council for Social Development, Hyderabad, India
182. Dr. Julien-François Gerber, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands
183. Siddharth Joshi, Independent Researcher, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India
184. Dr. Chusak Wittayapak, Chiang Mai University, Thailand
185. Dr Jens Lerche, SOAS, University of London
186. Dr. Pritish Behuria, London School of Economics and Political Science
187. Dr. Tsegaye Moreda, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague
188. Arati Kumar-Rao, Independent Environmental Photographer & Writer, Bangalore, India
189. Dr. Pascale Hatcher, Political Science and International Relations, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
190. Divya Sharma, Research Fellow, Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University, UK
191. Dr. Mindi Schneider, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, Netherlands
192. Prof Ben Cousins, Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
193. Irna Hofman, Ph.D. Candidate Leiden University, the Netherlands
194. André Laliberté, Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada
195. Dr. Giuliano Martiniello, Assistant Professor, American University of Beirut
196. Dr. Amitabh Singh, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
197. Mauro Conti, Phd Candidate University of Calabria
198. Dr Rebecca Elmhirst, University of Brighton, UK
199. Dr. Oane Visser, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, The Netherlands
200. Dr. Sergio Sauer, University of Brasilia, Brazil
201. Alberto Alonso-Fradejas, PhD researcher, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, The Netherlands
202. David Rodríguez Goyes, PhD, Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, University of Oslo, Norway.
203. George T.Mudimu,Centre for Youth Empowerment, Zimbabwe
204. Dr Paul Hendler, Extraordinary Senior Lecturer, School of Public Management, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa
205. Dr. Allison Loconto, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France
206. Levi Gahman, The University of the West Indies, Trinidad and Tobago
207. Enrique Castanon Ballivian, PhD Researcher, SOAS, University of London
208. Muhammad Abdur Rahaman, Director, Climate Change Adaptation Mitigation Experiment & Training (CAMET) Park, Bangladesh
209. Dr Karim Eid-Sabbagh, Thimar research collective and London School of Development, UK
210. Dr. Alexander Dunlap, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
211. Dr. Priya Chandrasekaran, Postdoctoral Lecturer, Princeton Writing Program, Princeton University, USA
212. Daniela Andrade, PhD Researcher, International Institute of Social Studies, Netherlands
213. D.Narasimha reddy, Professor of economics (Rtd), University of Hyderabad, India
214. Dr. Lynda Dematteo IIAC EHESS Paris France
215. Leandro Vergara-Camus, Senior Lecturer, SOAS University of London, UK
216. Prof. Steve Déry, Université Laval, Québec, Canada
217. Dr. Felice S. Wyndham, Postdoctoral Researcher, School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography, University of Oxford, UK
218. Dr. Clifford Andrew Welch, Universidade Federal de São Paulo, Brazil
219. Brittany Bunce, PhD Researcher, Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
220. Claudia Job Schmitt, Social Sciences Graduate Program on Development, Agriculture and Society, Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
221. Satyam, Doctoral Student, Indian Institute of Management Lucknow, India
222. Michael Levien, Department of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University, USA
223. Alexander Reid Ross, Department of Geography, Portland State University
224. Profa. Dra. Marta Inez Medeiros Marques, Department of Geography, University of São Paulo, Brazil
225. Paulo F. Petersen, Agronomist, Executive Coordinator of AS-PTA, Vice-President of Brazilian Association of Agroecology, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
226. Robert Wilcox, Associate Professor, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, KY, USA
227. Nadia Augustyniak, PhD Student, The Graduate Center, CUNY, New York City, USA 
228. Daniela Marini, PhD Candidate, Colorado University Boulder, USA
229. Cathy A. Rakowski, Associate Professor, Ohio State University, USA
230. Jason W. Moore, Associate Professor, Binghamton University, USA
231. Barry Ferguson, Moderator, Madagascar Environmental Justice Network
232. Victoria Sanford, Professor and Chair of Anthropology & Director of the Center for Human RIghts & Peace Studies, Lehman College, City University of New York, USA
233. Baris Karaagac, Lecturer, International Development Studies, Trent University, Canada
234. Eugene N. Anderson, Professor Emeritus, Dept. of Anthropology, University of California, Riverside, USA
235. Dr. Claudio H. M. Batalha, History Department, Campinas State University (UNICAMP), Brazil
236. Sidnei J. Munhoz, State University of Maringá, Brazil
237. Joel Andreas, Associate Professor, Sociology Department, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA
238. Colum Graham, PhD Candidate, Australian National University, Canberra
239. Prof. Raj Patel, Lyndon B Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, USA
240. Dr. Jonathan Rosa, Stanford University, USA
241. Dr. Michael Kleinod, University Bonn, Germany
242. Dr Sayoni Bose, Assistant Professor of Non-Western Geography, Governors State University, USA
243. Kathleen Dill, PhD, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, USA
244. Ramón Fogel Ph.D Researcher, Paraguay
245. Sylvester P. Harris,MBA, Chief Executive Officer, Poverty Reduction Initiative (PORIN) West Africa, Liberia
246. Dr. Sergio Pereira Leite, Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
247. Dr Gerard Clarke, Swansea University, UK
248. Burak Gurel, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Koc University, Turkey
249. Fazil Moradi, Postdoc. University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germany
250. Ben McKay, Assistant Professor of Development and Sustainability, University of Calgary, Canada
251. Nicholas Lo, Graduate Student, Yale University, USA
252. Dr Joe Hill, Society for Promotion of Wastelands Development (SPWD), Ranchi, India
253. Jonathan Shannon, Professor and Chair, Department of Anthropology, Hunter College CUNY, New York, NY USA
254. Eunice Adhiambo Odhiambo, Executive Director, Ujamaa Center, Mombasa, Kenya 
255. Jared Naimark, Graduate Student, Yale University, USA
256. Dr. Deborah Dergousoff, University of British Columbia, Canada
257. Dr. Julie Skurski, City University of New York Graduate Center, USA
258. Dr. Betsy Taylor, Livelihoods Knowledge Exchange Network (LiKEN), USA
259. Dr. James Blair, City University of New York, USA
260. Dr. Kregg Hetherington, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada
261. Dr. Irene Velez-Torres, Associate professor UniValle, Colombia
262. Sam Bliss, University of Vermont, USA
263. Mihika Chatterjee, University of Oxford, UK
264. Dr. Philippe-Richard Marius, College of Staten Island/City University of New York, USA
265. Dr. Jacques Pollini, Research Associate, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
266. Prof Raúl Delgado Wise, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico
267. Dr. James Loucky, Western Washington University, USA
268. Dr. Jacob Blanc, University of Edinburgh
269. Hendrik Mentz, Retired, Suurbraak, Western Cape,South Africa
270. Dr. John Metz, Northern Kentucky University, USA
271. Ugo Mattei, Professor, UC Hastings, University of Turin, Italy
272. Toms K Thomas, Olive Touch Healthcare Services, India
273. Alaina L. Schneider, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
274. Dr. Nga Dao, York University, Canada
275. Magnus Fiskesjö, Cornell University, USA
276. Dr. Paola García Reyes, Universidad del Norte, Colombia
277. Dr. David Rojas, Bucknell University, USA
278. Dr. Linda Rabben, University of Maryland, USA
279. Professor Judith Friedland er, Hunter College (CUNY), USA
280. Dr. Mark Edberg, George Washington University USA
281. Dr Stephen Quilley, University of Waterloo, Canada
282. Dr. Preeti Sampat, Ambedkar University Delhi, India
283. Prof. Thomas H McGovern, Hunter College CUNY, USA
284. Dr. Karina Kato, Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
285. Dr. Luis Felipe Rincón, São Paulo State University, Brazil
286. Dr. Maren Freudenberg, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany
287. Dr. Christine Ho, Professor Emerita, Fielding Graduate University, USA
288. Michael Wilson Becerril, University of California, Santa Cruz, U.S.
289. Dr. Samuel Totten, Professor Emeritus, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, USA
290. Dr. Carole Nagengast, Professor Emeritus, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
291. Dr. Charles Goldblum, Professor Emeritus, Université Paris 8, France
292. Dr. Renata Moreno Quintero, Associate professor, Universidad Autónoma de Occidente, Colombia
293. Nelson Delgado, Professor Titular, Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro
294. Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, Full Professor, São Paulo State University, Brazil
295. Sergio Gomez, Full Professor, FLACSO, Chile
296. Brian Walter, Graduate Student, University of California- Santa Cruz
297. Dr. Nils McCune, School for Environment and Sustainability, University of Michigan, USA
298. Dr. Henry Veltmeyer, Universidad Autónoma de Zacataecas, Mexico
299. Ana Flavia Badue, City University of New York, USA
300. Prof. Charlene Makley, Reed College, Portland, OR, USA
301. Dr. Valdemar João Wesz Junior, Federal University of Latin American Integration, Brazil
302. Dr. Stefania Barca, Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Portugal
303. Dr Martin Mowforth, School of Geography, Earth & Environmental Sciences, University of Plymouth, UK
304. Dr. Mubbashir Rizvi, Department of Anthropology, Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA
305. Dr. Martha W Rees, Professor Emerita, Department of Sociology & Anthropology, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, GA, USA
306. Dr. Fátima Portilho - Professor, Social Sciences Graduate Program on Development, Agriculture and Society, Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro - Brazil
307. Thomas C. Patterson, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University of California, Riverside USA
308. Alex Martin, Director of Travel Programs, Institute For Village Studies, Bellingham, Washington
309. Les W. Field, Professor and Chair, Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico, USA
310. Emel Karakaya, PhD, Department of City and Regional Planning, Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University, Turkey
311. Christian Zlolniski, Department of Sociology and Anthropology. University of Texas at Arlington, USA
312. David G. Sweet, Dept. of History (Emeritus), University of California, Santa Cruz, USA 
313. Hector Grad, Dept. of Social Anthropology, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Spain
314. Ivette Perfecto, Professor of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan, USA
315. Kate Crehan, Professor Emerita, College of Staten Island and the Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA
316. João Márcio Mendes Pereira, Professor, Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
317. Dr. François Gemenne, University of Liège, Belgium / Sciences Po Paris, France
318. Dr. Ritu G. Khanduri, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Texas at Arlington. Arlington, TX, USA
319. Yunan Xu, PhD Researcher, International Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands
320. Dr. Joseph Misati, School of Arts & Social Sciences, Maasai Mara University, Narok - Kenya
321. China Sajadian, Department of Anthropology, City University of New York - Graduate Center, USA
322. Lindsay Parme, Department of Anthropology, City University of New York - Graduate Center, USA
323. Megan Youdelis, Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, Canada
324. Dr. Miguel Carter, Founding Director, DEMOS - Centro para la Democracia, la Creatividad y la Inclusion Social, Caacupe, Paraguay
325. Prof Walden Bello, State University of New York at Binghamton, USA
326. Dr Joseph Trapido, School of Oriental and African Studies, United Kingdom
327. Dr. Jeanne Koopman, Boston University African Studies Center, USA
328. Dr. David Blake Willis, Fielding Graduate University, Santa Barbara, California, USA 
329. Dr. Mary Hufford, Livelihoods Knowledge Exchange Network, Bala Cynwyd, PA USA 
330. Prof. Gregory Thaler, University of Georgia, USA
331. Prof Lyla Mehta, Institute for Development Studies (IDS), Sussex, UK
332. Dr. Kevin Healy, Georgetown University, USA
333. Dr. Barbara Rose Johnston, Center for Political Ecology, Santa Cruz, USA
334. Dr. Fina Carpena-Mendez, Oregon State University, USA.
335. Dr. Nina Wallerstein, University of New Mexico, USA
336. Ryan Schaars, Hunter College, USA
337. Dr. Maximiliano Menz, Department of History, Universidade Federal de São Paulo (Unifesp).
338. Nicholas Glastonbury, Department of Anthropology, City University of New York - Graduate Center, USA
339. Dr. Kathleen Kevany, Associate Professor of Social Sciences, Director of the Rural Research Centre, Dalhousie University, Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada
340. Professor Elizabeth Ferry, Department of Anthropology, Brandeis University, USA
341. Dr. James Phillips, Southern Oregon University, USA
342. Ellie Hamrick, PhD student, CUNY Graduate Center Department of Anthropology, New York, USA
343. Angela J. Lederach, PhD Candidate, University of Notre Dame, USA
344. Henry C. Theriault, Ph.D., Worcester State University and President, International Association of Genocide Scholars, USA
345. Maria Aparecida de Moraes Silva. University Sao Carlos, Brazil
346. Jérôme Rousseau, Professor emeritus, Dept. of Anthropology, McGill University, Canada
347. Bernadete Aparecida Caprioglio de Castro, São Paulo State University, Brazil
348. Dr. Kathryn Goldfarb, University of Colorado Boulder, USA
349. Dr. Jose Carlos Silva-Macher, Departamento de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
350. Dr. Nora Haenn, North Carolina State University, USA
351. Dr. Eraldo da Silva Ramos Filho, Universidade Federal de Sergipe, Brazil
352. Dr Khin Zaw Win, Tampadipa Institute, Myanmar
353. Dr. Ryan Mongelluzzo, San Diego Mesa College, USA
354. Pamela Cantine, Ph.D., University of California, Riverside, USA
355. Dr. Margo Okazawa-Rey, Fielding Graduate University, Santa Barbara, California, USA
356. Martha Robbins, PhD Researcher, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands
357. Prof. Kathy Le Mons Walker, Dept. of History (retired), Temple University, Philadelphia, USA
358. Prof. Robert A. Benfer, Department of Anthropology (retired), University of Missouri, USA
359. Dr. Javier Puente, Assistant Professor, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
360. Dr. David H. Price, Department of Society and Social Justice, Saint Martin's University. USA
361. Dr. Jennifer Sime, San Diego Mesa College, USA
362. Dr. Luis Llambí, Venezuelan Institute for Scientific Research, Venezuela
363. Dr. Amy Speier, Assistant Professor, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
364. Dr. Stephanie Buechler, University of Arizona, USA
365. Dr Paul Hodge, University of Newcastle, Australia
366. Prof. Dzodzi Tsikata, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana
367. Prof. Edward Schortman, Anthropology Department, Kenyon College, USA
368. Stephanie Miller, University of California, Riverside, USA
369. Dr. Noam Hart, Battery Researcher, University of California, Riverside, USA
370. Dr Ernest-Emile Lopez-Sanson de Longval, Archéologue, France, Ong Cerediar, Société Internationale d’archéologie sociale
371. Dr. Andrew D. Turner, Yale University, USA
372. Eric J. Heller, PhD Candidate, University of California Riverside, USA
373. Dr. Robert K. Hitchcock, University of New Mexico, USA
374. Professor Anthony Bebbington, University of Melbourne, Australia and Clark University, USA
375. Charles A. Flowerday, formerly editor, School of Natural Resources, University of Nebraska--Lincoln, formerly managing editor, Anthropology of Consciousness, USA
376. Dr. Christine Gibb, postdoctoral researcher, University of Toronto, Canada
377. Lic. Victor Falcón Huayta. Peruvian archeologist, Peru
378. Professor John Collins, Queens College and the CUNY Graduate Center, New York, USA
379. A/Prof Sarah Wright, The University of Newcastle, Australia
380. Devra Weber, Associate Professor, History, University of California, Riverside, USA
381. Brenda Biddle, Adjunct Lecturer, Queens College (CUNY), New York US.
382. Professor Katherine Gibson, Western Sydney University, Australia
383. Timothy Erik Ström, PhD Researcher, Western Sydney University, Australia
384. Sam Pack, Associate Professor, Anthropology, Kenyon College, USA
385. Harry W. Fischer, Associate Senior Lecturer, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden
386. Dr. David Gilbert, Visiting Fellow, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia 
387. Violet Cho, PhD Candidate, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
388. Dr. Uzma Z. Rizvi, Associate Professor, Anthropology and Urban Studies, Pratt Institute, USA
389. Kees Krul, PhD Researcher, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands 
390. Dr. Charlotte Cable, Postdoctoral Researcher, University of New England, New South Wales, Australia
391. Derick A. Fay, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Riverside, USA.
392. Dr. Leah Temper, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technology, Spain
393. Dr. Greg Acciaioli, The University of Western Australia, Australia
394. Dr C Shambu Prasad, Institute of Rural Management Anand, India
395. Dr. Lawrence Surendra, Chairman, The Sustainability Platform, India
396. Prof. Balbir Singh Butola, Centre for the Study of Regional Development, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
397. Lic. José Luis Fuentes Sadowski, National University of San Marcos, Perú
398. Dr. Miles Kenney-Lazar, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, Japan
399. Amit John Kurien, PhD scholar, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment, Bangalore, India
400. Dr. Shuo Li, Zhongshan School of Medicine, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
401. Genevieve Gebhart, Electronic Frontier Foundation, San Francisco, USA
402. Dr. Anders Riel Müller, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark
403. Dr. Jonas Ecke, Forcier Consulting, South Sudan
404. Professor Rosalind C. Morris, Department of Anthropology, Columbia University, USA
405. Dr. Jennifer C. Transnational Institute (TNI), Amsterdam
406. Erik Harms, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Yale University, USA
407. John Gledhill, Emeritus Professor of Social Anthropology, The University of Manchester, UK
408. Dr. Satomi Higashi, Post Doctoral Fellow, Hosei University, Japan
409. Dr. Theodora Tsongas, Oregon Physicians for Social Responsibility, USA
410. Dr. Eduardo C. Tadem, University of the Philippines
411. Abdul Rahman, graduate student, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia
412. Dr Vikas Bajpai, Assistant Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India 
413. Professor Charanjit Singh, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
414. Dr. John R. Campbell, School of Oriental & African Studies, London, UK
415. Miki Namba, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan
416. Prof. Marco Armiero, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
417. Dr. Ethemcan Turhan, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
418. Jiraporn Laocharoenwong, PhD Candidate, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

As representatives or heads of international academic organizations or academic programs, we view with deep concern the recent news that the Royal Thai Police may be about to charge Dr. Chayan Vaddhanaphuti from Chiang Mai University along with four others - Chaipong Samnieng, Ph.D. Candidate and Lecturer, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Chiang Mai University; Teeramon Buangam, M.A. Candidate, Faculty of Mass Communication, Chiang Mai University (and Editor, Prachaham News); Nontawat Machai, undergraduate student, Faculty of Mass Communication, Chiang Mai University; and Pakavadi Veerapaspong, independent writer and translator - with illegal political assembly.

The recent 13th International Thai Studies Conference (ICTS) and the 10th International Convention of Asia Scholars were major international academic events each attended by around 1300 participants, from 37 countries (ICTS) and over 50 countries (ICAS) respectively, that brought a global presence of scholars to Thailand. These conferences enjoy high international prestige and produce work of impressive and lasting significance. Dr. Chayan was entrusted by his university to facilitate the organization of these two major events, both of which received official support from the Governor of the Province of Chiang Mai. Dr. Chayan’s organizational skills and intellectual leadership are celebrated worldwide, and were certainly in evidence on these occasions.

The presence of military officers at the ICTS conference apparently prompted some individuals to affirm that the conference was an academic forum and not a military barracks, a statement made in defense of the academic nature of the conference. We are sure you will agree that Chiang Mai’s Convention and Exhibition Center is indeed not a military barracks. We believe that making this factual statement was a legitimate expression of their rights and liberties, as permitted under Article 4 of the 2017 Constitution; and one that in no way threatened Thailand’s peace and order. We would therefore urge that all charges be dropped against Dr. Chayan and the other individuals named above, who clearly had no intention of violating any laws on political assembly.

Chiang Mai University and other universities in Thailand have hosted many international academic conferences, each important not only for the opportunities for scholars to share current research, but also for generating economic revenue for Chiang Mai and other hosting provinces. Holding such international conferences is a vital component if Thailand is to reach the stated goal in its “Thailand 4.0” plans of ensuring that at least 5 Thai universities are ranked among the world’s top 100 higher education institutions within the next 20 years. We hope, too, that Thailand will continue to welcome serious scholars of all disciplinary inclinations and to benefit from the global contributions of Thailand’s own most important academics – of whom, without question, Dr. Chayan is an outstanding representative.

Issued on behalf of the following:
International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden, The Netherlands
Dr. Nira Wickramasinghe, Chair of the Board
Dr. Philippe Peycam, Director

International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS)
Dr Philippe Peycam, International Council Chair
Dr. Paul van der Velde, Secretary

Association for Asian Studies (AAS)
Dr. Katherine A. Bowie, President
(AAS is an international academic association with more than 7000 members)

Committee of the Thai Studies Program, Asia Center, Harvard University
Dr. Michael Herzfeld, Director

New York Southeast Asia Network (NYSEAN)
Dr. Duncan McCargo, Co-Founder

Humanities Across Borders, Asia and Africa in the World (HaB) program
Dr. Aarti Kawlra, Academic Director
(HaB is a consortium of 22 universities and institutes in Asia, Africa, Europe and 
North America)

Southeast Asian Neighborhood Network (SEANNET) 
Dr. Rita Padawangi, Co-Director 
Dr. Paul Rabé, Co-Director

The Board of the European Association for Southeast Asian Studies (EuroSEAS)
Dr. Silvia Vignato, President

The Board of the Association of Southeast Asian Studies (ASEAS) (United Kingdom)
Dr. Deirdre McKay, Chair

Presentation at the Dialogue on RCEP Negotiations and their impact on Human Rights and the Environment: The Role of Parliamentarians and Other Stakeholders

By Joseph Purugganan, Focus on the Global South

Good morning. It is a privilege to be given this space and opportunity to share our perspective on the on-going talks towards a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement or RCEP. On behalf of my organization Focus on the Global South, I extend our sincere gratitude to the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights for inviting us in this important conversation.

I have four main points I want to underscore today:

1. First point is the need to situate RCEP talks in a larger context. And I would like to highlight at the onset the peoples resistance not just to trade agreements like RCEP but against the broader policies that have driven what many have referred to as corporate globalization. Here I would like to discuss a broader, more general context of resistance, and a more RCEP-specific context.

The broader context is the backlash against globalization that we have seen across many parts of the globe. This phenomenon has been observed in the Brexit vote in the UK, the election of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and the most recent ascension to power of Donald Trump in the United States.

The phenomenon of people- mostly working class people- expressing dissatisfaction over the impacts of globalization (i.e. loss of jobs and livelihoods, poor public services like education, health, and public transport, ever increasing inequality and wealth concentration), and using the power of the vote, to express that anger against politicians who espouse, support or perceive to be supporting these anti-people policies. While there may be nuances, and the case is clearer in some cases compared to others, for example in the case of Duterte in the Philippines, the ire of the electorate was not bent against globalization policies although there were some discussion over the lack of inclusive growth during the campaign- the ire of the electorate was against the politicians or the elites as represented by the Philippine oligarchy, rather than on the policies. A common feature nevertheless of the globalization backlash is that unfortunately, right wing politicians, are the ones who have effectively tapped into the public outcry and thus been able to maximize the backlash to their political advantage.

What is lost however in the noise, is the fact that the subject of the outcry should not be globalization per se, but against corporate globalization. The kind of globalization that advances and is driven by the corporate agenda rather than peoples needs. RCEP and all the other mega FTAs, is a key component of the agenda of corporate globalization.

Which leads me to the growing peoples resistance against RCEP. While there is as yet no public outcry against RCEP, for how can people in general resist something that they know very little about, or the fact that trade policies one or two steps remove from the bread and butter issues, the resistance to RCEP is nonetheless to my view growing and intensifying. We’ve seen a series of peoples actions against RCEP that started in Jakarta in 2016, then to Kobe, Manila, and most recently Hyderabad in India, where the overwhelming demand of various peoples organizations, NGOs, CSOs, academics, HR networks is for governments and the people to REJECT RCEP.

The main concerns revolve around loss of jobs, the need for secure jobs, the threats to livelihoods of farmers and fishers, and the related threat to food sovereignty, the negative impacts on farmers right to seeds, and the small fishers access to marine resources, the threats to public services like education and health, the threat to access to affordable life-saving medicines, the impact of investments on land and indigenous territory; the threats to the environment, and the impact on human rights.

Concerns were also raised on broader issues like investments and the threats to public policies and regulations from the investor-state-dispute-settlement provisions in RCEP.

Another fundamental concern raised was the lack of transparency and the democratic deficit hounding the negotiations themselves.

It is clear that the people have taken a stand against RCEP even if their governments are more aggressively pushing in the other direction. The debates on RCEP and trade policies in the halls of Congress and Parliaments across SEA should take these issues into account.

2. The second point I want to underscore is how the ambitious agenda underpinning these agreements is also creating problems for the negotiations.

RCEP, TPP, TTIP, CETA these are all mega FTAs, or so called new generation FTAs that are key elements of what is called the 21st Century trade and investment regime.

Over the past couple of years however, negotiations for these big trade deals have been faltering, prompting one analyst to declare that “the era of the big trade deal is certainly in hibernation. The question now is whether it is dead altogether.”[i]

The difficulties in seeing these negotiations through can be attributed to a combination of factors. There is the complexity of the trade deals themselves— covering so many chapters, and dealing with varying sets of rules, across several countries and continents. The negotiations for these mega FTAs have also been affected by changing tides in domestic politics, with the election of Trump in the US causing the greatest disruption.

With TPP moribund under Trump, RCEP has emerged as the biggest game in town. While generally seen as a less ambitious agreement compared to the TPP when the negotiations started, what we are seeing is that there is a stronger push in the wake of the TPP debacle, to bring higher standards to make RCEP agenda increasingly more and more like TPP.

One issue that has to be tackled squarely by RCEP is the issue of development asymmetry.

The economies of the 16-country RCEP account for around $22.8 trillion, or roughly around 30% of the global economy.[ii] The aggregate figure however, belies the asymmetry that exists within RCEP.

In terms of Gross National Income (GNI), China with its $10.83 trillion economy is easily the biggest in RCEP. A distant second is Japan with $4.9 trillion, followed by India with $2.08 trillion. In comparison, the economies of the three least developed countries in ASEAN- Myanmar (0.57 %) Cambodia (0.15 %) and Lao PDR (0.10 %) - account for less than half of one percent of China’s huge economy.[iii]

In terms of per capita GNI, Australia tops all RCEP countries with per capita income of $60,050. This is closely followed by Singapore ($52,090), New Zealand ($40,020), Japan ($38,840), and Brunei ($38,010). Based on GNI figures from the World Bank, seven countries in RCEP (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, and India) are classified as low-middle income countries, while three countries (China, Malaysia, and Thailand) fall within the upper-middle income classification. Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, Japan, and Korea on the other hand are classified as high income economies.

This development asymmetry poses the biggest challenge for governments in RCEP. How parties can forge an agreement that is ambitious enough to satisfy the needs of the high and middle-income economies while also recognizing the development agenda of the poorer and smaller economies.

This issue of development asymmetry is a crucial one for ASEAN governments. ASEAN leaders have time and again asserted the centrality of ASEAN in the RCEP talks, looking at RCEP essentially as a further consolidation of its existing trade agreements with its dialogue partners.

ASEAN engagement on RCEP is guided by Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the RCEP towards the swift conclusion of the RCEP negotiations.”[iv]

Aside from asserting ASEAN centrality in the talks, the guiding principles and objectives of ASEAN in negotiating RCEP also include a principle that could very well temper the push of Japan, Korea and others to increase the ambition of RCEP.

ASEAN governments stated that being cognizant of “the different levels of development of the participating countries, the RCEP will include appropriate forms of flexibility including provision for special and differential treatment, plus additional flexibility to the least-developed ASEAN Member States, consistent with the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs, as applicable.”[v]

The Philippines, as Chair of ASEAN for 2017, will play a key role in the RCEP talks. After the 18th round of negotiations, the talks will move to Hyderabad, India, for the 19th round in July, before moving back to the Philippines in September for a Ministerial Meeting, and then to South Korea in October for the 20th round of talks, where parties are hoping to finally conclude the negotiations.

How the various groupings in the talks are able to muster and consolidate support for their positions will determine whether the RCEP talks will produce a TPP-like highly ambitious agreement, or a more moderate agreement that takes into consideration the asymmetries that exists among the parties.

Aside from development asymmetry, and the varying positions of government, the RCEP talks are also weighed-down by the negotiating agenda itself.

RCEP is not a simple free trade agreement where we deal with reduction of tariffs and market access. It is a highly ambitious agreement that goes beyond trade in fact.

It is an agreement that could determine what kind of intellectual property rights regulation will be put in place; which would then have a bearing on the level of IPR protection, and ultimately on questions of access to things such as medicines, life saving drugs, and seeds. Here too we must emphasize the asymmetry.

Among the RCEP countries, Singapore (4th), New Zealand (6th), Japan (14th), and Australia (16th) rank highest in terms of IPR protection. While Thailand (121st), Cambodia (130th) and Myanmar* (134th) are at the tail end of the global rankings.

Stronger/stricter IPR protection have already been criticized by many groups including the UNDP and UNAIDS for their potential negative impact on public health and access to medicines.

The IPR chapter is also seen as undermining farmers’ rights. The IPR chapter in RCEP will force countries to comply with UPOV 91[vi], an international convention that has been highly criticized by farmers organizations and support groups for “eliminating the right of farmers to save privatized seeds and also limited what other plant breeders can do with that seed.”[vii] Focus on the Global South analyst, Afsar Jafri, sees this as part of a strong push towards corporate agriculture and agribusiness, and a concerted effort to undermine farmers’ rights.[viii]

Among the 16 RCEP countries, only five countries (Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam) are parties to UPOV 1991. China and New Zealand are members of the UPOV but have not signed on to the 1991 Act of the convention, while the remaining 9 countries (Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand) are not even members of UPOV.

Countries that are not a party to UPOV and UPOV 1991 however, are being made to ratify or accede to UPOV 1991 and or comply with UPOV 1991 standards. In the case of the Philippines for example, the Department of Agriculture sought from UPOV Council an examination of conformity to UPOV 1991 of the country’s Plant Variety Protection Act of 2002. The Council was then asked to “advise the Government of the Philippines that the Law incorporates the majority of the provisions of the 1991 Act, but still needs some clarifications and amendments, as provided in this document, in order to conform with the 1991 Act; once the above clarifications and amendments are incorporated in the Law, the Government of the Philippines is invited to request the examination of the amended law as provided in Article 34(3) of the 1991 Act.[ix]

The Philippine experience, and those of other countries that are being made to amend their national laws, shows the tremendous influence that international standard setting conventions like UPOV have on domestic policies, with far reaching implications on how a country can pursue development of its agriculture sector and secure the livelihoods of its farmers and food producers.

Perhaps one of the most contentious issues is that if the investor state dispute settlement mechanism, or ISDS. There are people here more able to speak on that so I will not dwell on ISDS too much except to repeat a quote made at our intervention on ISDS at the stakeholder engagement in Manila.

“RCEP through ISDS will give corporations--many of which have annual revenues bigger than the GDPs of most countries in ASEAN, and therefore have more economic power compared to governments in these countries-- the right and even more power to sue governments over public policies and regulations in secret, ad-hoc tribunals. These tribunals or more appropriately, corporate courts, have handed down million dollar rulings that have penalized governments over regulatory actions to defend public health, pursue more inclusive development, protect the environment, and public interest in general.”

“RCEP through ISDS will give corporations--many of which have annual revenues bigger than the GDPs of most countries in ASEAN, and therefore have more economic power compared to governments in these countries-- the right and even more power to sue governments over public policies and regulations in secret, ad-hoc tribunals. These tribunals or more appropriately, corporate courts, have handed down million dollar rulings that have penalized governments over regulatory actions to defend public health, pursue more inclusive development, protect the environment, and public interest in general.”

3. The third point I want to make is for us to be mindful of the larger picture beyond RCEP, that is to say also that we need to link the RCEP talks to other issues:

There is increasing coherence on the agenda of connectivity. APEC, ASEAN have their own blueprints, and the WTO is supporting the agenda as well of connectivity and inclusiveness. The connectivity agenda encompass physical infrastructure (roads, ports, bridges, energy projects), and institutional connectivity (standards and regulations). I think the big institutions like the WTO are not just mindful but are in fact strategizing on how this seeming global push for connectivity can be maximized and help sustain the neoliberal, corporate agenda.

Connectivity underlines as well the Belt and Road Initiative of China, a highly ambitious development project meant to spur economic development across Asia and beyond anchored on massive infrastructure investments estimated to cost as much as $900 billion. The Belt and Road Initiative is also seen by some analysts as China’s “geopolitical gambit in order to boost China’s regional clout at a time when Donald Trump’s US looks to be stepping back from Asia.”[x]

Governments across the region seem to be taking their cue and have stepped up infrastructure spending, utilizing various public-private partnership schemes and financing arrangements with China in particular.  

4. Fourth is to underscore Trade and human rights issues, which have also been in the spotlight in the wake of worsening human rights conditions across much of Asia. This has prompted trade advocates to work more closely with human rights networks in pushing a trade and human rights agenda that includes calls for a comprehensive human rights impact assessment of trade and investment agreements. Civil society concerns have been echoed by Alfred de Zayas, a United Nations Independent Expert, on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order. De Zayas notes that “It is high time to mainstream human rights into all trade agreements and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and regulations, so that trade representatives and dispute-settlers know that trade is neither a ‘stand alone’ regime nor an end in itself.

The primacy of HR over trade and other commercial/economic interests must be upheld. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done, institutions like the European Union for example, a strong advocate for HR, has been hesitant to say the least in pushing the HR issues in trade agreements for two reasons I think. First is the clear reason that the EU wants these trade agreements forged because it sees these are crucial to its economic agenda; and two perhaps because it also does not want the agreements themselves to be the subject of HR impact assessment to look into the negative impacts on HR from these highly ambitious agreements.

These are four main points I wanted to share. I end with a plea to our distinguished legislator here to open the space for more transparent and participatory trade policy making process, listen to the pleas and demands of the people on RCEP, investigate and examine the broader economic issues underpinning these negotiations from the purview of the peoples interest, tame the power of corporations through stronger and more effective regulations. Show the increasingly dissatisfied peoples of ASEAN that coming together rather than isolation can work for the interest of people and nature. Thanks.  

Photo courtesy of Maris Dela Cruz.-Cardenas

[i] Barker, Tyson (2016). How TTIP Lost Steam. Foreign Affairs. Online: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-09-28/how-tt, ip-lost-steam


[ii] World Bank data. Online: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=chart accessed May 2017.


[iii] World Bank. New Country classifications by income level. Online: https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-country-classifications-2016. Accessed May 2017.


[iv] Chairman’s Statements from the 30th ASEAN Summit held 29 April 2017 in Manila. Online: http://asean.org/chairmans-statement-30th-asean-summit/. 30 April 2017.


[v] ASEAN Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Online: dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/documents/guiding-principles- rcep.pdf accessed May 2017.


[vi] UPOV is the French acronym for The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. UPOV91 stands for the 1991 Act of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV 1991)

[vii] GRAIN (2015) UPOV 91 and other seed laws: A basic primer on how companies intend to control and monopolize seed. Online: https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5314-upov-91-and- other-seed-laws-a-basic-primer-on-how-companies-intend-to-control-and-monopolise-seeds


[viii] Presentation notes at Agroecology Encounter of Via Campesina. June 2017 in Sri Lanka.

[ix] UPOV (2007) Examination of conformity of the Philippine Plant Variety Protection Act of 2002 with the 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention. online: http://www.upov.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?meeting_id=12283&doc_id=...

[x] Phillips, Tom (2017) The $900bn question: What is the Belt and Road initiative? The Guardian. 12 May 2017. Online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/12/the-900bn-question-what- is-the-belt-and-road-initiative

by Joseph Purugganan

When Rodrigo Duterte won the presidency in May 2016, he inherited an economy that was growing at an average rate of 6.2 percent annually. Investor confidence was on the upswing since the country got its first ever investment grade debt rating midway into President Benigno Aquino III’s term. The favorable investment climate translated into increased foreign direct investments, which amounted to around $7.9 billion in 2016.(1) Contrary to what many people think today, there was also quite strong public approval of Aquino’s Daang Matuwid program.  An SWS pre-election survey conducted in February 2016 found that around 60 percent of Filipinos would support a candidate that would continue the development vision of the Aquino administration.(2)

Daang Matuwid (straight path), the governance and development platform under Aquino, was itself not a totally new framework but a continuation of the same neoliberal, pro-corporate development path of Aquino’s predecessor Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, albeit underpinned by the promise of clean, corrupt-free, and better governance. “The Philippines is open for business under new management,” Aquino had declared before stockholders and investors in 2012.(3)  He said that the role of his government as far as economic governance was concerned would be as “management that is putting an end to backroom deals and suspect transactions, so that business, trade, and investment can flourish in an honest and level playing field.”Behind the glare of high growth and credit ratings, however, there were some very crucial concerns and weaknesses in Aquino’s economic policies and governance.  Among the issues cited by economists were the failure to address the more “pervasive and structural problems facing the Philippine economy—unemployment and income inequality.”(4)  While there were improvements in the poverty alleviation numbers under Aquino, with a significant decline in poverty incidence from 25.2 percent (23 million Filipinos) to 21.6 percent (21.8), translating to roughly around 1.2 million Filipinos lifted out of poverty in the last years under Aquino, inequality continued  to be a pervasive problem.  Income inequality remained high with a Gini coefficient of 0.43, the second highest in ASEAN (next only to Malaysia).5 The degree of wealth disparity in the country was also one of the worst in the region, where the combined income of the wealthiest 10 percent of the population was more than twice that of the poorest 40 percent.6There were questions on how the “confidence-led growth” could be sustained amidst concerns from the business community over weak government standards, poor and inadequate infrastructure, and political instability. There was also the increasing public perception that the growth had not been inclusive.7The Duterte administration’s major challenge thus would be to balance competing interests and issues: continuing towards the path to high growth, sustaining investor confidence in the economy, addressing constraints such as inadequate infrastructure and high power costs on the one hand, and on the other, the publics demand for more secure and better paying jobs, agrarian reform implementation, better public services in health and transportation, and more transformative social protection. 

Globalization BacklashDuterte ran and won on a platform promising change to a population increasingly dissatisfied with elite politics and governance, and with the majority (the so-called 99 percent) not benefitting from economic growth.  The backlash via popular support for Duterte was directed more towards the elite bureaucracy and an oligarchy that were both impervious to the needs of the poor, and not necessarily sentiments against the pro-market, pro-corporate policies that caused the inequalities. In other countries, particularly in the United Kingdom (as seen in Brexit) and the United States (Trump’s triumph), the backlash has been directed more pointedly at individuals and institutions that have pushed for globalization policies—free trade, investment liberalization, privatization of public services, and the deregulation of the economy.The Duterte government’s economic agenda that has emerged still embraces and pushes for ‘globalization policies’ and is content with putting in place safeguards to “shield Filipinos from the market volatility spawned by this emerging pattern of resurgent protectionism across the globe,” as Dominguez himself said8, rather than a reversal of such policies.There was expectation that Duterte’s strongman style of governance would be translated into strong government intervention in the economy for more inclusive development. But at the outset, Duterte already disappointed with his pronouncement that he would take a “hands-off” approach to economic policies.  Speaking before business leaders in June 2016 in Davao, he said: “You know I’m a lawyer and I never pretended to be an economist. As a matter of fact, I could hardly pass the economics subject in college.” In typical Duterte jest, the business sector got their assurance that the members of the incoming Cabinet, particularly those in the economic cluster, were positioned to study and adopt their recommendations. Reassuring the business community was a message repeated constantly by Duterte and his cohorts over the course of his first year in office.

Economic ManagersPerhaps the strongest signal to the business community that the economy would be in safe hands under the new administration came with the appointment of known technocrats to handle the economic portfolios.  Duterte’s long time friend and province-mate Carlos “Sonny” Dominguez III was appointed Secretary of the Department of Finance, Benjamin Diokno got his old post back at the Budget and Management, Ernesto Pernia was tasked to head National Planning, and businessman/entrepreneur Ramon Lopez of Go Negosyo was given the Department of Trade and Industry. The economic managers all have impressive academic backgrounds in economics and business management; have had extensive experience in government as well as regional and global institutions like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and International Labor Organization (ILO), and most have direct experience as well in the corporate sector.

Evolution from Populist Rhetoric to Entrenched NeoliberalismTwo days after the election, Duterte’s transition team led by incoming Finance Chief Carlos “Sonny” Dominguez III, unveiled a more consolidated eight-point socio-economic agenda, with the message, especially to the business community, of continuity, predictability, and more decisive government action. The Duterte administration would continue to maintain the current macroeconomic policies centered on tax reforms, including improving income tax system; accelerated infrastructure spending; attracting foreign direct investments by addressing restrictive economic provisions in the Constitution and laws; enhancing economic competitiveness; pursuing a genuine agricultural development strategy, addressing the bottlenecks in land administration and management system; strengthening basic education system and providing scholarships for tertiary education, and; expanding the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program. Dominguez also alluded to what he has called the ‘Davao City model’ of economic governance, where licenses for doing business are given in the shortest possible time and where government is actually helping business to establish in Davao. It also means reducing criminality to give sense of security to businesses.(9) The model would guarantee greater ease of doing business combined with law and order and increased investor security. It is clear that the major demands of the corporate sector—outlined in a proposal dubbed “Sulong Pilipinas: Hakbang Tungo sa Kaunlaran” have been adequately reflected in the broad plan. Some key issues from the electoral campaign like support for agriculture and farmers, overseas Filipino workers, and small businesses have been included in the plan but using a market-oriented lens.  The land issue is seen as a land management and administration problem that needs to be addressed to facilitate more investments, rather than an issue of social justice and redistributive reform. The CCT program, another important and popular demand, was incorporated with a promise to expand coverage.  Conspicuously absent, which were in the campaign promises are ending illegal contractualization and engendering more secure and stronger labor market institutions, a living wage policy, implementation of labor standards, and protection of workers’ rights. According to one NEDA official, this is because many of these popular campaign issues have already been dealt with by the administration even before they can be incorporated in the plan. On the issue of ending “endo” or end of contract practice, the ‘swift response’ came in the form of Department Order 174 issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), which amended labor code provisions contracting and sub-contracting. Progressive labor union SENTRO has lambasted Labor Secretary Silvestre Bello III and his DO 174 saying it “ensured the continued practice and prevalence (of contractualization) rather than putting an end to it.” SENTRO lamented that “workers now are worse off than ever before because DO 174 merely continues DOLE’s failed policies to regulate contracting out of labor.”(10) 

Philippine Development Plan (2017-2022)

The zero plus 10 agenda is further consolidated into the Philippine Development Plan (2017-2022). This medium-term plan hopes to establish the foundations for inclusive growth, resilient society, and a globally competitive knowledge economy. A few things stand out from this PDP. First is its reference to a long-term vision outlined in a document called AmBisyon Natin 2040. AmBisyon is a project initiated by NEDA towards the end of the Aquino regime but was formally adopted under Duterte.  In his foreword to the PDP, Duterte said that AmBisyon is the  manifestation of  “bold vision and effective development planning” based on a “forward-looking approach that goes beyond a single administration.”(11) AmBisyon is a major achievement of NEDA, one that sets our country into a 25-year growth and development trajectory anchored supposedly on articulated aspirations of the Filipino for a simple and comfortable life. 

Secondly, the new PDP espouses a National Spatial Strategy (NSS) that will set the direction of future growth. Development will be pursued in relation to a three-tiered network of settlements linking sub-regional and regional centers to larger metropolitan centers. The strategy recognizes the pivotal role played by cities “as engines of economic growth and venues of growth and poverty reduction, and infrastructure to provide efficient connective networks of sustainable urban and rural communities.”(12)

The NSS is not a new idea. It has been articulated in past plans as a strategy to equalize access to development opportunities across geographic areas, and by so doing decongest Metro Manila. The NSS however seems to have found greater resonance and meaning under Duterte with his tirades against Imperial Manila and rhetoric to spread the wealth by promoting investments to underdeveloped regions like Mindanao. The key question at this point however is whether the rhetoric can be matched with action.

First quarter 2017 data on investments show that Luzon is still the preferred investment area for both foreign and Filipino investors. Calabarzon and NCR combined account for almost 70 percent of total investments.  The whole of Mindanao only accounted for less than 10 percent of total investments.(13)

The plan has very lofty targets as well. It envisions the Philippines reaching upper middle-income status by 2022, which means a per capita income of between $4,036 and $12,475; lower poverty incidence from 21.6 percent in 2015 to 14.0 percent by 2022. The plan also hopes to achieve high level of human development and reduce unemployment from the current 5.5 percent to 3-5 percent in 2022.  There is also a target to slightly increase the contribution of industry to the economy by 8.1 to 9.1 percent by 2022. Likewise, a slight increase in the contribution of services by 7.9 percent is targeted in the plan.

Addressing inequality has been rightfully identified as a key concern, as the Duterte’s plan echoes Aquino’s call for more inclusive development. The plan dedicates a whole pillar dubbed “Pagbabago” or inequality-reducing transformation and defines broad strategies under this to expand and increase access to economic opportunities in all sectors (agriculture, fisheries and forestry, industry and services); accelerate human capital development; and reduce vulnerability of individuals. Strategic trade and fiscal policies will be implemented, macroeconomic stability will be maintained, and increased competition promoted.

Forty percent of the country’s total employment in 2015 came from the combined contribution of agriculture, fisheries and forestry, and manufacturing sectors.(14) The push for an increased contribution of agriculture (see Continuity or Change?: Unpacking Duterte’s Agenda for the Countryside on page 16) and industry, in particular the manufacturing sector, to the economy will be crucial in addressing inequality.  Despite recent growth in the manufacturing sector, the overall contribution of industry to GDP has stagnated over the years at around 30.8 percent of GDP.(15) 

Manufacturing’s share in employment has been stagnant for the past decade, contributing only around eight percent. There has to be a clear plan towards resurgence in the manufacturing sector. Unfortunately, there is not even a mention of industrial policy nor a reference to the industry plans generated in previous years. What is there instead is bias towards more trade liberalization, foreign investments, and linking to global value chains. Essentially repeating the same mistakes committed in the past despite, what even neoliberal economists have noted, the inability of Philippine industry to adjust to a less protected economic environment.16The emphasis in the strategies is still pretty much towards market-oriented reforms, such as investment liberalization that would include the planned removal of restrictions on foreign ownership in the Constitution, ease of doing business, free trade, among others. This is a cause of alarm since studies even by proponents of neoliberal policies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have shown that policies that push “globalization and market-oriented reforms have driven rising inequality in Asia through capital, skill, and spatial biases.”(17)

The coup de grâce, easily the most promoted and central component of Dutertenomics is massive, multi-trillion peso infrastructure program (see Stories Behind the Numbers: Dissecting Duterte’s Build, Build, Build Program on page 9) aimed at spurring and accelerating further economic growth in the next five years. A key concern here is whether the bravado will be matched with the technical and financial capacity to manage these projects.

Whither Neoliberalism?

In the book State of Fragmentation: The Philippines in Transition (2014), Focus wrote about the “emerging consensus that the future of the Philippine economy lies in reversing three decades of neoliberal self-destruction and whether there is political will to take the country in this direction.”(18)

A year on since Duterte assumed office, we have seen the continued push for neoliberal policies on trade and investment. The minimial role that government has taken on in economic affairs, and merely to preserve law and order, to enforce contracts, and to foster competitive markets, is consistent with the neoliberal prescription.   Two parameters put forward in the State of Fragmentation are worth examining in this regard; the balance of public investments versus debt servicing and the globalization of the Philippine economy.

On public investments, budget secretary Benjamin Diokno has described the 2017 national budget as an “expansionary budget,” pointing out that at 21 percent of GDP, “it is much higher than the average government spending at 17 percent of GDP over the last decade.”19 To finance the budget, the government is planning to increase the deficit to three percent for the next three years (2017-2019). Aside from revenues, government expenditures will also be covered by borrowings estimated to be around $631.3 billion for 2017, 80 percent of which will be sourced from domestic sources. On a positive note, debt to GDP ratio continues its downward trend in the last five years, with national government debt now only at 41.6 percent of GDP. The government expects debt to decline further to 38.08 of GDP midway into Duterte’s term.

The amount for public debt transactions in the budget will decrease from 419.3 billion in 2016 to 351.6 billion in 2017. But compared to social spending, the debt payments continue to corner a larger amount of the budget.  The budget for primary education is lower by 149.7 billion. For conditional cash transfer, the allocation of 78.69 billion for 2017 is lower by 272 billion compared to the allocation for debt payments. 

Furthermore, there are recent reports indicating a surge in debt payments with the amount of debt paid by the government tripling to 78.387 billion in May 2017 as both amortization and interest payments rose. With the massive infrastructure projects in the works, the Bureau of Treasury expects that Philippine debt will hit 7 trillion by 2018. 

State of Fragmentation further outlined two aspects by which the Philippine economy has been globalized: the disarticulation or disintegration of the national economy, leading to a crisis in agriculture, industry, and services; and on the other hand the articulation or integration of key dimensions of the economy at the global level. 

There is no doubt that trade remains an important component of the Philippine economy. While trade to GDP ratio has declined in the first three years under Aquino from 71.4 percent in 2010 to 60.24 in 2013, the lowest in nearly three decades, trade’s contribution to the economy was on an upward trend after 2013, reaching 64.9 percent in 2016.(20)

Duterte’s economic plan is pushing for increased exports and an expansion of our engagement in free trade and investment agreements (FTAs). When the Duterte government says it will expand these engagements, it will confront a changed global policy environment. The so-called 21st century trade and investment regime emphasizes trade in tasks under transnational corporations (TNCs) dominated global value chains, ambitious new generation, and mega FTAs that will increase investor protection and higher standards on intellectual property rights, and both physical and institutional connectivity. 

The push for Chinese investments is another area that is worth examining closely not just because of the concerns over increasing  loans from China to finance the massive infrastructure projects, but also in terms of subsuming our own development goals to Chinese economic interests.

In the absence of a clear industrial policy, it is unclear whether the massive development projects being pursued by the administration could translate into overall economic development or would only be beneficial to the lenders who finance these projects and the contractors of the projects.

What is clear after one year is that the economic agenda of Duterte has been consolidated, with infrastructure investments at the front and center. Government is taking on the primary tasks of preserving law and order, enforcing contracts, and fostering competitive markets, which are straight out of the neoliberal economic rulebook. While it is trying to put in place a hybrid model or approach in project development and implementation, the overall agenda remains corporate-driven and market-oriented.  

_{1Net Foreign Direct Investments. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas . Online: http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/spei_new/tab9_fdi.htm}

_{2Social Weather Stations (SWS) February 2016 Pre-election Survey. Online: https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-2016031111...}

_{3PNoy’s speech at the PHL Stock Exchange’s 20th anniversary. GMA News Online. December 2012. Online: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/personalfinance/284819/pnoy-s-speec...}

_{4Tupaz, E and Wagner, D. Aquino’s Legacy in the Philippines. July 2015. HuffingtonPost. Online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edsel-tupaz/aquinos-legacy-in-the-phi_b_79...}

_{5Income inequality, Gini coefficient data. UNDP Human Development Data (1990-2015). Online: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data#}

_{6United Nations Human Development Report 2016. Online: http://report.hdr.undp.org/}

_{7Lim, J. An Assessment of the Economic Performance of the Administration of Benigno S. Aquino III. Action for Economic Reforms (AER)-Industrial Policy Team Special Report. March 2016.}

_{8Department of Finance News and Views. Inclusive growth is Gov’t response to failures of globalization—Dominguez. November 2016. Online: http://www.dof.gov.ph/index.php/inclusive-growth-is-govt-response-to-fai...}

_{9Video of Incoming Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez’s presentation efore media.  12 May 2016. http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/132850-duterte-8-p...}

_{10SENTRO. Keeping ‘endo’ alive: DOLE’s Department Order No. 174. Rappler. Online: http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/164921-endo-contractualization-al...}

_{11President Duterte’s foreword to the Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022. National Economic Development Authority (NEDA). Online: http://pdp.neda.gov.ph/}

_{12Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022. National Economic Development Authority (NEDA). Online: http://pdp.neda.gov.ph/}

_{13Total approved foreign investments by region. Philippine Statistical Authority (PSA) 2017. Online: https://psa.gov.ph/foreign-investments-press-releases/tables14Asian Development Bank (ADB). Key Indicators Asia and the Pacific 2016. Online: https://www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-asia-and-pacific-201615https://www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-asia-and-pacific-201616Balisacan, A., and H. Hill, eds. The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 2003.}

_{17Jain-Chandra, S et al. Sharing the Growth Dividend: Analysis of Inequality in Asia. IMF Working Paper. International Monetary Fund. March 2016. Online: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp1648.pdf}

_{18Bello, Walden, et al State of Fragmentation: The Philippines in Transition. Focus on the Global South. 2014. Freidrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation.} 

_{19Diokno, B. Foreword to the 2017 Peoples Proposed Budget. Department of Budget and Management. September 2016.}

_{20Trade (% of GDP).World Bank data. Online: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?locations=PH}

By Mary Ann Manahan

The Duterte administration heralds the next five years as the “Golden Age of Infrastructure.”  Infrastructure development is envisaged to support the three pillars of the 2017-2022 Philippine Development Plan (PDP), namely malasakit (enhancing social fabric), pagbabago (inequality-reducing transformation), and patuloy na pag-unlad (ensuring growth potential).  The country lags behind in Southeast Asia in terms of infrastructure quality and spending. As a bold move, the Duterte administration commits to boost public spending for infrastructure from the current 5.1 percent to 7.4 percent of gross domestic product by end of his term.^[1] Further strengthening the commitment is the creation of an infrastructure cluster headed by Secretary Carlos Dominguez III of the Department of Finance to lead this initiative. 

During the first quarter of 2017, Duterte’s economic managers unveiled the $160 billion or 8.2 trillion infrastructure plan before foreign investors and the Filipino business community. Build, Build, Build^[2] (BBB) is coordinated by the country’s major infrastructure agencies, namely the Department of Transportation (DoTr), Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH), Bases Conversion Development Agency (BCDA), and the National Economic and Development Agency (NEDA). The administration claims that having these agencies coordinate is to be a historical first. Based on government’s data, about 61 projects^[3] worth 1.7 trillion[4], which are in various stages of project development and implementation, are included in the initial list. 

The government sees infrastructure development as the solution to job generation, transportation and traffic woes, and high prices of goods and services. According to the International Labor Organization’s estimate for developing countries, for every $1 billion spent on infrastructure, about 200,000 direct jobs are created, which certainly forms part of the government’s strategy for unemployment rate reduction of 3-5 percent or six million new jobs by 2022.[5]

Three Components

The Duterte administration hopes to attract more investments into the country by focusing on three components: (1) building more railways, urban mass transport, airports and seaports, (2) more bridges and roads, and (3) new and better cities. These components underpin the PDP’s National Spatial Strategy (NSS), which recognizes the role and comparative advantages of cities as engines of economic growth, poverty reduction, and infrastructure development “to provide efficient connective networks of sustainable urban and rural communities.”^[6] The NSS is a strategy discussed and adopted among the country’s technocrats during the tail end of former President Benigno Aquino III’s government and has found its way as a key framework under the President Duterte’s PDP.

Under BBB, DoTr will implement more than half of the infrastructure projects worth 1.17 billion. DPWH will handle 15 projects with an estimated cost of over 276 billion, while BCDA will implement 11 projects, which are new cities or special economic zones (SEZs) which would cost 317 billion. Figure 1 shows that 29.5 percent or 18 projects have been earmarked for improvement or building of new airports. This will be followed by building of roads and bridges, almost 20 percent or 12 projects in total. About 11 new railway projects will be constructed that are mostly carry-over from the previous government of Benigno Aquino III. The top five most expensive infrastructure projects are all railways; the Mega Manila Subway estimated at 227 billion would be the top project. The subway will be a 25-kilometer underground mass transportation system that will connect major business districts and government centers in the capital and is expected to serve about 370,000 passengers per day. 

Addressing the infrastructure deficit of the country has been a major demand of different sections of Philippine society. Almost every Filipino has argued for more quality roads and bridges, improved airport facilities, and mass transport systems for everyday mobility and to ease people’s lives. Memories of ‘carmaggedon’ along EDSA linger and decongesting major cities is one of the campaign promises of President Duterte. Common sense and economic expertise also dictate that infrastructure have “a multiplier effect to existing industries as well as linkage effect, in the sense that it can spur new enterprises.”^[7]

But has President Duterte delivered on his promise? Has the first year laid the foundation to support his PDP’s three pillars of malasakit, pagbabago, and patuloy na pag-unlad? 

Figure 1: Distribution of Build, Build, Build Projects by Sector

Lion’s Share for ‘Imperial Luzon’

President Duterte promised to expand to the periphery. This would mean focusing on the neglected regions of the Visayas and Mindanao via more public spending and ending the domination of ‘Imperial Manila’ through a shift to federalism. Coupled with his plans to build new SEZs in every nook and cranny of the country, BBB is peddled as a tool to facilitate not only the flow of trades, goods, people, and investments but also spur economic activities and consequently reduce poverty in the periphery. 

However, the Duterte administration will follow the same pattern of skewed distribution of public infrastructure projects of the past. Government’s data reveal that ‘Imperial Luzon’, which covers the regions of Metro Manila, Central Luzon, and CALABARZON, where less than 40 percent of the total national population lives, would still be the geographic priority of the infrastructure projects, both in terms of total number and total value/estimated costs. In terms of number, the map below illustrates how Luzon will get a total of 27 projects, while the regions in the Visayas and Mindanao combined will only get 18 projects. Even for projects that will cover inter-regional/multiple regions, majority of them will be in Luzon. 

In terms of combined value/costs, Central Luzon leads with 564.45 billion worth of projects, followed by interregional/multi-regional (mostly located in Luzon) for 533.18 billion and Metro Manila accounting for almost 366 billion. Altogether, they comprise 82.9 percent of all infrastructure projects’ costs, which is similar to the previous administration’s infrastructure spending.8 These two regions plus CALABARZON accounted for almost two-thirds of the GDP from 2014-2016, and hence, the historical/current focus (see Table 1). The projects in Central Luzon will involve three railways, six components of Clark Green City, an airport and a road/bridge. Metro Manila gets five mass transit, two railways, four roads and bridges, and two flood control projects. Compared to other infrastructure, railways are most expensive. 

Unfortunately, projects for the Visayas and Mindanao will account for only 12.9 percent of combined costs or 227.644 billion, more than half are to be allocated for airport development, operations, and maintenance. The remaining projects involve mass transit, flood control, road/bridge, and railway (see Table 2).

Government Takeover and ‘Hybrid PPP’

What is qualitatively different from the past administrations is the shift from Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) to government spending as the main financing mode. Figure 2 shows that more than half of the projects will be sourced from the General Appropriations Act (GAA) and official development assistance (ODA) including Chinese ODA. The combined value is estimated at 1.1 trillion, 90 percent of which are ODA. 

Duterte’s economic managers have criticized PPP as slow in terms of taking off ground. Government has taken over the operation and modernization of five regional airports in Davao, Bacolod, Iloilo, Laguindingan, and Bohol as well as the improvement of Clark International Airport, all of which were included in the PPP list during Aquino’s erm.9 As mentioned above, the current government prefers to source financing from taxes and ODA, especially Chinese ODA. On May 2017, President Duterte made a pitch of the BBB program before global leaders present at the Belt and  Road Forum in Beijing, China. He explained that the country’s program can “complement regional and international connectivity mechanisms, such as China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and the ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity.”[^10] The Philippines however is not included in OBOR, a multi-trillion-dollar, massive undertaking to build infrastructure networks to connect Asia and Europe, involving around 60 countries. As part of its pivot to China, the government hopes to be part of this initiative. 

This policy shift has hit the pause button on the battle of Filipino billionaires, particularly on who will bag the $1.5 billion new international airport construction, the subject of unsolicited proposals from the private sector. San Miguel Corporation, Ayala, Metro Pacific Investments Corporation, Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. and Henry Sy’s SM group have all tendered their proposals to the Duterte government. But the government has yet to issue a decision.^[11] 

The private sector has expressed their concern over what they deem as government takeover, citing that the government is not the best stakeholder to handle infrastructure projects. Based on the PPP Center’s data, 20 projects in the pipeline (MRT Line 6, NAIA PPP Project, North-South Railway Project - South Line - Operations and Maintenance Component, etc.) would be affected by this policy shift.^[12] However, Secretary Dominguez has allayed their fears by explaining that a hybrid PPP is underway, which means that government will take the initial steps to jumpstart the construction and “the PPP component will come later when the operations and maintenance of the project are bid out to the private sector”.^[13] This is somewhat a reverse Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), a scheme commonly adopted in infrastructure projects in the country by governments after Marcos, in which the private sector receives a concession or contract from the state or public sector to fund, design, and construct infrastructure projects and then transfers the operation and maintenance back to the state/public entity. 

Concerns About BBB

Infrastructure, especially those that promote universal public provision of goods and services, people’s mobility, and a life with dignity are necessary. Government/public spending under BBB is crucial as past experiences have exposed the weaknesses and contract anomalies as well as demystified the non-transparent PPP processes and false promises, all designed to protect corporate profits (e.g. Laguna Lake dredging, NorthRail and Roll-on, Roll-off). These are fundamentally incompatible with ensuring universal access to quality public services (see Duterte’s Social Development Agenda: Radical Change or Business as Usual? on page 37) and protecting the environment. 

However, there are concerns about the current state of BBB. One, as mentioned above, Luzon still gets the bigger share of the pie. Second, some of the projects did not follow the usual project cycle and are now ongoing construction, even without accomplishing specific tasks under project procurement or the endorsement of the NEDA Investment Coordinating Committee, the body that reviews all investment projects in the country. Only 25 out of the 61 projects have completed an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and four of them are already being implemented without one. Bypassing processes can generate social and environmental problems.

The proclivity for fast-tracking projects is exemplified by the road heightening and tide embankment project in typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)-affected communities in Leyte province. The Community of Yolanda Survivors and Partners (CYSP), a consortium of affected communities and NGOs monitoring the government’s recovery and rehabilitation efforts in the Yolanda corridor, has pointed out the project’s threats to the livelihood and survival of the coastal communities, with potential displacement that can exacerbate their existing vulnerabilities. A 2016 study conducted by the Center for Environmental Concerns stated that the said project can lead to the loss of 97 hectares of mangrove forest and wetlands, citing the project’s own EIA.^[14] Still, despite these warnings, the project went ahead, with DPWH Region 8 admitting in a public consultation that they had been pressured to produce results by the national government. 

Third, the initial projects intend to facilitate the activities of the middle class, more than the poorer sections of Philippine society. This is consistent with AmBisyon 2040, the country’s new long-term vision to become an upper middle-class country. Many of Duterte’s infrastructure projects involve right-of-way, possible displacement of urban poor communities, clearing of lands, and cutting of trees. Infrastructure costs are much higher if socio-environmental impacts are considered. 

Finally, the involvement of Chinese ODA and investments raises a red flag. Experiences of Africa, neighboring Southeast Asian countries, and the Philippines have demonstrated the bad practices in terms of corruption (e.g. NBN-ZTE deal), labor rights violation, environmental degradation, and land grabbing by Chinese companies. Therefore, it may not be a surprise if struggles and conflicts around infrastructure projects escalate and intensify in the next five years. 

Given these concerns, one could not help but anticipate that the socio-economic and environmental costs of BBB will be borne by those already marginalized and vulnerable, negating Duterte’s promise of malasakit and pagbabago. 

------

^{1 NEDA (2017), Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022, NEDA, Ortigas Center.}

^{2 BBB’s website does not include 33 projects from NEDA’s database, which totals 248.05 billion. NEDA’s database also contains the complete Consolidated Infrastructure Investment Program, which details infrastructure projects by other government agencies.} 

^{3 The budget for four projects are yet to be determined. These are BCDA Smart City Solutions, Central Spine RORO Alignment Project, New Clark City-Mixed Use Industrial Real Estate Developments, and New Clark City- Agro-Industrial Park. The last two are part of the Clark Green City initiative which started during Benigno Aquino III’s government.}

^{4 Based on the datasets of PPP and BBB, there is a variance of 7.8 billion in budget estimation, mainly from the PPP projects of DoT and DPWH.} 

^{5 NEDA (2017), Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022, NEDA, Ortigas Center.}

^{6 Ibid., p. 36.}

^{7 Comment by James Matthew Milaflor of the Institute of Popular Democracy, posted on the author’s  Facebook page. This is response to a crowd sourcing question: “is an aggressive government spending a sound policy as long as it’s done for better infrastructure, job generation and poverty reduction/ public goods objectives, even if it will lead to a fiscal deficit? What’s your take?”}

^{8 Forbes Philippines (2016) “Leader Board: Public Infrastructure, Imperial Regions”, Philippines.}

^{9 Philippine Daily Inquirer (2017), “Unexpected policy shift”, PDI, Editorial.}

^{10 Corrales, N. (2017), “Duterte pushes Build, Build, Build program at Beijing Forum, Philippine Daily Inquirer.}

^{11 Mukharjee, A. (2017), Frustrated in the Philippines, Bloomberg Gadfly, March 28, 2017.}

^{12 “Unexpected policy shift”.}

^{13 Ibid.}

^{14 Center for Environmental Concerns (2016), “Dinhi kami nabubuhi” (We live here), unpublished manuscript, Development and Peace Caritas Canada, Quezon City.}

by Mary Ann Manahan

Candidate Rodrigo Roa Duterte promised a break from the past, by prioritizing the rural sector, focusing on smallholder agriculture, providing free irrigation to farmers, and addressing long-standing issues of agrarian and land reform. He criticized the 29-year old Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) by describing it as a ‘farce and total failure’ and planned to discontinue it.[1] He expressed support for the release of the P100 billion worth of accumulated coco levy assets to coconut farmers, stating that the “levy is an emotional issue… and should be given to the farmers”.[2] On March 2016, President Duterte and his then-running mate, Alan Peter Cayetano, signed a manifesto in front of farmer beneficiaries promising the immediate release of the coconut levy funds and pledged to develop 600,000 hectares of new coconut farms.

These campaign promises were made in the context of decades of government neglect and liberalization policies that have contributed to the perennial issues faced by the countryside. The Philippine agriculture sector has been in a dismal state for decades. In the first quarter of 2017, its contribution to the country’s national output was a measly 0.05 percent, compared to that of industry at 2.1 percent, and services at 3.8 percent.[3] Farming and fishing households can barely keep up, hampered by perennial problems of low productivity and incomes. The share of agriculture in total employment also declined from 31 percent in 2013 to 29 percent in 2015.[4] Farmers and fisherfolks had the highest poverty incidences among the basic sectors in 2015 at 34.3 percent and 34 percent, respectively. These sectors had consistently registered higher poverty incidence than the rest of the country.[5]

When he won the presidency, Duterte committed to tackle food security, ensure the affordability and availability of food to Filipinos, and distribute the coco levy funds to farmers in his first 100 days in office. He pledged to focus on Mindanao’s great potential as the country’s food basket, and to spread the wealth to regions that lagged behind. He also declared to get rid of traders and loan sharks in the agricultural value chain. 

What Has He Done so Far?

His appointments of peasant movement leader Rafael Mariano and Emmanuel Piñol, former sportswriter, farmer, and governor of North Cotabato, to the Departments of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Agriculture (DA), respectively, signaled a pro-small farmer and pro-poor agenda of upholding farmers’ rights and reprioritizing agrarian reform and smallholder agriculture. Before he assumed office, Sec. Mariano announced that “no farmer will be displaced under his watch,” and that DAR will undertake a review and reversal of anti-famer decisions and a moratorium on land use conversion, and stop the cancellation of farmers’ certificate of land ownership awards (CLOAs) and land titles distributed under CARP.[6] Mariano also said that his first 100 days in office will usher in the beginning of a “genuine land reform program” and that he will investigate the anomalies in Hacienda Luisita as well as other  onerous contracts in corporative schemes used by landlords and corporations as mechanisms to avoid land distribution.  

For his part, Sec. Piñol, who had been an ardent supporter of President Duterte during his campaign, said he vowed to end corruption in the DA, provide affordable food for the people, and increase agricultural productivity. His major thrusts would include “100 percent rice self-sufficiency by 2018,” institutional defragmentation by bringing back the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), National Irrigation Administration (NIA), National Food Authority (NFA), and Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority under the DA umbrella; he would also stop the smuggling of rice and other agricultural products⁷ and provide free irrigation services to small farmers. 

President Duterte’s zero+10-point socio-economic agenda (see article on Dutertenomics: Recipe for Inclusive Development or Deeper Inequality? on page 3) also focuses on agricultural and rural development, aiming to facilitate rural investments through land tenure security and improve the quality of life of Filipino farmers and fisherfolk. The administration aims to reverse of the negative contribution of agriculture, fisheries, and forestry to the economy while increasing the sectors’ growth and productivity. Under the populist rhetoric of “change is coming,” his agenda for the countryside intends to shake up the system that has entrenched inequality, poverty, and marginalization of farmers. 

ut a year hence, the Duterte administration’s agriculture, agrarian, and rural development agenda (agri-agra) can be best described as schizophrenic because of the contradictions: populist promises in favor of the marginalized and poor in the countryside, on one hand, and on the other, a strong bias for agribusiness and big players in the sector manifested in a number of policies or programs.

This schizophrenia can be gleaned in the contradictions between policy direction and concrete actions undertaken by the Cabinet. 

Competing Frameworks

The Philippine Development Plan (2017-2022) has an inequality-reducing transformation pillar in its principle called pagbabago, but which unfortunately reiterates the unchallenged assumptions that small farmers, fisherfolk, and forest users have limited economic/market participation, and by nature, are uncompetitive; and that only by linking them to markets and fostering agricultural value chains through partnerships with agribusiness firms can they improve their competitiveness, income, and welfare. The government’s zero plus 10 agenda also outlines the need to organize farms into clusters to create economies of scale as a strategy to increase productivity and growth. 

The PDP highlights the National Spatial Strategy (NSS) as an underpinning framework, which recognizes “the role and comparative advantages of cities as engines of economic growth and poverty reduction, and infrastructure development to provide efficient connective networks of sustainable urban and rural communities. (see Stories Behind the Numbers: Dissecting Duterte’s Build, Build, Build Program on page 9).  The idea of linking small farmers to markets and value chains complements the NSS in terms of one, central and growth pole thinking, which argues for the need to establish and maintain growth centers that can disperse growth more evenly across regions (a legacy of the Marcos dictatorship years), and two, that urban-to-rural linkages and connectivity via infrastructure can increase local and foreign investments for growth centers and improved market access. 

The best illustration of this thinking is President Duterte’s focus on special economic zones (SEZs). President Duterte appointed Charito B. Plaza as the new Director General of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) in September 2016.[8] Plaza has stated her wish to establish new economic zones in every province and city in accordance to President Duterte’s campaign pronouncements. Plaza said that special economic zones will encourage investment and job creation in the country particularly in underdeveloped region, further stating that “we have to make every land productive and utilized so every province and every city have different potentials.”[9] 

These strategies run counter to populist policies of DAR Secretary Mariano, who has temporarily stopped the partnerships with agribusiness firms, also known as agricultural/alternative venture agreements (AVAS). His department has been conducting a review of all AVAs in the country and has ordered to rescind two onerous contracts involving banana plantations in Mindanao. 

Farmers’ groups including Sec. Mariano’s Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement of the Philippines) have consistently slammed AVAs because they provide inadequate support services, they don’t transfer control of land and production to the tillers, and they promote unjust contracts.[10] Focus on the Global South’s own research has shown that these schemes have facilitated “ownership without control” of the land on the part of the tillers because former landowners or big conglomerates such as DOLE or Del Monte lock new ARBs into long-term contracts lasting for 25 years.[11] DAR’s actions around AVAs, considered long-overdue, were welcomed by farmers and agrarian reform advocates. 

Policies on Rice Self-sufficiency, Free Irrigation, and Land Use Conversion 

The policies on rice self-sufficiency, free irrigation, and land use conversion also show competing interests. 

Last year, Sec. Piñol approved the free irrigation program and the implementation of the Corporate Farming System. Free irrigation was a campaign promise of Duterte meant to subsidize small farmers, to which NIA protested. NIA argued that this policy will cost them an annual revenue loss of 4 billion from irrigation fees from farmers around the country. But President Duterte assured that the loss in revenue will instead be sourced from the national budget. 

Sec. Piñol’s Corporate Farming System is another subsidized program aimed at enhancing the country’s rice sufficiency and cutting dependence on imported rice by improving production via contract farming agreements between local government units (LGUs) and farmers. According to Piñol, LGUs will finance the seeds and fertilizer requirements of farmers through the Land Bank, and after the cropping season, the DA will buy the farmers’ rice produce. The LGUs will set up rice retail outlets called “bigasan ng masa,” where beneficiaries of the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) “could withdraw their monthly rice allowances” and which other poor families could use to purchase their rice needs.[12] The Department of Social Welfare and Development which handles the national CCT rice supply program will then pay the LGUs. The scheme, as recommended by President Duterte, intends to engage farmers’ associations and cooperatives in a bid to empower them. Three pilot areas have already been identified: Quezon City as a model representing the urban non-agricultural area, and Kidapawan City and Quirino province as areas with rice fields. The program is expected to generate at least 50 million in a 5,000 hectares of farm land per cropping season, benefit the farmers with increased productivity, and support the CCT program. 

On the other hand, Duterte’s economic managers have pushed for the lifting of quantitative restriction (QRs) in rice, which will affect not only Sec. Piñol’s program but also the country’s rice farmers. QRs are mechanisms to limit the country’s rice importation and NEDA wants it removed, and its position has found its way in the current PDP. NEDA has also suggested that the DA shift its focus on providing farmers with more and diversified livelihood and income opportunities. The DA, on the other hand, has endorsed the extension of Executive Order (EO) 190, which imposes tariff rates for imported agricultural products including rice. Sec. Piñol has sided with rice farmers, citing that they are not ready to compete with imported rice and the fault is not theirs.[13]

Meanwhile, on September 2016, during the 35th Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) meeting held in Malacañang, President Duterte expressed his support for a two-year moratorium on conversion of agricultural lands and ordered the Land Bank to provide more aid for CARP implementation. From July 2010 to May 2016, DAR had a total of 142 applications for conversion of CARP lands to non-agricultural uses, of which 101 applications covering 2,496 hectares were approved and 41 applications representing 1,397 hectares denied.[14] 

NEDA has rejected the proposal for moratorium, citing that the policy is anti-poor as this would “prevent the government and the private sector from addressing the 5.5 million backlog in housing units,”[15] earmarked for the poor. NEDA Secretary Pernia argued that many lands were better suited for housing than agriculture. Former housing secretary and Vice President Leni Robredo sided with NEDA. As a result, the proposed executive order is still being discussed in the cabinet, on its sixth draft, and it is uncertain when the order for moratorium will finally come out. 

Genuine Agrarian Reform or Unrestricted Land Markets?

Sec. Mariano’s symbolic move to open the department’s two main gates and dismantle the fences aimed at controlling ‘farmers protesting’, which were erected by former Sec. Virgilio delos Reyes has signified an ‘open door policy’. His office’s first order of business was to reverse the anti-farmer policies of his predecessor, such as the administrative the administrative orders which will remove the attestation by the landowners that the farmer is his/her tenant and institute new rules to expedite agrarian reform implementation. He also ordered the conduct of an inventory of the status of CARP lands (those that were distributed as well as pending land distribution cases) to know whether farmers are still in control of their lands. This inventory will include the 621,085 hectares that remain undistributed as of January 2016 and six million hectares of lands which may have been exempted from the CARP due to circumventions by landlords.16 Figure 1 shows that majority of the remaining lands up for distribution are contentious landholdings, which should be redistributed through compulsory acquisition covering 410,332 hectares. On February 2017, Sec. Mariano announced the 120 billion was to be allotted to the entire agricultural sectors of which 9.8 billion will be earmarked for land distribution of around 48,000 hectares of agricultural lands this year, which is one of the lowest targets in CARP history. 

His policy issuances are part not only of the new thrusts for agrarian reform and free land distribution under Duterte but also of the peace talks between the government and National Democratic Front. For the former, President Duterte has convened the PARC three times since he took office, which is significant since PARC has not met for the last 10 years notably under Aquino’s term. But within the cabinet, Duterte’s economic managers have criticized Sec. Mariano’s proposal of free land distribution arguing that it will restrict the development of a rural land market, which according to them has kept farmers poor. Instead, they have proposed a property rights regime with no agricultural land ceiling as the way forward. Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez III called for the harmonization of land use laws as a way to resolve the burgeoning land governance crisis he talked about at a conference of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) this year; the rationale was to attract foreign investment. Further, charter change, specifically the removal of restrictive economic provisions including foreign ownership in lands in the 1987 Constitution, is a legislative priority (and mentioned in the PDP) under Duterte. This certainly is contradictory to agrarian reform as a social justice measure. 

Farmers’ Concerns

Beyond the national debates and inconsistencies in public policies on agriculture and agrarian reform, farmers continue to lament the unfulfilled promises, unchanged situation, and slow implementation of reforms on the ground.  

For one, President Duterte, despite his strongman leadership style, has failed to recover the coconut levy funds, return it to 3.5 million coconut farmers, and enact a law for the utilization of the fund and development of the coconut industry. According to Sec. Piñol, the President has ordered the release of the coconut levy fund but there is no directive to Congress to act on a pending bill on the coconut levy. Eduardo Mora, sectoral representative of the National Anti-Poverty Commission’s council of farmers, landless and rural workers, and lead convenor of Kilusang Magniniyog, expressed his disappointment over the lack of action on the passage of the bill in Congress, controlled by the President’s majority coalition.  

Secondly, the implementation of agrarian reform remains slow and incomplete. Farmers from Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (KMBP) have called Sec. Mariano’s attention and non-action in distributing their CLOAs. Maribel Luzara, leader of KMBP, expressed that “Ka Paeng needs to distribute our titles since there is no more legal impediment to land redistribution. What is holding back Ka Paeng from doing this? Only he can answer”. Meanwhile, 1,200 farmworkers belonging to the ECJ CLOA Holders Association are also waiting for Sec. Mariano’s decision on their demand to rescind the 19-year old  joint venture agreement between them and Danding Cojuangco, which covers 4,661 hectares of sugar lands in Negros Occidental.[17] Further, while Sec. Mariano has asserted the ownership of farmers in Hacienda Luisita and committed to resolve the existing arriendo (informal land lease/selling) system, he has yet to make any pronouncement about ensuring the smooth agrarian transition and provision of support services that can increase ARB’s rural incomes and usher in lasting peace and life with dignity in the hacienda. 

Third, the government has failed to address food security. Achieving rice self-sufficiency has been pushed back to 2020, with Sec. Piñol pointing to budgetary cuts as the primary reason. With the uncertainty about the moratorium on land use conversion that directly impacts food security, coupled with SEZs as a focus, farmers under the Save Agrarian Reform Alliance fear that rampant land use conversions and displacements will be the order of the day. 

Finally, farmers continue to experience different kinds of harassments and human rights violations. Three famer leaders were gunned down on different occasions in Compostela Valley, Sariaya, Quezon, and Calatagan, Batangas in June 2017. The leaders were frontliners and known to stand up against big businesses. Thirty-seven farmers, including 10 women, also faced imprisonment, as landowners of a large coconut estate in Bondoc Peninsula had filed 19 criminal cases of theft against them in 2016. Farmers like Ka Isidro Perez from Rizal fear that the ‘war on drugs’ may spill over into their communities. (see War on Drugs: “Punishing the Poor” on page 44).

What the first year has demonstrated is that the competing frameworks and interests pushed by the different agencies on agriculture and agrarian reform are glaring signs that long-standing issues affecting farmers and rural communities may not be resolved soon or during Duterte’s term, and that the trajectory of this government is about continuing past policies and programs proven detrimental to farmers. 

1This comment is attributed to his close ties and alliance with the National Democratic movement, which seeks free land distribution as one of its demands in the peace talks with the government. See http://www.inquirer.net/duterte/promises# for more information.    

2Ranada, P. (2016) “Duterte, Cayetano vow ‘return’ of coco levy fund in 1st 100 days”, Rappler, http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/127671-duterte-cay... (Accessed: June 10, 2017)

3Philippine Statistics Authority (2017) “National Accounts Q1 2017”, http://psa.gov.ph/content/philippine-economy-posts-64-percent-gdp-growth... (Accessed: July 15, 2017)

4Philippine Statistical Authority (2015) “CountrySTAT Philippines: Philippine Agriculture in Figures, 2015” Accessed at http://countrystat.psa.gov.ph/?cont=3 (July 16, 2017)

5The national poverty incidences for 2006, 2012, and 2015 recorded a consistent 34 percent poverty rate for farmers and fishers.

6Philippine Daily Inquirer (2016) “Incoming DAR Head Vows: No Farmers displaced from their lands” http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/788661/incoming-dar-head-vows-no-farmers-di... (Accessed: May 20, 2017).7Simeon, M. (2016) The President’s Men and Women: Manny Piñol - For the love of agriculture, Philippine Star, http://www.philstar.com/news-feature/2016/07/11/1601686/presidents-men-a... (Accessed: May 20, 2017).

8Philippine News Agency (2017) “President Duterte proclaims 13 new economic zones” Update.ph, https://www.update.ph/2017/05/president-duterte-proclaimed-13-new-econom... (Accessed: June 20, 2017).

9Romero, A. (2017). “PEZA eyes more economic zones to attract investors”, Philippine Star, http://www.philstar.com/business/2016/10/19/1635236/peza-eyes-more-econo... (Accessed: June 20, 2017).

10Ibid. 

11Obanil-Flores, C. and Manahan, M. (2007) “Leaseback Arrangements: Reversing Agrarian Reform Gains in the Philippines”, Focus on the Global South and Land Research Action Network, http://landaction.org/17-leaseback-arrangements-reversing-17 (Accessed: May 21, 201)

12Perez, A. (2016) “Free irrigation, corporate scheme achieved”, Sunstar, http://www.sunstar.com.ph/davao/business/2016/10/11/free-irrigation-corp... (Accessed: June 10, 2017).

13Pillas, C. (2017) “EO 190 extension, 2 other tariff measures, Ok’d”, Business Mirror http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/eo-190-extension-2-other-tariff-measure... (Accessed: June 15, 2017)

14Philippine Information Agency (2016) Du30 approves DAR proposal to issue moratorium on land use conversion, PIA,  http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/1141473838996/du30-approves-dar-prop... (Accessed: May 10, 2017). 

15Valencia, C. (2016) “NEDA against ban on land conversion”, Philippine Star, www.philstar.com/business/2016/10/03/1629653/neda-against-ban-land-conve... (accessed May 10, 2017).

16Pazzibugan, D. (2017) “DAR chief eyes 6M hectares for famers”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://newsinfo. inquirer.net/889551/dar-chief- eyes-6m-hectares-for-farmers ( Accessed: May 10, 2017).  

17 Farmworkers are decrying that it has been disadvantageous to them and has written Sec. Mariano in 2016 but the he has yet to issue a decision. 

by Galileo de Guzman Castillo

Rodrigo Roa “Rody” Duterte or DU30, as he’s fondly called by his supporters and followers, was elected 16th President of the Philippines last year and is now also the first ever elected president from Southern Philippines. His fixation on domestic policies such as the war on drugs and the insurgencies in Mindanao was honed from his long stint as the “strongman” from Davao, but on matters of foreign policy, including on issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and maritime disputes in the region, he lacks experience. Yet he has been crafting the country’s foreign policy through his pronouncements, even if often done with brusqueness and profanity.

What has been said and done in as far as the country’s foreign policy is concerned? What are the elements and manifestations of the Duterte administration’s foreign policy? How should one define an ‘independent’ foreign policy? Has Duterte been consistent or contradictory with his policy pronouncements and actions? Who have been gaining and losing in the process?

While it has only been a year into Duterte’s presidency and much remains to be seen with his administration’s evolving foreign policy, unpacking his pronouncements and actions over the last 12 months reveals much incoherence and inconsistencies in Duterte’s touted in(depend)ent foreign policy. From Duterte’s policy pronouncements, his understanding of an independent foreign policy would seem to revolve mainly around being free from interference in his domestic policies. But while he has sought to be “free” from the US and European Union (EU), he is not loath to turn to other powerful players, just because they may not care too much about human rights—forgetting that these countries have their own geopolitical and economic interests that may impact on our own. Duterte has not wasted time in quickly realigning with powerful countries that he deems as allies, namely China and Russia. At the onset of his administration, it would appear that his in(depend)ent foreign policy depends on several factors—it being contingent on whether a country supports or criticizes his war on drugs, it being conditional as he “breaks free” from the US but hurries under the wings of other rival powers, and ultimately, it being determined and controlled by Duterte’s whims and hedging game.

New Allies

Duterte’s announcement of separation from the US “both in military and economics” could have indeed signified a fundamental change—the Philippines’ rethinking of its almost century-long alliance with its erstwhile colonizer. It may be easy to conclude that the Philippines has truly embarked towards an independent stance, given that Duterte has gone around cursing the United Nations (UN) and the EU when they criticized his bloody war on drugs and raised concerns on human rights, rejecting foreign aid that his administration felt “may allow others” to interfere in the country’s internal affairs.

In September 2016, Duterte announced an end to the joint US and Philippine military drills and said that the already scheduled joint military exercises between Filipino and American troops will be the last. A month after, he threatened to scrap the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and ended 2016 by saying “bye-bye” to America and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in retaliation to the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s deferment of voting to renew aid to the Philippines. The US agency had expressed concerns on rule of law and civil liberties in light of Duterte’s war on drugs.

Duterte made very clear his hard-line stance on charting an independent foreign policy for the Philippines right before he left the country for his first official foreign trip to the 2016 ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos, when he said “I would not appear to be beholden to anybody. I only am answerable, again, to the Filipino people who elected me as president. Period. Nobody but nobody should interfere. This is an independent country; nobody has the right to lecture on me. God, do not do it.”[1]

It was also in this pre-departure press conference in Davao City International Airport, when asked by a journalist how he would address human rights questions that may be raised to him at the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit (in light of the war on drugs, on the spate of extrajudicial and vigilante killings of suspects, and the emboldened Philippine National Police), that he unabashedly directed a common swear word at then-outgoing US President Barack Obama: “son of a whore,” to underline his “separation” from the US. This resulted in a cancelled bilateral meeting between the two heads of state.

Early on, he had turned to Moscow to purchase arms as a result of the cancellation of a deal with the US. And then, at the Philippines-China Trade and Investment Forum in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing last October 2016, Duterte presented a purely dualistic worldview when he said in front of Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli and hundreds of Filipino and Chinese businessmen, “I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow and maybe I will also go to Russia to talk to (President Vladimir) Putin and tell him that there are three of us against the world—China, Philippines and Russia. It’s the only way. That’s the long and short of it. I want an independent policy na hindi pasunod-sunod (that is not subservient).”[2]

Whimsical and Incoherent

Duterte’s evolving foreign policy can be characterized also by a series of contradictory statements and confused policy pronouncements from him and his Cabinet, further highlighted by his flip-flopping on critical issues like the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), EDCA, VFA, Balikatan exercises, and military alliance with the US. Despite earlier pronouncements that they would end, the Balikatan joint military drills eventually pushed through in May 2017 with Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana persuading the president to allow them to continue albeit with adjustments—no more exercises in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea (WPS/SCS) and the focus of Balikatan will shift from maritime security and territorial defense to humanitarian aid, climate change, disaster response, and counter-terrorism operations. Neither were the MDT, EDCA, and VFA repealed. Despite Duterte’s claim that “the Philippines is not a vassal state,” military bases and facilities with presence of foreign troops have remained on Philippine soil and are in fact to be upgraded and expanded according to Lorenzana.

The derailed Philippines-US meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN meeting in Laos prompted Presidential Spokesperson Ernesto Abella to deliver a clarificatory statement that the administration’s “primary intention is to chart an independent foreign policy while promoting closer ties with all nations, especially the US with which [the Philippines] have had a long-standing partnership.” Consequently, political security relations with the US remain strong despite changes in the nature of the military exercises, as revealed by the US Special Forces’ support to the operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the crisis-hit Marawi.

Even so, Representative Jim McGovern declared during the July 20 US Congress hearing on the war on drugs in the Philippines that he would lead the protest should Duterte accept Trump’s recent invitation to visit the White House—given his human rights record. Duterte’s response was “There will never be a time that I will go to America during my term or even thereafter. So what makes that guy think I’ll go to America? I’ve seen America and it’s lousy.”[3]

Duterte’s pronouncements in his state visit to Beijing also necessitated a quick clarification from his camp, with no less than the country’s top economic policymakers finance secretary Carlos Dominguez III and economic planning secretary Ernesto Pernia issuing a joint statement just a few hours after Duterte’s speech in China: “The Cabinet will move strongly and swiftly towards regional economic integration. This is why the president prioritized foreign trips to ASEAN and Asia. We will maintain relations with the West but we desire stronger integration with our neighbors. We share the culture and a better understanding with our region.”4  There were strong economic motivations to this too because in 2015, total external trade in goods with ASEAN member countries had amounted to $26.705 billion or 20.6 percent of the Philippines’ entire trade. This may also explain a budget allocation of 15.5 billion for the ASEAN processes, as the Philippines assumed chairpersonship in 2017 (curiously, 11.5 billion was allocated under the Office of the President).5 In comparison, the budget of the Department of Foreign Affairs for 2017 is 16.5 billion, down by almost 4 billion from that of 2016.

Hedging and Opportunistic

Time and again, Duterte’s Cabinet has argued that people should not take his careless statements and policy pronouncements seriously but rather wait for the actions and concrete steps. Duterte himself has tried to convince the public that his “outbursts” at the international stage is in fact a hedging strategy, a diplomatic balancing act that on the one hand may improve political and economic relations with certain countries, but on the other, risks one being branded as “all bark and no bite.” Hedging on a supposedly independent stance from global powers, he uses this as leverage against those critical of his domestic policies. His hedging game extends to the ASEAN platform where diversifying of relations with neighboring countries is used to get mandate for his war on drugs.

Some argue that Duterte does not just act on any whim that enters his head but is in fact a “master strategist” who pragmatically makes the best of the cards laid down before him—pursuing bilateral relations with China as it is poised to emerge as a global power, and as the US pushes forward with its isolationist agenda under the Trump presidency—with the “axis of power” shifting to China in its pursuit of a more multilateral agenda. In the face of the decline in huge global infrastructure investments by the US and EU, China has launched the The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and The Belt and Road (B&R) and funded infrastructure projects left and right with its Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). The Philippines, though, is not part of the BRI.

According to the Official Gazette of the Philippines, “a crucial component of foreign relations, international travel has always offered an opportunity for the President of the Philippines, in his [or her] official capacity as both Head of State and Government, to foster and maintain relations with other states or meet with foreign dignitaries.”6 Duterte’s presidential foreign trips in his first year tallies at 21, costing almost 400 million. Comparing this to his predecessors, he has surpassed almost half of Benigno Aquino’s 46 trips for the entire six years, surpassed Joseph Estrada’s 20 trips during two years in office and is about a third away from Fidel Ramos’ 69 trips. At the rate Duterte is going with his presidential foreign trips in his first year, he may even surpass Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s 127 trips over a 9-year term, the highest among all Philippine presidents after Ferdinand Marcos. All four presidents before Duterte had one thing in common: their most frequented country was the US.

In contrast, Duterte concentrated on visiting Southeast Asia, East Asia, West Asia (Middle East), and Russia. This manifests a foreign policy directed towards maintaining stronger cooperation and integration with the Philippines’ neighbors while exploring linkages and/or re-establishing relations with other nations, which may be a good thing in itself. However, what is common to these nations is that they are either supportive of, or silent on, his flagship war on drugs. Specifically, China’s explicit support for Duterte’s war on drugs, which the US cannot match because of its stance on human rights, makes the China pivot more attractive to him.

“We hope the international community can respect the judicial sovereignty of the Philippines and support its efforts in fighting drug-related crimes through cooperation,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang on the 27th session of Universal Periodic Review (UPR), May 8, when 45 of 47 members of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) expressed concern over the wave of extrajudicial killings and revival of death penalty in the Philippines.[7] On May 11, at the World Economic Forum (WEF) on ASEAN in Cambodia, Duterte zeroed in on his war on drugs and sought support for his flagship domestic policy: “We need to take a committed stand to dismantle and destroy the illegal drugs trade apparatus. We must reaffirm our commitment to realize a drug-free ASEAN community,” he said. And, for the first time in history, the Philippines invoked the much-criticized non-interference principle of ASEAN as Duterte opened the 30th ASEAN Summit in Manila.

Beyond ASEAN, however, Duterte seems to be losing such opportunity on other international platforms, as he was not invited to the G20 meeting of the world’s advanced and emerging economies last July 7-8 in Germany, even if it has always been the practice to invite the current Chair of the ASEAN. Presidential Spokesperson Ernesto Abella’s response to this snub was that “He [Duterte] is focused on affairs here; he is not necessarily seeking for the approval of others. It’s really not the style of the President because we need to run our own economy. Our progress as a nation is not tied to the approval of others. The president is not really the type to ask for that kind of audience.”[8]

Economic Diplomacy

The president’s trips were celebrated as “victories” by his administration as he secured plenty of cooperation deals and signed a number of Memoranda of Agreement or Understanding, notwithstanding that some were not legally-binding. Duterte’s pivot to China and focus on a more economic diplomacy rather than political security were exemplified by his bagging of a total of $24 billion worth of business and financial deals and developmental assistance during his state visit to Beijing, albeit as the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) reported, majority of these are concessional and are either tied loans or grants that are currently merely pledges.9 He secured these deals by not invoking the arbitral tribunal landmark ruling that invalidated China’s so-called nine-dash line, downplaying the territorial and maritime disputes in the WPS/SCS, and issuing a watered-down ASEAN Chair Statement that was silent on China and its aggressive land-from-sea reclamation and militarization. It even became very apparent that he was not keen on pressuring China on the WPS/SCS issue and even welcomed the Chinese warships docked at Davao’s Sasa Port after the ASEAN Summits for a “goodwill visit”.

As of June 2017, Duterte has made presidential trips (classified as a state, an official, or a working visit) to sixteen sovereign states internationally. This includes one visit to Bahrain, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Peru, Russia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Vietnam and two visits to Cambodia, China, and Thailand. Photo by PatTag2659. (Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Duterte_foreign_trips.png), licensed under CC BY 4.0

His May 22-23 official visit to Russia, cut short with the terror attacks in Marawi and his declaration of Martial Law in Mindanao while still in Moscow, produced 10 deals on defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, among others.

China remains the second largest trading partner of the Philippines in 2015 according to the Philippine Statistics Authority, with total trade amounting to $17.646 billion or 13.6 percent of total (but registering a trade deficit of $5.296 billion as exports to China totaled $6.175 billion and imports were valued at $11.471 billion). Japan is the country’s top trading partner (total trade worth $18.669 billion or 14.4 percent) and the US is third (12.7 percent or $16.491 billion), with both countries reflecting a trade surplus; $5.932 billion for the former, $1.554 billion for the latter.10 Japan and the US are still the Philippines’ major source of foreign direct investments (FDI) and Japan remains the top aid provider for the Philippines, with $5.8 billion in loans, grants, and official development assistance (ODA). Meanwhile, Russia has neither been a considerable source of FDI nor a significant trade partner (less than one percent of total trade).

Recently on June 28, Duterte thanked China for its military aid package of 590 million worth of weapons and ammunitions to fight the ISIS-inspired Maute on top of the 15 million donation for relief and rehabilitation, signaling the reemergence of Sino-Philippine defense cooperation or “the dawn of a new era” in Duterte’s own words.[11]

Differentiating Independent from In(depend)ent

While Duterte, in his first year as president, attempted to steer the Philippines to an “independent” path, a critical question is raised: Are we really moving towards a truly sovereign path? A year hence, Duterte’s foreign policy seems to point more towards an in(depend)ent rather than an independent path. An assessment of any current foreign policy direction necessitates looking at it through the prism of the Constitution, which states thus:

“Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.”

“Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and the right to self-determination.”

“Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.”

“Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

What should a truly independent foreign policy mean for a developing country like the Philippines, an archipelagic state situated in the geo-strategic, geo-economic, and geo-political Asia-Pacific region, and with a long colonial history that spanned more than three centuries?

In 2011, as part of the Development Round Table Series (DRTS) organized by Focus on the Global South, the Technical Working Group on Alternative Foreign Policy outlined principles that underpinned what the group was advocating for—democratic, principled, independent, and strategic foreign policy.12  In the present context, this should still mean that the Philippines is able to prioritize its national, regional, and global interests, defined as the collective interest of the Filipino people and formulated through a broader participation of the people—a recognition that the charting of an independent foreign policy is not the exclusive concern of the president. A nagging question is how much Duterte is really open to inputs on the foreign affairs agenda, from his own officials, the business sector, the military, the academe, the civil society, and ultimately from the Filipino people themselves. For example, it is a question why the Department of Foreign Affairs budget has been reduced by 4 billion or by 19.9 percent from 2016 to 2017.[13]

An independent foreign policy should not mean abandoning one ally for another, but rather, a careful balancing of international relations while unequivocally renouncing subservience to all countries, even with perceived allies. Economic cooperation, security ties, and alliances with other nations—big or small, superpower or emerging power, from the Global North or Global South—should be based on the principle of mutuality and should be seen as part of the country’s long-term vision to attain social justice, sustainable development, and lasting peace. In contrast, a myopic view fixated on seeking legitimacy for Duterte’s flagship war on drugs, falling into overdependence on China, and failure to understand the nuances of foreign policy and the complex decisions a head of state must make, especially in crucial times when the country’s sovereignty is threatened like in the Marawi crisis and the WPS/SCS maritime dispute, would further impede the Philippines from attaining a sovereign foreign policy.

Roland Simbulan, in his 2008 paper published by Focus on the Global South for the DRTS, reviewed critical issues in Philippine foreign policy. “For a long time already, many Philippine regimes bowed to the impositions of the advocates of imperialism and swallowed the sugarcoated poison of the International Monetary Fund-World Bank (IMF-WB) duo which wreaked havoc to our national economy and has only brought further inequality and poverty to this country. […] Many of our national woes, including foreign debt, widespread poverty, worsening unemployment are caused by having been entangled if not integrated in the structures of an inequitable global economic system where the decisions, activities, and influence of countries with dominant economies and with the greatest influence on institutions like the IMF-WB and the World Trade Organization, impact on our local politics to a great extent,” he said.[14]

So now the emperor walked under his high canopy. Black and white illustration in Hans Andersen’s fairy tales (1913) London: Constable. Illustration by Robinson, William Heath, 1872-1944. (Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia .org/wiki/File:Page_234_of_ Andersen%27s_fairy_tales_( Robinson).png)

Almost a decade hence, several contending forces continue to influence the Philippines’ formulation of a truly sovereign, democratic, and alternative foreign policy. When placed in the much larger context of neocolonialism, imperialist globalization, cultural hegemony, and tug-of-war between major powers, would Duterte’s in(depend)ent foreign policy protect the interests of the Filipino people or further undermine Philippine sovereignty? A pivotal moment occurred on September 16, 1991 when the Philippine Senate made the historic decision of rejecting the renewal of the US Subic Naval Base. Other nations such as Vietnam and Cuba with which we have had a shared history were able to assert their national interests and right to self-determination. Will we see these happen under the Duterte administration?

The pendulum of charting an independent foreign policy has swung, yes, but when the dust of Duterte’s outbursts, pronouncements, and actions has finally settled, would we finally see the Philippines attaining an independent foreign policy faithful to the spirit with which the provisions in the Constitution were written? Or by this time, would the people have grown weary of Duterte’s invectives and empty promises, and eventually realize that the emperor has no clothes? 

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1   CNN Philippines Staff. (2016 September 8). FULL TEXT: President Rodrigo Duterte’s departure speech (ASEAN Summit). CNN Philippines. Retrieved from http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/09/06/duterte-departure-for-asean-summit-speech.html

2   Blanchard, Ben. (2016 October 20). Duterte aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS

3   Phillips, Kristine. (2017 July 22). Philippines’s Duterte vows not to come to the U.S.: ‘I’ve seen America, and it’s lousy’. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/22/philippines-duterte-vows-to-not-come-to-the-u-s-ive-seen-america-and-its-lousy/?utm_term=.bb903b28562d

4    Macas, Tricia. (2016 October 20). Duterte’s economic team clarifies: ‘PHL to maintain ties with West, pursue regional integration. GMA News. Retrieved from http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/economy/585821/phl-to-maintain-ties-with-west-pursue-regional-integration/story/

5   Diaz, Jess. (2017 April 29). Gov’t spending P15.5 B for Asean summit. The Philippine Star. Retrieved from http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/04/29/1695002/govt-spending-p15.5-b-asean-summit

6   Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. Presidential Trips: The full list. Retrieved from http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/presidential-trips/the-foreign-trips-of-the-presidents/

7   Flores, Helen. (2017 May 13). China urges UN to support Philippines’ war on drugs. The Philippine Star. Retrieved from http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/05/13/1699401/china-urges-un-support-philippines-war-drugs

8   Ranada, Pia. (2017 July 11). Palace on G20 Summit: Duterte doesn’t need approval of others. Rappler. Retrieved from http://www.rappler.com/nation/175275-palace-g20-summit-duterte

9   Please refer to the investigative report done by Malou Mangahas, Karol Ilagan, and Kenneth Cardenas of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism that was published on May 8 and 9, 2017. The two-part report may be accessed at these links:

      (1) http://pcij.org/stories/24-b-not-yet-a-cinch-brokers-stalk-talks-contracting-so-tedious/

      (2) http://pcij.org/stories/dutertes-china-deals-dissected/

      (3) http://pcij.org/stories/the-philippine-parties-to-dutertes-china-deals/

      (4) http://pcij.org/stories/manila-beijing-dating-again-who-is-the-screwer-screwed/

10 Philippine Statistics Authority. (2016 July 15). Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines: 2015. Retrieved from https://psa.gov.ph/content/foreign-trade-statistics-philippines-2015

11 Ho, Alex. (2017 June 30). Duterte thanks China for firearms, ammo vs Mautes. CNN Philippines. Retrieved from http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/06/29/Duterte-thanks-China-for-military-aid-vs-Mautes.html

12  Fabros, Corazon. (2011 December). Foreign Policy and the Visiting Forces Agreement. Crossroads: Focus on the Philippines 2011 Yearbook. Published by Focus on the Global South Philippines Programme. Quezon City, Philippines.

13 Department of Budget and Management. Volume II of the National Expenditure Program 2017. Retrieved from http://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/NEP2017/NEP%202017-VOLUME%20II.pdf

14                          Simbulan, Roland. (2008 September 16). Reviewing Critical Issues in Philippine Foreign and Security Policies: Towards an Assessment of the Visiting Forces Agreement. Development Roundtable Series. Published by Focus on the Global South Philippines Programme. Quezon City, Philippines.

By Raphael Baladad

Since assuming office, President Rodrigo Duterte has constanly reassured the public of his promise to sustain the previous administration’s momentum for social development as well as to confront the challenges it failed to address by introducing radical changes. Although the first few months of his term was spent on making true his campaign promise on a war on drugs, Duterte, in his first State of the Nation Address in 2016 articulated the broad strokes of his administration’s social development agenda: to improve the people’s welfare in the areas of health, education, adequate food and housing, among others.

The 2017-2022 Philippine Development Plan (PDP) fleshed out Duterte’s pronouncements into actual strategies and programs the government intends to pursue in the next five years. Banking on people’s aspirations, it intends to establish a distinct national vision/framework for development, setting it above the inclusive growth model promoted by the last administration. Highlighting the human development approach, the PDP aims to implement government “policies, plans and programs anchored on the people’s collective vision” to uplift the living conditions of every individual, induce the expansion of the middle class and achieve a society “where no one is poor.”

The growth objectives presented in the PDP however are not entirely as people-centered as they appear. Similar to its predecessor, there are clear manifestations towards broadening private sector involvement, as well as facilitating connection to local and global value chains.¹ While this is not entirely wrong in the economic/growth discourse, private investments particularly in the delivery of essential social services often lead to privatization and has not exactly worked for the poor in terms of accessibility. These contradictory goals put into question how Duterte intends to confront social development challenges. Will the public still see the radical changes he promised?

Distinct or Similar?

Development is not only measured through economic gains but also through improvements in well-being and living conditions². Enhancing capabilites (or what a person can be or can do in life such as being healthy or owning a home), provide individuals better opportunities to transcend poverty³. The other view is that it is important to develop a person’s capability because it has economic value⁴ and interventions are seen as capital to fuel economic growth.

The AmBisyon2040 is supposed to sum up the living aspirations of most Filipinos. Based on a survey conducted by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) before crafting the PDP, four out of five Filipinos want a simple and comfortable life, which means enjoying a middle class lifestyle such as owning a house (and a car) and having enough savings to afford education, health and other leisures such as travelling for vacations abroad. Also, three out of eight priority agenda in the AmBisyon 2040 pertain to social development and the extension of government services⁵ for housing, education, and health to every individual. Thus, enhancing the potentials of Filipinos is at the very core of the PDP’s 10th chapter on “Human Capital Development” which also interprets human development not just a means to an end, i.e. for capitalist production, but as an end goal itself. But does this distinction signal a complete departure from the old strategies and thrusts for social services delivery?

Financing, accessibility, and delivery networks are key factors in the delivery of public health service. Same with education which should also focus on access and relevance to industry growth. The housing sector also defined outcomes related to accessibility, but with the added feature of integrating the anti-drug campaign in communities. Based on NEDA’s assessment in the PDP, there are milestones in terms of achieving targets based on the indicators posted by the Millenium Development Goals, but several gaps in terms of accessibility and the quality of services delivered still have to be met. For health, the increase in the number of health facilities have resulted in the lack of health professionals deployed in communities and budget to sustain medical equipment and supplies. For education, net enrollment rates increased under the Aquino government, but the quality of education suffered due to imbalances in student-learner ratios as well as insufficient learning facilities. For housing, the direct housing assistance increased outputs, but were dampened due to the lack of social impact assessments, leaving thousands of houses in several resettlement areas unoccupied.⁶

Continuity is essential to progress. But does the need to address persistent social problems equate with the adoption of past development models? Looking closer at several key interventions in social development presented in the current PDP such as the expansion of service delivery networks and health financing, improvements in the quality of technical and higher education for global competitiveness and the increase of direct housing assistances, one could find resemblances in strategies and programs with those of the PNoy government’s. But the radical changes Duterte has promised in terms of health, education, and housing are somewhat missing, if we compare to the amount of rigor that went into framing other “priority” programs such as infrastructure and the war on drugs. While others may find fault there, 52 percent of Filipinos, according to a recent Social Weather Station survey⁷, still believe that Duterte will honor his pronouncements, such as the universal access to quality tertiary education or a universal ‘Cuban Style’ health care system. Based on these observations on the PDP, we can can take the view that the Duterte administration might not radically differ from past governments’ social development agenda. Whether or not government targets will be met or again missed depends on how bottlenecks in implementation as well as policy and budget gaps are addressed.

What the Budget Says

Having a vision is one thing, and providing the necessary budget towards realizing it is another.  And from what the 2017 General Appropriations Act reveals, there is a gap between the promise of social development in the PDP and what we can expect. For education, a six percent⁸ automatic appropriation of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is needed to realize the promise of free tertiary level education. Although both the Senate and the House of Representatives has passed the bill granting full tuition subsidy for students in state universities and colleges, the budget for operationalizing this has not been reflected in the 2017 budget. For public health services, an additional 57 billion is needed to bring the doctor to patient ratios⁹ near the Cuban Health System or even the World Health Organization standards, according to former appointee Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial¹⁰. For housing, Vice President and former Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council Chief Leni Robredo said the “gold standard” target is two to five percent of the GDP in order to close the gap of 5.5 million housing units the previous administration left in socialized housing, or to build some 2,600 units per day.

Based on the 2017 GAA, what the government has allocated is a far cry from reaching the promises/ambitions of the Duterte government for health, education, and housing. The education budget is at        637 billion, with the Department of Education receiving the highest among all government agencies at 544 billion, registering a 32 percent growth increase from the previous year. The Commission on Higher Education budget also increased by 237 percent at 18 billion. But the total budget for public education is still only two percent of the GDP and is almost equal to the combined budget for the military and police, though lower than the budget for infrastructure development. In addition, both NEDA director general Ernesto Pernia and budget secretary Benjamin Diokno admitted that the government cannot afford the 100 million budget streamlined for the free college education bill¹¹.

Although the health budget increased by 19 percent at 149 billion compared to the previous year’s, more than 50 billion was allocated to expand health financing under Philhealth. While the government aims to improve health access of the poor, the budget for service delivery networks was cut by 10 percent, and only 7 billion is alloted each for Health Human Resource Development and the Doctors to the Barrio Program, which would not meet the amount needed to close the doctor-patient ratio gaps.

The housing sector suffered deep budget cuts as well, down by 54 percent to 15 billion, which will be shared by the National Housing Authority, Social Housing Finance Corporation, and the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council which is now under the Office of the Cabinet Secretary. This is despite the huge housing backlog of 5.5 million units¹², plus the 1.5 million target for direct housing assistance under the 2017 PDP.

While Duterte has set the bar high through these promises, how they will become reality is not very clear when the budget is used as indicator, even if only for this year. The 2017 budget’s priorities are: peace and security, infrastructure development, and the war on drugs.

Legislative Support

The legislative agenda presented for social reforms under the present PDP seems to lack the radical shifts towards attaining the promises pronounced by Duterte for health, education, and housing. Even notable policies such as the passage of the National Land Use Act, the Idle Land Tax Bill, the Philippine Qualifications Framework Bill, and the National Mental Health Care Delivery System have been inherited from past Congresses.

This does not mean, however, that the government will not pursue future policy reforms. But in terms of numbers, the government must have been either selective or realistic on what policies they want the PDP to endorse. Given that the PDP presents a space to put forward the policy foundations needed to reinforce government goals and ambitions, it only endorses 14 new policies for three sectors compared to the 13 policies endorsed only for infrastructure development. These policies also appear to be less exhaustive compared to those proposed under infrastructure development.

For education, priorities have transcended basic education to include improving the quality of mid-level to higher education, as highlighted by the Philippine Qualifications bill and Apprenticeship bill. For health, the government seems to lean towards population services, highlighted by the Local Population Development Act and the Prevention of Adolescent Pregnancy Act. It is also important to note that the only policy agenda endorsed by the plan for expanding health human resources are Amendments on the Barangay Nutrition Scholar program. For housing, the legislative agenda remains addressing the structural/systemic discord in housing services through the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Socialized Housing Development Finance Corporation, and the passage of the Comprehensive Shelter Finance Act—all of which have already been filed and refiled numerous times.

Creeping Privatization

In Aquino’s PDP and economic policies, we have witnessed the expansion of private sector collaboration through the promotion of Private-Public Partnership (PPP) agreements. The same could be expected in the current PDP assuming that it remains “cognizant of the private sector’s efficiency and innovativeness,” further stimulating private sector participation in improving the quality and sustainability of its projects.

For education, private sector involvement is apparent on “updating course programs and the alignment of domestic regulations for the ASEAN Qualifications Reference Framework (AQRF), as well as in scaling up technical and vocational training programs.” For health, private provider participation will be “harnessed and coordinated when planning Service Delivery Networks, implementing interventions, and securing supply-side investments.” For housing, key shelter agencies are prompted to involve private stakeholders in crafting the National Resettlement Plan and to secure additional financing from the private sector to attain the expanded targets for socialized housing services.

In the current PDP, too, there are clear linkages between the government’s strategy in enhancing the quality of education to be more responsive to industry needs and private sector involvement in developing curriculums in the name of pursuing “leading-edge, commercial-ready innovations.” The PDP also states that the government also devise performance measures, incentives, and rewards for universities who collaborate with industry partners. While the number of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in the Philippines is 10 times more than in its neighboring countries, it falls short in producing innovators with a ranking of 74 out of 128 in the Global Innovations Index.¹³ According to the PDP itself, this is caused by the increasing number of commercialized HEIs that use curricula that are misaligned with the Commission on Higher Education’s standards and policies as well as privileging of business interests over quality considerations. On the other hand, with 4,486 private schools offering senior high school, compared to 220 non-DepEd public schools, private education subsidies have already reached P23 billion in 2017¹⁴, to accommodate K to 12 spillovers. The Voucher Program however has been mired in controversy due to the lack of accountability¹⁵, especially from private institutions that receive subsidy.

Private hospitals greatly outnumber government hospitals, particularly those with higher service capabilities.¹⁶ This basis alone, interventions therefore, to reduce “out-of-pocket” sources which highlight the thrusts of the 2017-2022 Philippine Health Agenda can be seen as a profitable arrangement for corporations engaged in the health sector. In addition, the incumbent health secretary also declared that at least 33 of the 72 public hospitals will be privatized to gain financial autonomy¹⁷. This strategy would further deprive the poor of health care services since, in the name of financial viability, corporations will still require patients to pay on top of government subsidies. In 2016, the Philippine Institute for Development Studies observed lower health service utilization in areas where the private sector had increasing role.  In that same year, the Commission on Audit found that the Health Facilities Enhancement Program had roughly 1.1 billion due to “idle and/or unutilized hospital buildings, facilities, and equipment, among others.” Given the strategy to tap private investments for improving service delivery networks outlined in the PDP, the HFEP is in danger of being a vehicle for privatization by entering into public-private partnerships to improve facilities and equipment.¹⁸

In 2012, the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association presented to the Board of Investors their 2012-2030 Philippine Housing Industry Roadmap with calculations of the economic impact of private business investments for socialized housing; with 2.3 jobs created for every million invested, and for every peso invested, a 3.32 value multiplier for local businesses as well as a     .047 income multiplier and 3.90 pesos tax multiplier for each household. While this only expounds the rationale behind private investments on socialized housing, the Ibon Foundation has warned that private developers will continue to amass profits from socialized housing through guaranteed payments from the government and that these socialized housing units will remain unaffordable and unattainable for many despite government-private sector collaboration to lower amortization costs.

Whose Development?

Kayong mga Pilipino nakikinig sa akin ngayon. Magpa-hospital kayo, ako ang magbayad, tutal hindi man nila ako mademanda. [To all Filipinos listening to me now. Go to hospitals, I will pay for it. Anyway, they won’t be able to sue me.] – said President Duterte in his 2017 State of the Nation Address.

Duterte is ambitious in envisioning the delivery of a holistic social development package, responsive to the aspirations of every Filipino and founded on improving the living conditions of the poor. Fleshing out these ambitions, however, remains a challenge especially when the 2017-2022 PDP merely escalates the strategies and programs of the previous administration for social development.

Cruel World. Homeless children sleeping on the EDSA-Guevarra Pedestrian Overpass, Mandaluyong City, Philippines. 2017 February 24.  Photo by Galileo de Guzman Castillo

The human development approach in the delivery of education, health, and housing services is a welcome change, along with the emphasis of increasing quality, accessibility, sustainability, and innovativeness. The litmus test for this is addressing budgetary and operational impediments, which the government plans to do through private sector involvement, which is nothing new, much less radical.

Human capital development, although government has explicitly defined it as improvement of individual capacities as an end in itself, will inevitably be more targetted based on the economic value an individual could possibly generate. Human as Capital, in sum, is wealth viewed not as an end in itself but as a means to more wealth, something which the PDP embodies as it factors in industry participation, private sector investments and collaboration, and competitiveness as part of intended interventions and outcomes. By deliberatelty continuing the same strategies and programs found in the previous PDP, public investments made by the government will always be weighed by the economic outcomes.  

There are both gains and losses in engaging in PPP, but the government should veer away from inviting business interests and profiteering in key programs that uplift the dignities of its citizens. Instead, it should focus more on effective and responsive program implementation as well as the timely and proper allocation, disbursement, and utilization of public funds. 

1                             Based on the Foreword on the 2017 Investment Priorities Plan, the need for this is as part of a grand blueprint to “strenthen the resurgence of manufacturing”

2                             According to Amartya Sen, an Indian economist behind the Capability Theory and the Human Development Index.

3                             Where ‘poverty’ is seen as a deprivation in the capability to live a good life. “The Capability Approach” - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/capability-approach/

4                             Referring to “human capital”, a term popularized Gary Becker, an economist from the University of Chicago. It is also a collection of traits that translates to the total capacity of the people that represents a form of wealth which can be directed to accomplish the economic goals of a state.

5                             The other 5 pertains to Tourism, Manufacturing, Connectivity, Agriculture and Financial Services

6                             i.e. the idle housing project in Pandi Bulacan that the Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY) occupied in March 2017.

7                              Expected Fullfillment of the President’s Promises, 2017 Social Weather Report, Social Weather Stations: https://www.sws.org. ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/? artcsyscode=ART-20170512214448

8                              According to Sanlakas, a party-list organization in the Philippines, advocating th SixWillFix campaign for the education sector. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/857414/youth-groups-hit-duterte-on-false-pr...

9                             1 doctor to 20,000 population. The Philippines is currently at 1:33,000 according to the Department of Health.

10                          Jee Geronimo, “Learning from Cuba’s health system: 35,000 more doctors needed in PH” http://www.rappler.com/nation/145333-ubial-cuba-health-system-doctors-ne...

11                          Lira Dalangin-Fernandez. Govt can’t afford free tuition – economic managers. http://www.interaksyon.com/govt-cant-afford-free-tuition-economic-managers/

12                          Amor Canlang The continuing saga of socialized housing in the Philippines, http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/the-continuing-saga-of-socialized-housi...

13                          Honly 81 researchers per million population compared to indonesia at 205

14                          DepEd expands access to secondary education through GASTPE, http://deped.gov.ph/press-releases/deped-expands-access-secondary-educat...

15                          DepEd’s voucher program lacks transparency—solon, http://thestandard.com.ph/news/top-stories/238939/deped-s-voucher-progra...

16                          Based on 2015 DBP and DOH Bureau of Health Facilities and Services Data. Privately owned Tertiary level hospitals outnumber government

17                          Dr. Eleanor Jara. Duterte’s first year: Philippine health agenda ‘a sham’. http://www.rappler.com/views/imho/175296-duterte-first-year-philippine-h...

18                           Health Facilities Enhancement Program (HFEP): Ubial DOH’s White Elephant, Health Alliance for Democracy, September 2016.

by Clarissa Militante

About the cover photo: Rodrigo Duterte’s flagship domestic policy, The War on Drugs, has killed thousands—and the death toll continues to rise. International Human Rights Day mobilization, Manila, Philippines. 2016 December 10.  Photo by Galileo de Guzman Castillo

Where lies the coherence between pronouncement, policy, and execution in the Duterte government is in its war on drugs, via project double barrel or tokhang (local term for the war on drug campaign). 

President Duterte won on a campaign platform that had for its central program a war on drugs aimed at addressing criminality with iron hand, and with drug addiction seen as the existential threat to the nation. This promise hit the ground running immediately after he was sworn into office. On the first year of execution, this violent, uncompromising approach has already resulted in the deaths of 7,000 to 10,000 people.^[1] (Other claims say the figure is higher, but with the numbers from the police not very reliable, it’s hard to be conclusive; what is conclusive is that thousands have died as a result of this bloody policy, which the President has vowed to continue until the end of his term)

But the war on drugs is not just about peace and order, and security (maybe for select members of the population). It fits well in a social-economic agenda that has no place for the poor—our own “wretched of the earth”—and is underpinned by an economic system that kills off (literally and figuratively) those who could not survive the free market jungle. From news reports, the victims’ profile would tell us that they belonged mostly to the urban underclass, the slum dwellers, even if the number of those killed would vary even from official government sources.

It is a system, which according to Loïc Wacquant, privileges the middle class and the rich who can survive and provide for themselves, “rewards individual responsibility,” but punishes those who fall into the cracks. Below the cracks there are no more safety nets.

Wacquant, in his books Punishing the Poor—The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity and Ordering Insecurity Social Polarization and the Punitive Upsurge, underscores the link between the “ascendancy of neoliberalism” (1980s onwards) as political-economic project and the rise of the “punitive state”.  In this social-political-economic order, there has been “rolling off of the welfare state, giving way to the privatization of the public.”^[2]

What is happening in the Philippines is not without precedence, as Wacquant cites France (which has demonized the ‘refugees’) and the US, where the poor African-Americans are the evil and threat; it is also in the US where the term war on drugs originated. But to revise Wacquant a bit, in the Philippines now, the state is not only punishing but killing off the poor.^[3]

The Targets: the Urban Underclass

Here’s the social-economic backdrop of the war on drugs.

The urban underclass has grown considerably and in such a fast pace in recent decades; this is both a result and cause of rapid urbanization in the Philippines. Another factor that has greatly contributed to this breakneck urbanization has been “the radical transformation of the city landscape in the mid-‘70s to the 2000s…(especially) in Metro Manila and its peripheries, namely the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal to its south, and Bulacan to the north…” with Metro Manila reaching “a hundred percent level of urban land use in the ‘70s, and experiencing several construction booms in the periods 1993-1997, 2003-2008, and 2010-2013…”^4[4]

This has spawned problems such as increase in urban poor population, poverty incidence and magnitude, more marked social division in urban areas between the haves and have-nots, as seen in the rise of commercial enclaves and fenced/secured residential areas while the roads and public facilities in the urban poor districts are undergoing decay, and worse they live in dilapidated shanties and on extra-legal status.

The Philippine Institute for Development and Studies projected that “without adequate intervention, Metro Manila’s slums will increase to 53.6 percent of its population, and one-third of all residents of large towns and cities (33.7 percent) will likely be slum dwellers.”^[5]

In 2014, the magnitude of urban population in the Philippines was already 44,104, 820 (or around 44 percent of the population), making the country the sixth most urbanized in Southeast Asia in terms of the percentage of urban population.^[6]  Also in the same year, the magnitude of slum population registered at 17,055,400, which was about 38 percent of total urban population.^[7]

Before this, the growth of slum population from years 2004 to 2006 was 3.4 percent annually, “which exceeded the population growth of urban and metropolitan areas of 2.3 percent….”^[8]  These slum dwellers were located in “more than 500 dispersed shantytown communities—particularly in Quezon City, Manila, Caloocan, Navotas, Las Piñas, Paranaque, Marikina, and Makati City.”^[9]

This urban underclass comprised mostly of the so-called slum dwellers, characterized by their extra-legal status in places of residence, an inability to participate in the formal economy, with limited-to-no-access to resources needed for subsistence, and are “typically excluded from government registries and regulatory instruments. They are also marginalized in terms of basic services, such as education and health, potable water and sanitation, power and telecommunications, infrastructure, public security mechanisms, and so on.”^[10]

It is in these urban poor districts where most police operations and vigilante killings have been taking place in the past year. It is this urban underclass that comprises the victims of the war on drugs.

As per the June 2017 report of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, the top five regions in terms of deaths as a result of project double barrel until January 2017 were: 2,555 killed (police figures/from police operations) Metro Manila with 983; Central Luzon 484; CALABARZON 304, Central Visayas, 167, and Davao region, 89.

The data of those killed during police operations match the data of deaths under investigation (DUI) (3,952 of the total also as of January 2017) in terms of location, meaning that the highest would be from Metro Manila or NCR, followed by CALABARZON and then Central Luzon (with a little difference/variation from the ranking in those killed in police operations where Central Luzon came in second). In DUIs, Central Visayas and Davao placed number five, and Northern Mindanao figured in as number four.

Also very telling would be the number and location of “drug-affected barangays” as of April 2017. According to PCIJ, the terms ‘drug-affected’ was not clearly defined in government data. Did this mean they have the highest concentration of drug users; were they central areas in the drug trade; or location of identified drug dens; or had to do with the number of those killed? PCIJ also noted that a year after tokhang, which supposedly aimed to stem the growth of drug use and drug users, the number of barangays affected has increased, from 32 to 36 percent in July 2016 to 48 percent of the total barangays in the country by April 2017.

No Anti-Poverty Program

Despite its rhetoric, the government does not prioritize social safety nets for the poor. The Philippine budget for 2017, called the People’s Budget, mentions as one of four pillars social order and equitable progress.  It is explained as: “To foster peace and progress, especially in conflict-affected areas, the 2017 Budget will fund programs and projects designed to fight crimes and instill order in society. It also reinforces infrastructure investments and expands employment opportunities to ensure that growth is felt in the lagging regions.” 

It can be gleaned from the language how social order is no longer based on addressing the deeper causes of disorder, which is poverty, lack of education, lack of livelihood and resources for the poor to survive, to re-enter mainstream society as productive citizens and not remain as dregs of society.

In the 2017 budget, under the budget for social protection, the conditional cash transfer will get 78.69 billion and housing development, 14.41 billion. Other items we need to look at in the budget:

•             For housing: housing development is assigned 119 billion, water supply 9.16 billion, community development, 1.55 billion;

•             Public health services get 50.20 billion.

Meanwhile, public order and safety will get 170.80 billion, and under it, police services will have 115.07 billion while under Defense, the military defense gets 113.7 billion.

Under the previous government, the social service sector’s share increased annually from 2010 to 2016, from 31.1 percent (479.9 billion) to 36.6 percent in 2016 (952.7 billion); although 2015’s share was higher at 37.2 percent, in actual monetary terms it was 842.8 billion.

Urban Apartheid and Struggle for Space^[11]

The social-economic divide in urban and urbanizing areas, specifically in Metro Manila and its peripheries to the south and north, is reflected in how space has been used and who has benefited. This is seen both in private-led real estate projects and government infrastructure development program.

Under the PNoy government, the urban development trajectory was towards what could be called “bypass urban implantism...(or) bypassing the congested arteries of the ‘public city’ and ‘implanting’ new spaces for capital accumulation that are designed for consumerism and export-oriented production.”^[12]

One example of this kind of infrastructure project started by the PNoy government and is being continued and claimed as its own by the current administration is the skyway. It is now being expanded to link southern Luzon to the north and key parts of the Metro. One key link in this network of skyways are those that link different parts of Metro Manila and Cavite to the international airports; e.g. from the international airports to the hotels, casinos, and commercial enclaves on Macapagal Road. The Duterte government is not veering away from such projects of his predecessors, with majority of the planned infrastructure  projects (40 percent) still concentrated in and benefitting Metro Manila and Luzon. (See Stories Behind the Numbers: Dissecting Duterte’s Build, Build, Build Program on page 9).

Essentially, it is the kind of infrastructure program that heightens the spatial divide; that develops select areas of the city according to international standards while “bypassing the rest of Metro Manila’s woes and its poorer inhabitants.”^[13]  This spatial divide has created apartheid among the middle class directed at the poor. Currently, the war on drugs has exacerbated this apartheid as the poor has been painted as source of insecurity, and from whom the rich and middle class have to be protected.

A recent Pulse Asia survey showed that “82 percent of Metro Manila residents feel safer” as a result of the war on drugs.^[14]  Predictably, Philippine National Police Director General Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa has also claimed that the reduction in the crime rate in the past year from mid-2016, when Duterte assumed presidency, to the first half of 2017 has been due to project double barrel. However, PNP data also show that crime rates have actually been declining, although not steadily in the period 2014-2015; by 16 percent from 2013 to 2015 and five percent from 2014 to 2015. The PNoy government’s own claim was this was due to its Oplan Lambat-Sibat, which intensified surprise checkpoints, raids and home visits directed at gun owners, and intelligence gathering.^[15]

Apartheid has gained a new face owing to the stigma that has now been attached to being drug users or just being suspected or accused of being one.

Weakening the Poor’s Agency^[16]

How do the poor fight back now? What agency is left to them?

“The members of our community used to stand together and fight side-by-side against demolition. We were ready to die fighting for our rights, but now there’s so much fear in the community because many have been killed because of the war on drugs,” said a woman community organizer in Caloocan, northern Metro Manila, in one of the city’s districts populated by informal settlers. She requested anonymity during a focused group discussion conducted by In Defense of Human Rights and Dignity Movement (iDEFEND), a coalition of human rights defenders formed in August 2016.^[17]

Why were they not afraid to die fighting for their rights before, but now could not even organize the members to stand up against illegal arrests and killings?

“There’s so much distrust now. I am distrusted, because one of my relatives was killed and branded a drug addict,” the woman community organizer said.

It is the stigma, said the other community leaders, who all requested anonymity for fear of reprisal, as their community continues to be an open target for the war on drugs. Fighting for their right to a decent place of living was easier for these organizers than now defending the right to life and due process of drug addicts and pushers who are perceived as mere criminals.

Community kinship has also been a casualty.

“If you were killed because of tokhang (local term for the war on drug campaign), nobody even goes to your funeral, except your own family,” said one of the discussants.

“That is if you are able to claim your dead bodies from the morgue. Most of us hardly have the money to pay the morgue. And I’ve tried to approach the local government for support but when they learn that your relative died because of tokhang, then they refuse to give support,” shared another woman leader.

They admitted that there were users in their neighborhood, even pushers—small-time pushers, they said.  They knew these neighbors: young boys who would sniff solvent because this was cheaper (at 10) than buying food and it would make them numb to hunger for three days; the neighborhood basurero (people who earn from finding saleable stuff from garbage) who used shabu (a slang term for the drug methamphetamine) to stay awake in the wee hours of the morning when they needed to be awake because of their jobs; young men who were runners for the big-time pushers so they could earn pittance from selling tingi or drugs in small amounts. They were aware that using and selling drugs were not right, but it was part of their daily living in a poor neighborhood.

Their stories should not aim to romanticize but humanize the narrative of those who are being felled like pins in a bowling game; to show that the drug menace has social-economic roots.

“Sana po mawala ang stigma. Sana pa maalis iyong paghihinalaan ka at di na pagtitiwalaan ng mga kapitbahay mo. Marami po sa amin umaalis na lang sa komunidad.” (I hope the stigma will disappear. That there would no longer be mistrust among neighbors. Many are choosing to leave the community).

 --------

1                             The police claim that there have only been a little over 3,000 that could be directly linked to police operations; DUI not included; but human rights organizations say there are more

2                             Wacquant

3                             Wacquant

4                             Bello, Walden; Cardenas, Kenneth; Cruz, Patrick Jerome; Manahan, Mary Ann; Militante, Clarissa; Purugganan, Joseph; Chavez, Jenina Joy. State of Fragmentation: The Philippines in Transition. Focus on the Global South & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Quezon City, 2014

5                Bello, Walden; Cardenas, Kenneth; Cruz, Patrick Jerome; Manahan, Mary Ann; Militante, Clarissa; Purugganan, Joseph; Chavez, Jenina Joy. State of Fragmentation The Philippines in Transition. Focus on the Global South & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Quezon City, 2014

6                             https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/philippines/urban-population

7                             https://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=711&crid=

8                             Bello, Walden; Cardenas, Kenneth; Cruz, Patrick Jerome; Manahan, Mary Ann; Militante, Clarissa; Purugganan, Joseph; Chavez, Jenina Joy. State of Fragmentation The Philippines in Transition. Focus on the Global South & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Quezon City, 2014

9                             Bello, Walden; Cardenas, Kenneth; Cruz, Patrick Jerome; Manahan, Mary Ann; Militante, Clarissa; Purugganan, Joseph; Chavez, Jenina Joy. State of Fragmentation The Philippines in Transition. Focus on the Global South & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Quezon City, 2014

10                          Bello, Walden; Cardenas, Kenneth; Cruz, Patrick Jerome; Manahan, Mary Ann; Militante, Clarissa; Purugganan, Joseph; Chavez, Jenina Joy. p. 202; Chapter 6: State of Fragmentation The Philippines in Transition. Focus on the Global South & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Quezon City, 2014

11                          Bello, Walden; Cardenas, Kenneth; Cruz, Patrick Jerome; Manahan, Mary Ann; Militante, Clarissa; Purugganan, Joseph; Chavez, Jenina Joy. p. 202; Chapter 6: State of Fragmentation The Philippines in Transition. Focus on the Global South & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Quezon City, 2014

12                          Bello, Walden; Cardenas, Kenneth; Cruz, Patrick Jerome; Manahan, Mary Ann; Militante, Clarissa; Purugganan, Joseph; Chavez, Jenina Joy. p. 202; Chapter 6: State of Fragmentation The Philippines in Transition. Focus on the Global South & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Quezon City, 2014

13                          Bello, Walden; Cardenas, Kenneth; Cruz, Patrick Jerome; Manahan, Mary Ann; Militante, Clarissa; Purugganan, Joseph; Chavez, Jenina Joy. p. 202; Chapter 6: State of Fragmentation The Philippines in Transition. Focus on the Global South & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Quezon City, 2014

14                          http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/884205/pnp-murder-homicide-other-crimes-dec...

15                          http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/13/17/philippines-crime-rate-falls-13-percent-in-2016

16                          This section was originally published by ucanews

17                          Focus Group Discussion; September 2016

Dutertism. Dutertismo. The suffix ‘ism’ according to the dictionary may refer to a “distinctive practice, doctrine, theory,” and/or ideology. Does attaching an ‘ism’ therefore to the president’s name imply that he carries with him a unique brand of presidency; a different style of governance; a vision for the country that would set him apart from previous post-EDSA 1986 administrations?

What do his pronouncements—for which he’s famous or infamous for and through which most of his policies are crafted and known—tell us in terms of the future direction of his government? Is there anything new, radically, in vision and policies—economic, political, social? What kind of leadership, government, society do we glean from the first year of his presidency? Are we in for a change, as promised during his campaign? Or, as most of the articles you will find in this issue ask, do the policies just show continuity from the past government/s? Is that bad or good? Bad, maybe, in the sense that we have been promised that change is coming.

In the article on Dutertenomics, Joseph Purugganan points out why we were captivated by the promise of change—because millions of Filipinos were “dissatisfied with elite politics and governance, and with the majority (the so-called 99 percent) not benefitting from economic growth.” That “the backlash via popular support for Duterte is being directed more towards the elite bureaucracy and an oligarchy that are both impervious to the needs of the poor.” But President Duterte immediately professed he would be hands-off as far as economic policies are concerned because this was not his forte. Can we therefore expect the same economic recipe as in the past recipe defined by neoliberal orientation?

Some good news though came through the appointment of progressives in the cabinet; and one post which is very important is that of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) secretary’s given to former peasant leader Rafael Mariano. Mary Ann Manahan writes that this “signaled a pro-small farmer and pro-poor agenda of upholding farmers’ rights and re-prioritizing agrarian reform and smallholder agriculture.” However, she characterized Duterte’s countryside agenda as “schizophrenic…: populist promises in favor of the marginalized and poor in the countryside, on one hand, and on the other, a strong bias for agribusiness and big players in the sector…”

Manahan again points out this same style of governance in the environment sector, which she calls “laban-bawi”—one positive step is rendered meaningless by a counter move. But would this be sustainable in a situation where we face an environmental crisis? More of continuity would be seen in this government’s Build, Build, Build program, argues, Manahan in her piece on infrastructure.

In his piece on Duterte’s foreign policy, Galileo de Guzman Castillo invites us to ‘embark’ on a journey of unpacking the president’s “pronouncements and actions over the last 12 months” to find out what Duterte’s “touted in(depend)ent foreign policy” is all about. Can we finally find coherence and consistency here? Is there an opportunity to craft a genuine independent policy, according to our Constitution and laws? What should constitute an independent foreign policy?

Or can we find the radical change in Dutertism’s social reform agenda, which Raphael Baladad unpacks by comparing the lofty vision of the 2017-2022 Philippine Development Plan and the 2017 People’s Budget.

Where lies the coherence, it would become clear, is in the truly distinctive policy of this administration, the war on drugs which has been synonymous to war on the poor. As Clarissa V. Militante argues in her article, “Duterte’s campaign promise to kill drug addicts “hit the ground running immediately after he was sworn into office. On the first year of execution, this violent, uncompromising approach has already resulted in the deaths of 7,000 to 10,000 people.” The numbers may vary but “what is conclusive is that thousands have died as a result of this bloody policy, which the President vowed to continue until the end of his term.

Interview with Leila de Lima, political prisoner

On August 21, her 181^st day of incarceration and a week short of her birthday, Senator Leila de Lima gave me a wide ranging interview, perhaps the most extensive she has ever given.  The last time I saw her was in totally different circumstances, when we faced off as opposing candidates for the Senate at a debate sponsored by Rappler in April 2016.  I never imagined that at our next meeting she would be a tightly guarded political prisoner at Camp Crame.

Do you think Duterte will ever give up power?

I do question his psychology and state of mind.  You can’t tell what he will do.  He’s been charged with crimes against humanity before the International Criminal Court.  So it’s hard to see that he will easily relinquish power.  I think he is just waiting for the right opening to declare martial law over the whole country. The appointment instead of election of barangay officials must be seen in this light.  It could be a step towards martial law or authoritarianism. I don’t know whether to underestimate or overestimate his capacity.  It’s very fluid.

What accounts for Duterte’s rise?

Duterte’s rise must be seen in the context of the rise of populism globally.  Duterte’s rise was a reaction against decades of neglect and mounting frustrations.  People were fed up with the leaders who were educated and came from the elite.  It’s time to try a different animal, they thought, even if he is a scoundrel.  He struck the right chords, despite his bravado.  He speaks a language people understand.  He sold himself as anti-corruption, and he branded all those opposed to him as enemies of the state.  He definitely managed a good sell of his persona.  But with what is now happening, it’s time for people to rethink.

How would you assess your record at the Department of Justice?

I was a political neophyte.  I had been an election law practitioner, before I was appointed to be chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights. But I just served two years out of the seven year-term since I was appointed by PNoy to be Secretary of Justice.  I was full of idealism and desire to change things in any way I could.  But I knew the problems were overwhelming and that PNoy had to focus on the economy.  I was tasked to give order to the administration of justice, and as in other areas of public service, there was inefficiency and corruption there.  In my own little way as Secretary of Justice, I pushed a number of reforms like revitalizing the network of prosecutors and taking on a number of high profile cases, like the PDAF scam, the Luneta hostage taking, the Atimonan massacre.  And I had to go after corrupt prosecutors. The challenge was quite overwhelming. We had areas of successes and areas of failure.  The important thing was to make sure democracy was working.  One thing I can say is that persecution was not in my agenda, and we never persecuted anyone using the machinery of the executive branch. I don’t think we were remiss in addressing the drug problem, as Duterte’s people claim.  We prosecuted people, but we followed the law.  We did not engage in extra-judicial killing of suspects.

What ae your views on the drug problem?

The basic problem is poverty and inequality.  That has to be addressed.  The president has exaggerated the danger because he was a single-issue candidate, and it worked with voters.  His statement that there are 3 or 4 million users is inaccurate.  The Dangerous Drugs Board head said there are only 1.8 million, and this cost him his job because the president had to persist in his narrative that we are a narco-state.  It’s propaganda.

Why has Duterte focused on you?

It’s a personal vendetta.  He can’t stand my having dared to investigate him in 2009, when I was CHR chair.  We had open public hearings on the Davao Death Squad, and we summoned him.  He appeared.  I told him straight that we were told that he had encouraged the unsolved killings.  He has not forgotten nor forgiven me.  He got a tape about an interview in Davao where I said that I would prove that there is DDS and he’s behind it. When he became President, he said in a public event that he would make me eat the CD.

Second, because I am a woman.  He can’t imagine that a woman would dare defy him, much less openly oppose him.  His own men and contemporaries in San Beda confirm he can’t stand being contradicted.  So what more if a woman opposes him.

He told Congress not to interfere with his war on drugs.  On July 13, 2016, when I called for an inquiry, the old wounds resurfaced, and what really angered him was when we presented Edgar Matobato as a witness.

I am also an easy target.  I don’t belong to any dynasty, have no influential friends, and don’t have any political clout.  I made enemies during my stint at the DOJ as SOJ, among them GMA, some senators, and people who belonged to powerful blocs.  So no one really came to my defense or my rescue.

Aren’t there people that the president listens to?

There are decent people in the Cabinet, like ES Medialdea, and Secretaries Tugade, Evasco, Dureza and Briones, who are in a position to ask the president to stop the killings.  But will they do it?  These Cabinet members can see the growing outrage, especially over the killing of the student.  It’s very clear what’s right and wrong.  But they’re scared of the president because he does not like to be contradicted.  To me, it’s no surprise that they are fearful of the president.  At the same time, they don’t want to take the option of resigning.

The constitutional provision is available that if a president is physically or mentally incapacitated, the Cabinet can declare him unfit to discharge his duties.  They can have recourse to that.  I don’t see anyone in the cabinet who would even raise the subject.  But if they persist in their silence, they are complicit in what is happening.

Is the PNP hopeless?

It’s not really hopeless.  But rebuilding the institution will take years since the current crop of police officers have been converted into cold blooded killers and they’ll be there for two more decades.  Reforming the PNP will take more than the usual reforms.  A few more years of this would take a toll on the institution.  The next president will have his hands full attending to this institution.

What about the military?

To be honest about it, the only remaining institution that is more or less faithful to its constitutional mission is the military.  Congress supported the martial law extension and the Supreme Court supported the Marcos burial and provided the legal justification for martial law.  I am still trying to pin my hopes though in the Supreme Court, even if 10 or 11 are or will be the president’s own appointees if he serves his term.  Congress is very disappointing.  It has served as a rubberstamp and lost the opportunity to manifest its ideal role as an independent branch of government.  But the military is hanging on, so far.  As an institution it refuses to be used in the war on drugs.  The president knows his hold on the military is less strong than on the other institutions.

What about the Senate?

The president could not stand me and wanted me out.  The majority could not afford to go against the wishes of the president because he has the capacity to make their lives difficult.  He has dossiers on each of them and he can use these to harass them.  They were scared of the president, but they would not admit that or admit that ousting me was what the president wanted.

Some of them are sincere, and as things become more and more unacceptable, some of the others may seize the opportunity to take advantage of the outrage as the tide turns.  I have an idea of who are the sincere ones and who are plain opportunists.

With the police having become the personal instrument of the president, do you feel safe being incarcerated at the PNP custodial center?  With the president now able to get away with almost anything, don’t you feel you can be an object of EJK and the PNP custodial center would be the ideal site for such an action?  What is your estimate of getting out of here alive?

I still believe – and, of course, pray – that I would someday regain my freedom and vindication in this lifetime.  Perhaps it is naïve of me to say it, but I admit that there is a part of me – perhaps the same part that keeps me going in spite of everything – that believes that my innocence and the importance of my advocacy somehow protects me.  I am aware, of course, that this might be more a matter of faith and wishful thinking on my part.  I am all that more vulnerable because I am completely and utterly at the mercy of my captors.  And that is what I am – a captive in my own country, at the mercy of my oppressors.  While my immediate jailers – the police officers here at the Custodial Center – tend to be professional and respectful, I cannot for a moment forget that the person at the very top of the food chain, who himself admits that he has no qualms about killing people, sees me as an arch enemy and has falsely charged me with illegal drug trading, which in the streets today is basically a death warrant for people who are not in this administration’s good graces.  He has even expressly stated that he wants me to hang myself. I cannot help but fear that he could have me killed anytime. 

In other words, while I still want to believe that my innocence must afford me some protection and chances of deliverance from evil designs, I cannot forget how vulnerable I am.  I live and die at the whim of a sociopath.

I know that the legalities are on your side, but since this is a political case, how confident are you that you will be able to get out of custody while Duterte remains chief of state?

While I still have faith in the independence of the judiciary – which might not be for long if the president and his allies succeed in ousting the Chief Justice, which will not only leave open that critical post, but will also necessarily have a chilling effect on everyone else as it serves as a warning against those who would dare stand up to him and his despotic rule – I am not very confident of regaining my freedom while the President remains as powerful as he is today.  I have to manage my expectations, you see.  And I expect that, even if the merits of my case are strong, probably the best I can hope for is to survive the waiting game.   So I remain hopeful because the law and the truth is on my side, but I cannot lose sight of the current political reality we are all living in right now.

If you were offered the choice of pleading guilty to lesser charges in exchange for freedom and assuming your Senate duties, would you take the offer?  Or is your position dismissal of all charges or nothing at all, in which case you are prepared to be detained indefinitely?

The question is would I sacrifice my integrity by pleading guilty to an offense I did not commit, in order to have the chance to assume my Senate duties and serve the people who elected me into office? On the surface, it seems to ask whether I would sacrifice my personal interest in order to serve the greater good.  I will not be serving the greater good by becoming complicit in obscuring the truth and playing into their narrative.  By pleading to an offense – any offense – that I did not commit in exchange for some promise, I would be selling my mandate, not serving it.  It would be tantamount to admitting that I am being charged, detained and oppressed for reasons other than the simple and incontrovertible fact that I dared stand up to the President in order to defend the human rights of our people – their right to life, liberty, and security – especially the poor and the vulnerable, who are dying in the streets while the real culprits, the big-time and even self-confessed drug lords are going scot-free.  Only the truth will set me and our people free. 

As someone who has followed your career closely and worked with you on some issues while I was in Congress, I find it inconceivable that people would believe what Duterte’s people are saying about you.  Why do you think there are so many people who are willing to swallow Malacanang’s story, no matter how outrageously false it is?

I think there are people who believe because they want to believe.  They want to believe because they don’t want to face the reality of who they elected as President.  That is the misconception we have about democracy.  People feel invested in the person they supported, and they do not want to believe that he is capable of destroying an innocent human being for personal vengeance and political power, because if they admit that, they believe that they also have to admit that they made the wrong choice.  I think people aren’t yet prepared for that dose of reality.  That is the only explanation I could come up with why ordinary people would believe the lies being peddled by the Duterte administration against me, even in the face of the facts, my track record in public service, the utter lack of evidence and even coherence in the cases filed against me, and the circumstances that placed me in the crosshairs of the president and eventually led me here.

I also believe that we have to do something about the erosion of the integrity of the information that our people are exposed to.  Fake news, online and offline troll armies and propaganda machineries that peddle so-called “alternative facts”.  If there is such a thing as “alternative fact”, we already have a word for it: lies.  People are being exposed to lies.  On some level, they are being duped.  But on another level, they must know that they are being lied to, but they are probably too weary to sort it out anymore.  They have become so tired of, and, thus, desensitized to, separating the lies from the truth. There is truth in the saying that the truth hurts.  People are perhaps not yet prepared to face certain truths.  The time will come when they will be forced to.  Unfortunately, it might take more lives to be sacrificed before that happens.  Hopefully, when they are ready to be awakened, it would not be too late for all of us.  On the other hand, I think that there are people who do not really believe that I am guilty of the charges filed against me.  These are people who, like you, have worked with me, or have seen me perform my duties, first, as an election lawyer, next as a public servant in the CHR and, thereafter, in the DOJ.  But they will not stand up to the President and say that to his face.  They will not come out to speak in my favor – even if their conscience tells them that I am a victim of political persecution – precisely because of my track record and the fact that I truly am a victim of political persecution.  Duterte has been very successful, thus far, in undermining the independence of offices and officials precisely because they have seen what he can do to an innocent woman.   

You said there have been so few of your colleagues and other personalities willing to stand up for you.  Where is this coming from?  Is it fear of what the president can do to them?

I think the same thing that I have said above applies to my colleagues and other personalities.  Some are in denial – they don’t want to face the reality that they have bent the knee, so-to-speak, to an unscrupulous, sociopathic, vengeful, remorseless despot.   Others, I believe, know the truth, but they dare not speak it because they dare not draw attention to themselves, or sacrifice what security – or what little thereof – they feel in the current political climate.  After all, if the President can do this to me – someone who is totally innocent – what can he do to others?

Finally, we have to see my current circumstances in light of everything I have done in my career as a public servant.  Let’s face it, I have made powerful enemies, many of whom are still in power and have formed an alliance with the President, because of my commitment to delivering justice without fear or favor.  Ironically, and yet logically, it is my track record as CHR Chairperson and DOJ Secretary that has made me a target for vengeance.  So there are those who would never speak up for me because they are probably thanking Duterte for giving me what they probably see as my comeuppance.  It is perhaps a blessing that I am not a traditional politician.  That I am used to standing up on my own.  That I do not have to rely on others to find the courage to do and stand up for what is right.  The tide will turn, with or without the support of my colleagues, and when it does, they will have to face the consequences of the choices they have made, even the choice to ignore the truth and allow innocent people to be victimized.

[This interview first appeared in rappler, September 5 & 6, 2017: https://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/181153-leila-de-lima-bloody-but-...

We are trade union and civil society representatives from seven Asian countries who came together to discuss the impacts on labour rights and essential public services of the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between 16 Asian nations. After two days of deliberations and reviewing the exciting experiences and the analysis available, we concluded that several proposals on the table of this far reaching economic deal have the potential to negatively impact decent work, labour rights, access to essential services such as water, electricity and healthcare, and add new challenges to the provision of quality public services in the region.

As the RCEP Ministerial will be held today 10 September in Manila, we publish the following statement of our position regarding these negotiations.

We are deeply concerned with the secrecy and lack of democratic process around these talks. Despite four years of negotiations texts have not been shared with elected representatives, and not been tabled for discussion in our respective tripartite mechanisms, let alone shared in the public domain for wide and informed consultation. While we acknowledge the 'official stakeholder' events that have taken place in the last three rounds of negotiations (Jakarta, Manila and Hyderabad) and in Manila a few days ago, these are far too limited as long as the text under discussion is kept secret.

We reject the controversial Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism proposed as part of this deal. ISDS is a flawed framework in which only one party – the investor - has the right to raise claims against another – the State. There is no justification for such a biased adjudication system in which States can never win, as even when they do not lose they bear the cost of litigation. The Philippines had to pay US$ 58 million in legal expenses despite the German transport company Fraport losing the case against the former. These arbitration tribunals only recognises rights, but no obligations for investors, and privilege the terms of trade and economic deals above our countries' Constitution.

Further, the threat of challenge under this powerful international arbitration system impinges on the sovereignty of nations to formulate national laws and policies. We are particularly worried of the possibility that foreign investors challenge the outcomes of collective bargaining processes within countries, as we have seen in Egypt. The French company Veolia challenged the increase in national minimum wage brought about in Egypt by trade union demands in the wake of the Arab spring. Veolia demanded that the minimum wage increase be revised or that the company be compensated by the State for so called 'loss in expected profits'. That a company feels emboldened enough to make such a claim speaks of the abusive use of this system that is currently taking place behind closed doors.

The current trade regime has already led to an intensification of precarious work and contractualisation of employment in the region. Permanent contracts, a key component of decent work as defined by the ILO is seen by business as a rigidity in employment regulations that needs to be done away with. RCEP's provision of drastic cuts in import duties will increase the competition among manufacturing companies within the region. Experience tells us that most often the response from management is to resort to exploiting loopholes in labour laws or the lack of implementation of labour laws, to cut costs. This not only impacts the livelihoods of workers but also unionisation as precarious workers are less likely to join trade unions. This is a concern for our societies as a whole as it has been shown that lower unionisation leads to more income inequality within a society.

The provision of quality public services is also at risk. On the one hand government revenues are affected, and on the other, the cost of public services provision, especially for healthcare, stands to increase substantially. According to UNCTAD, import duties are key sources of government revenues for developing countries. In the region, this can be as high as around 17% of central government revenues in India. Drastic cuts in import duties will have a negative impact on the ability of the government to adequately finance services such as healthcare, water and sanitation, and education. In addition, the compensation claims from international arbitration are exorbitant and this comes from tax payer’s money. Indonesia had to pay US$ 337 million to Cemex in compensation. According to a leaked text, RCEP also demands decreased licensing fees, which are essential revenues for municipalities.

The cost of the provisions of essential services has to be balanced between infrastructure, human resources and cost of inputs. If there is a substantial increase in any of the three, the availability of resources for the other will be affected. For instance, medicines are essential inputs in the provision of healthcare that account for a substantial part of government's health budgets. Provisions proposed under the Intellectual property rights text of RCEP would strengthen the monopoly of patent holders. Studies have shown that such changes would lead to higher costs of medicines (Kajal to add data).

Further, in the name of ensuring market access and equal treatment to foreign players, RCEP promotes the commodification of public goods, such as health, water and energy. These are services that are best provided by the public sector, require social accountability and have to be provided in the public’s interest. The private sector and the market are neither equipped, nor adequate to their provision and can at best play a subservient role under tight government regulation and guidance. Not only does RCEP promote the role of private players in the provision of these essential services, provisions in the services and investment chapters of RCEP stand to affect the ability of the government to regulate private providers. This is nothing but a recipe for disaster in which the worse affected will be the poor, women and marginalised communities across the region.

Finally, as shown in a recent report called “Reclaiming Public Services –how cities and citizens are turning back privatisation”, the failure of privatisation experiments, especially but not limited to the energy and the water sector, have led to a wave of cases where cities and municipalities have brought back privatised entities into public hands. The report identifies more than 800 cases in 41 countries over the past 17 years. Provisions proposed under RCEP, such as Standstill, Ratchet and MFN-Forward, would entrench privatisation and pose a threat to the option to remunicipalise services.

Based on the above concerns, we demand that the RCEP negotiations be halted until the text is made public and discussed in parliament and in tripartite bodies in our respective countries. We reaffirm and support the call of ASEAN Parliamentarians for a thorough cost-benefit assessment of RCEP as well as a human rights impact assessment.

We demand that submissions from the trade union movement and other people's organisations, based on a careful examination of the proposition on the table be taken as part of the negotiation process. ASEAN governments have asserted the centrality of ASEAN in this process. We demand then that the guiding principles of ASEAN be at the core of the considerations of economic deals in the region. This implies that differences in development need to be given due recognition and form the base of expectations from different countries within and outside ASEAN. The notion of ASEAN centrality should also mean giving primacy to peoples rights and needs in these negotiations. Human rights such as the right to water, right to health, right to life and right to development come before economic expectations of investors. To ensure this, the trade union movement and other people's organisations must have meaningful participation in the negotiations.

Until these demands are fulfilled, we reject the RCEP negotiation process and the outcome of it as a flawed and undemocratic process that does not stand to benefit workers, communities, and social development in our region.

Introduction

Over the past two decades, an increasing number of countries have been following a policy of ever-progressing trade liberalization. India has by no means been an exception to this trend. Despite the tremendous impacts of trade liberalization on Indian agriculture in particular and on people's livelihoods in general, the consequent Indian governments do not seem to lose their enthusiasm for free trade.

In general, trade liberalization aims at the reduction or complete removal of trade barriers between two countries or amongst a group of countries. This involves the reduction or the removal of both tariff-barriers (such as duties, export subsidies and surcharges) as well as non- tariff-barriers (such as hygiene standards, quotas or licensing rules).

Within the last twenty years there has probably been no other instrument that has influenced and promoted the free trade regime as much as the World Trade Organization (WTO) did. This intergovernmental organization had emerged out of the GATT[1] in 1995 and since then aimed at “ensuring that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.”[2] While the former GATT had only covered trade in goods, with the founding of the WTO, two new treaties, namely GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) and TRIPs (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) were added to the agenda of this new organization. This means that for more than two decades now, trade liberalization does not only cover the trade in goods, but goes much further and also includes the trade in services and investments, as well as other areas such as intellectual property rights, economic or technical cooperation and competition. Under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) the free trade regime, moreover, found its way into the agricultural sector, requiring all WTO members to liberalize their agricultural markets and remove all “trade distorting” measures such as subsidies and domestic supports. What is more, is that with WTO a dispute settlement was introduced, which allows the punishment of members that violate trade rules. This mechanism, together with the ongoing removal of trade barriers (especially in the agricultural sector), makes it more and more difficult for governments today to undertake policies that would secure their domestic agricultural and manufacturing sectors. This is especially alarming when it comes to developing countries[3] which highly rely on such policies in order to ensure food security for their population.

In the past, developing countries have consistently pointed out to this fact. They also revealed how the AoA has created a massive dumping mechanism for developed countries' cheap subsidized agricultural products that have been destroying the livelihoods of small farmers and peasants as they are no longer able to compete with the cheaper goods from developed nations that have been imported into their markets.

Due to such disagreements between developed and developing countries over the agriculture issues, negotiations at the WTO have been stalled for almost a decade since the launch of the Doha Round.4 However, developed nations, with the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) leading the way, found new ways to move forward the free trade agenda in the meantime. Today, so-called “Free Trade Agreements” or “FTAs” especially the mega FTAs like Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) or Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are the latest strategy of developed countries to push for access into new markets. As they bring with them unforeseen outcomes for millions of people, many questions can be raised; most of all, in what ways are these trade agreements affecting people in India and other developing countries? Are there new agreements that are being negotiated at the moment? And what are their possible impacts for Indian people in the near future?

This booklet attempts to answer some of these questions in the following four chapters:

Chapter One will provide detailed information on free trade agreements in general and explain how such agreements are different from the WTO.

Chapter Two names some of India's existing trade agreements and shows some of the negative impacts they already had for people in India.

Chapter Three examines new trade agreements that are currently under negotiation and refers to their projected consequences in different elds, such as agriculture, and access to medicine.

Chapter Four will give a conclusion and some ideas and perspectives on how to (re)act on the new free trade regime.

[1]GATT: The “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” (1948 – 1995) was a multilateral agreement regulating international trade. Its purpose was the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences.

[2]WTO: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm

[3]Today, developing countries constitute about two thirds of the WTO's 164 members (WTO: https://www.wto.org/ english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap6_e.pdf