In May last year, Rodrigo Duterte was elected to the Philippines presidency, with his ascendancy to power embodying an unravelling of the discourse  that has supported the People Power Revolution of 1986.  A populist, strongman figure and called as the ‘Executioner’ in Davao (Mindanao) where he had been mayor for several terms, Duterte's electoral campaign was anchored on the messaging “change is coming,” which responded to the disillusionment of many; the generals sense that nothing hasdchanged in the political and economic situation of the greater number of Filipinos since People Power and that previous elections had only entrenched Philippine elite rule. Duterte has rejected liberal democracy, in which human rights and due process serve as key ideals, as enshrined too in the 1987 Constitution. (In the economic sphere, though, he continues to implement policies following the neo-liberal economic/development paradigm) Authoritarianism is back in mode as epitomized by the following:

·        A super majority coalition in both houses of Congress and lack of real opposition,

·        Non-recognition of human rights as principle for citizen’s participation and democracy,

·        Pending death penalty bills in Congress,

·        Culture of impunity especially among security forces,  

·        Targeting of human rights defenders as enemies of the state,

·        Former generals and military people appointed to key government offices,  

·        Nationalist rhetoric and claims of promoting ‘nationhood’,

·        A bloody “war on drugs”, which has claimed 12,000 lives, mostly coming from urban poor communities and use of physical violence as core part of the state’s politics, and

·        Anti-women and patriarchal discourse and culture of misogyny and sexism with President Duterte sexually objectifying women, normalizing women-shaming and gender stereotyping to discriminate against women in political and public discourse.

The war on drugs, in particular, has caused worldwide alarm among other governments, civil society, and social movements.

Symbolic and discursive power and Duterte

The economic, political, and socio-cultural promises of People Power/EDSA 1986 remain unfulfilled and social justice, a pillar of the 1987 Constitution elusive. (Though it has to be said that there is no societal consensus on what those promises really are and the ‘change’ that Filipinos want after EDSA.) The rise of Duterte to power can be viewed as a manifestation of peoples’, in particular, the lower and marginalized classes, frustration and disillusionment over the last three decades of elite/liberal democracy that People Power ushered in. By presenting himself as anti-EDSA system, anti-oligarch, ‘leftist’, and anti-imperial Manila, Duterte was able to set himself apart from big-money-backed traditional candidates. Despite his self-professed connection with the Marcoses, who are part of the oligarchy, an overwhelming majority voted for him. I surmise that part of the reason for his victory is the compelling ‘alternative’ narrative he offered, anchored on (i) shaking up the economic system, get rid of mechanisms, rules, and processes which have entrenched inequality, poverty and marginalization into the core of Philippine political economy (e.g. ending contractualization, free irrigation for farmers, specialized hospitals in Visayas and Mindanao, government subsidies for the poor, getting rid of traders and loan sharks in the agricultural value chain); and (ii) fighting drugs and crime and ensuring general peace and order. This narrative contains frames/discourses that determine what Duterte sees as the key issue/problem of the country and the solution/action that he has taken or plan to take. On the promise of shaking up the system, Duterte’s administration is in fact maintaining the status quo and there are many manifestations that he will continue the past administration’s neoliberal economic agenda. For example, his macroeconomic strategy/ policies or ‘Dutertenomics’ focus on increasing free trade agreements, foreign direct investments, PPP schemes, and big infrastructure projects, which may increase the country’s debt burden. He recently allowed Congress to reject the appointment of Gina Lopez, a staunch anti-mining advocate, as Environment secretary; the mining industry’s interests prevailed.

For the second aspect, Duterte is way more consistent. Fourteen out of his thirty electoral promises are about peace and order: he has acted on them starting with his declaration of a brutal ‘war on drugs’, which has claimed more than 12,000 lives, mostly from poor communities, demonization of human rights and identification of human rights defenders as enemies of the state, the push for death penalty, the lowering of the age of criminal liability, and review of anti-wiretapping laws, among others. These are ‘disciplinary’ decrees/actions that crystallize his securitization discourse.

While sectors of society have criticized and opposed these actions and measures, especially the war on drugs, Duterte still enjoys popularity and political and social capital. However, recent surveys show that his popularity decreased among the poor classes but increased among the upper and middle classes. A section of the Philippine traditional left (the Bayan group) also supports Duterte, with three of its leaders now holding posts in the Agrarian Reform, Anti-poverty, and Social Work and Community Development ministries.

From a Foucauldian interpretation, his war on drugs forms a new ‘regime of truth and knowledge’, that the universal principles of human rights are excuses to destroy the country, that some lives are less important than others, that violence justifies the political end of making people feel safe in the night, and trade-offs are necessary.

But are the Filipino people really willing to trade off certain hard-won freedoms such as human rights for this?For how long will Duterte remain popular across classes despite his fascist/authoritarian policies and decrees? Are his supporters not conflicted about the killings, which has surpassed the Marcos dictatorship’s records by more than 100 percent?

To answer these questions, understanding power as discursive and symbolic (in Bourdieu’s sense) offer some conceptual handles. First, the power to spin a new narrative, that all crimes can be attributed to drugs, functions almost as an ideology to organize people’s perception of and their relationship to the world—to everyday life, politics, to the state and to build support for and neutralize/ alienate other narratives, for instance human rights and create social stigma around it. This is why the casualty of the ‘war on drugs’ are not only the 12,000 lives but peoples’ ability to make a stand and defend their rights in the face of real violence. This, in turn, create alternative realities and facts, new regimes of truth and knowledge. This is not about rational analyses or the sharpest lines but who has the ability to sustain a narrative, which can manufacture consent of the population and defuse counter-narratives in the context of contentious politics (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015).

The creation of a mythical figure and narrative is a key element in sustaining this narrative. Duterte projected himself as the father who will end the country’s national ‘chaos’/ problems, which adds to his appeal to many across the class spectrum. His language is couched in paternalistic love that produces a politics of emotive and affective symbolism and not politics of reason. His political and social capital rest on instincts, image, emotions and symbolism that present a different political ensemble than his predecessors (Bello, 2016). He appeals to a lot of Filipinos here and abroad because he taps on deep-seated frustrations, anger, and emotions and channels them into actions via his various wars and fights (war against scalawags/fight against corrupt police, war against the western world, war against mainstream media, etc.). French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu would explain this as the ‘tacit and almost unconscious modes of cultural/social domination happening within the everyday realities of conscious subjects’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 165-167)[1]. If we extend Bourdieu’s symbolic power, Duterte’s minion of trolls and propagandists on social media are imposing categories of thought and perception upon which most Filipinos begin to accept, use, observe and evaluate Philippine society in terms of such categories (e.g. drug addicts are less than human and they deserve to die; all opposition/critics of the President belong to the Yellow-camp/ dichotomies). The social construction of categories and ways of perceiving renders the violence as just/justified, the war on drugs a specter of legitimacy and therefore, perpetuates a social structure that serves the interest of the administration.

Power to the people?

How do you build political power in the context of authoritarianism and fascism-populism? How are poor communities responding to the war on drugs?What will become of grassroots activism in the context of authoritarianism, masked as war on drugs? Will the anti-dictatorship efforts and rallies be sustained and transformed into a political movement?

Let me respond to the point on grassroots activism viz. war on drugs. As posited by one of my colleagues in Focus, people’s abilities to make a stand about their rights are curtailed by the state-sponsored war on drugs and extra-judicial killings. Some local organizers in urban poor communities tell stories of shrinking democratic spaces, of clear and present danger and fear for their lives, and 24/7 surveillance by the police, which make it more difficult for grassroots activism or opposition to flourish. There are emerging local models, however, of how communities trying to defend themselves in the face of such violence. One model is to build local alliances with prominent faith-based leaders, local peoples’ organizations, lawyers, etc. Foremost for local communities that are targets of the Oplan Tokhang (local name of Duterte’s war on drugs) is to work together to access justice for victims, organize for awareness building and vigilance.  Some local communities are also aware and wary of the efforts of Kilusang Pagbabago (Movement for Change), the grassroots and village-level political formation being organized by Cabinet Secretary Leoncio ‘Jun’ Evasco to consolidate Duterte’s political base in support for his bid for federalism and to change the 1987 Constitution (to remove the restrictions for foreign investments in land).

Other initiatives are efforts by local executives or mayors to stop Oplan Tokhang or when lawyers were mobilized in to respond to the Philippine National Police’s letter demanding residents to attend an assembly/consultation on war on drugs. As of this writing, too, there is an on-going social movement-led march to defend human rights and resist the pending death penalty bills in Congress. The Catholic Church has joined these forces marching to defend people’s lives.

These efforts speak about various responses and strategies—from resistance to reworking or adapting to the current situation. These further allude to the relation between actors/agency and structure and how even in most repressive situations, local actors find ‘spaces to maneuver’ (Long, 2001) and ‘spaces of indeterminacy’ or grey areas, where the poor and marginalized can exercise claim-making and where agency is possible (Dressler, et. al., 2012). There might be also everyday forms of cultural ‘resistance’, hidden and public transcripts (cf. James Scott’s weapons of the weak) employed by communities under the war on drug that are as important a strategy as collective and planned actions such as mobilizations. New social movement formations have also emerged to provide the much-needed opposition to the administration.

The imposition of Martial Law in Mindanao carries with it the probability of Martial Law being imposed in the entire Philippines. With President Duterte threatening to put the Visayas and Luzon under Martial Law (he had made similar threats about Mindanao before actually declaring it on May 23 while on a state visit in Russia), there is no room for complacency, especially as far human rights defenders, leftist activists, and resistance and social movements are concerned. He has said that if even a single ISIS member is spotted in Metro Manila, he will expand the coverage of Martial Law (ML).

There should have been no qualification as to who should be concerned about ML being declared in the whole country; most are also at the forefront of the opposition now to ML in Mindanao, as the Marawi crisis has not warranted such response. The military has long been part of the island’s landscape, fighting rebellion and terrorism. Militarism has never sufficiently arrested conflicts and violence, even terrorism, and should be scowled upon. On the contrary, this response has often spawned more violence, especially directed against civilian.

For us in the human rights movement as well as ‘70s and 80s activists, it has been a quandary why the public couldn’t be united in opposing ML. It is a reality though that there are contending views on ML particularly around its necessity in addressing conflicts in Mindanao. But our history with ML under the Marcos regime should have generated a consciousness that would resist this, even among the younger generations who have not experienced and witnessed the horrors of that era. There has been a failure in our collective memory-making here. It certainly didn’t help that the liberal democrats who belonged to or are allied with the oligarchy have glossed over this reckoning with the past to protect their own political and economic interests.

With the ghosts of history being resurrected by the current ML rule in Mindanao, we can’t help but use the past and its lessons as lens for current events; and compare Marcos with Duterte.

Both Marcos and Duterte are popular, charismatic leaders. Marcos used to be the epitome of a firebrand, captivating public speaker until that time when even his eloquence could no longer cover up the horrifying realities under his dictatorship; when the vision of a “new society” had turned into a nightmare. Duterte has been able to capture the adulation of a sizeable public with his misogynist language and vitriol.  The base of Duterte’s popular support is also the lower to middle class, the same section of society that supported Marcos in the early years of his rule (and there would be the section of this population who would continue to remember him as a well-meaning leader). Their main argument, which sells to the middle class’ penchant for order and security: if one isn’t involved in illegal activity, one doesn’t to be afraid of ML. Marcos, however, demonized activists and leftists so that in the mind of the public, they caused disorder and that ML necessarily targeted them.

Under the Duterte regime, those who have something to be afraid is the cabal of human rights defenders, drug addicts (who are not human); and the ‘extremists’.

Marcos used the issue of peace and security as well as social stability when he declared ML in 1972; his bogeyman at that time were the Communists or the so-called imminent danger to the nation’s existence from Communist insurgency. This had held ground especially with the middle class who had an aversion for unrest, criminality, unruly behavior.  The poor of course went daily unrest caused by poverty and resulting from their lack of or inadequate social, economic, and political agency.

Duterte’s reason—excuse to deepen authoritarian rule—for declaring ML in Mindanao is terrorism, which isn’t a recent phenomenon, and in fact has long added to the complexity of the conflicts in the island. It is likely that he will use this again to justify ML in the whole country. For us human rights defenders, there should be no prevarication when it comes to our position towards ML whether the crisis is fabricated, perceived, or real. In the past and as it is now, human rights is the first casualty under ML, especially under this president who is its avowed enemy. 

History is also now being used to dredge up distortions and biases that the peace movements in Mindanao have painstakingly worked to diminish, if not to end. Mabel Carumba, a peace activist from the island, has spoken about how with Martial Law, the Christian-Muslim divide has been immediately played up by various interests, thus weakening efforts in the past to use dialogue and traditional means of resolving conflict.  These means might not have totally eradicated the roots of conflict, but there had been success stories, according to Carumba.

Collective Memory-Making as Resistance

Memory’s frailty often makes it unreliable, but in recounting history and passing on to the younger generations the narratives that comprise it, personal witnessing and reminiscences are very powerful. Historians though will caution us that collective memory is not just about personal experiences; the process of collective-memory making involves deepening our understanding and appreciation of historical events or periods through formal and other means of education. Beyond personal memory, collective memory comes also from all the documents, documentation, narratives of the period being remembered and judged. In historical time, 20 – 30 years would be insufficient for the collective memory-making process and thus would render historical interpretation still very contentious. The declaration of ML under Marcos will be 45 years old this year. This puts us at a critical juncture when it has become more urgent to fight revisionism and the interests behind authoritarian rule in the past who have been emboldened again by the Duterte government.

According to historians, after 50 years would be the minimum time needed to evaluate historical events—and that this role is not only for those who lived through these events but for those who have come after.#

*This article is based on the reflections I shared with members of #BlockMarcos Movement during their strategy meeting.

Joseph Elijah Sydney Gil and Jose Medriano III*

Banners in hand, feeling hungry but  resolute, the farmers marched from Bataan to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in Quezon City. Their voices sounding tired but  marked with incredible conviction. 

Their demands:: agrarian reform and justice. They ask that the government intervene to stop the human rights violations, criminalization of their struggle, and to allow them to enter and till their farms.

Despite the exhausting 100-km march from Hermosa, Bataan to the DAR in Quezon City, the farmers, 400 0f them, stood their ground. Farmers of the Samahan ng mga Nagkakaisang Mamamayan ng Barangay Sumalo (SANAMABASU) demanded accountability from Secretary Rafael Mariano.

Nine years ago, 214 hectares of land tilled by the farmers of Sumalo were fenced by the Riverforest Development Corporation, owned by the Litton family from Forbes Park. The government has since failed to address reports of human rights violations and continuous harassment.

The program started at the gates of DAR where leaders spoke before the gathered crowds. It was noon and the sun was at its peak. Clouds provided some relief, until the farmers were finally granted entry. But the Secretary is out of the country.

Around 50 farmers from Sumalo remain camped at DAR. They await a dialogue with the Secretary and with the Office of the President. 

Watch the struggle of Sumalo farmers, here: Fenced in, Fenced Out: The Struggle for Food, Land and Survival

More photos can be viewed here: Lakbayan of Farmers

* Joseph and Jose are interns with Focus on the Global South-Philippines Programme. Both are Political Science majors at the Ateneo de Manila University. 

“Enclosures have appropriately been called a revolution of the rich against the poor.”

Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. 1944. (p. 35)         

“Our ancestral domain or traditional territory covers not just our ancestral land but all the flora and fauna within it, the wildlife, the air, the minerals under it, the water which flows through it, the spirits within, which is passed on from one generation to another."

Nena “Bae Rose” Undag-Lumandong, an indigenous woman leader from the Philippines, speaking at the first Sombath Symposium on “Humanity and Nature: Traditional, Cultural and Alternative Perspectives”, February 15-17, 2015, Chulalungkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand

Introduction

The enclosures of the commons that Polanyi wrote about in 1944 Britain continue all over the world today, through an alarming array of laws, policies, and treaties and agreements, often through the exercise of brute force. In a world wracked with deepening climate, economic, environmental and social crises, capital recognizes the potential of commons to nurture and recreate “the conditions needed for life and its reproduction.” (De Angelis, n.d.)

The commons refer to different kinds of wealth, spaces, values, social relations, systems, processes and activities that “belong to” communities, societies and in some cases all of us, that are actively claimed, (re)created, protected and restored for collective good and purpose, for present and future generations. The best known examples of commons are natural, for example air, water, land, forests and biodiversity. But over the years, commons scholars have expanded the realm of the commons to social, intellectual, cultural and even political spheres. These include health, education, knowledge, science, technology, the internet, literature, music, human rights, justice, etc. Notions of social and political commons that require interventions by state institutions do not sit well with some commons scholars. We argue, however, that values and facilities crucial for life, dignity, equity and equality should be recognized as commons, even if we do not yet have non-state, non-market regimes to govern them.

Commons can be 'inherited’ by a community or group from previous generations and passed on to future generations. They can be invented, created, adapted, protected and replenished through collectively agreed and evolving rules, for example irrigation systems, music, urban gardens, revived watersheds, seeds, traditional knowledge, online knowledge portals, workers’ cooperatives, etc. Internet technology has enabled a virtual commons which in turn has led to the generation of new knowledges and knowledge communities, as well as new forms of social relations. Seed-sharing is one of the oldest commons that communities have practised. By ensuring seeds are made available to the public (through seed libraries, for example), it promotes local communities’ capacities to achieve food sovereignty and resiliency, and generates a shared sense of place, local interdependence and responsibilities.

Commons are not governed through private property, market or state regimes, but by one or many groups of people, who can be socially, economically, and culturally diverse. For example, a territory may include a forest, river and coastal area that would be shared and protected by peasant fishing and pastoral communities through a collectively elaborated system of governance with rules, obligations, penalties for over-use, damage, etc. Online platforms for sharing information and knowledge engage multiple users from across the world.  But for a resource, space, knowledge or facility to be commons, it must be identified and delimited as commons. Its boundaries, users, rules of access, use and control, inclusions and exclusions, and system of governance must be developed and recognized by the users of the commons. Commons evolve in practice and there are no commons without “commoning,” i.e., the acts and processes of creating commons (Linebaug, 2010). As social constructions, commons thus involve negotiations of social and political relationships among people who are part of a commons, as well as between them and actors outside the commons, for example, members of a community forest often have to negotiate with state authorities and/or neighboring villages who may want to gain control over the forest.

In this paper, we limit our discussion to natural commons that include lands, water bodies and associated resources that are not governed by state, market or private property regimes.  These can include, for example, farm/crop lands, wetlands, forests, wood-lots, open pasture, grazing lands, hill and mountain slopes, streams and rivers, ponds, lakes and other fresh water bodies, seas and oceans, coastlines, etc. In many rural communities, farm/crop and grazing lands are communally owned, although the tenure rights of families to cultivate specific parcels of land are recognised and respected. The notion of commons does not negate individual agency and responsibility; on the contrary, protecting and managing collective resources requires a collectivity of individual actors working together towards shared goals. In many upland areas in Asia, swidden fields are claimed by individual families but the broader hillside is protected by the entire community.  The lives and livelihoods of fisherfolk are greatly dependant on rivers, lakes, seas and oceans as commons, and their cultures and traditions define practices, rules, and limits for harvesting from and protecting them.

We argue in this paper that natural commons are threatened by the dominant model of capitalist and neoliberal development— leading to their commercialization, privatization, and commodification and destroying not only time-tested practices of sharing, using, managing and protecting them but also threatening the survival of communities that depend on these commons. Such processes are systemic and perpetuated by global governance institutions such as International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and market-driven mechanisms. However, local populations and communities are fighting back. There are many struggles around the world that illustrate their resolve to defend, protect, reclaim, restore and create the commons. These struggles not only directly challenge capitalism but offer better ways of organising our societies based on shared responsibility, benefits, accountability and equitable socio-cultural relations.

Commercialization, Commodification, Privatization

The expansion of global capitalism and neoliberalism has greatly accelerated enclosures, which bring the commons into private property and market regimes, demarcating and delineating zones for exclusive use by particular actors/groups, and breaking up and parcelling out collectively managed spaces for fishing, foraging/gathering, grazing, etc. to individualised ownership. Market-driven frameworks and policies such as free trade and investment agreements, financialization, private property regimes, and privatisation of public goods and services destroy notions of collective governance and responsibility, and pave the way for commons to be destroyed.  In a cynical manipulation of the climate crisis, the atmosphere and air are designated as global commons, but captured through market mechanisms. Emissions trading, clean development mechanisms (CDM), Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and Blue Carbon allow polluters and financial traders to monopolize resources vital for the planet and society but provide no assurances that anthropogenic climate change will be effectively checked.

Farmlands, forests, pastures, wetlands and rivers and other water sources are captured for a variety of purposes: logging, plantations, raw industrial materials, extractive industry, property and real estate development, energy production, tourism, etc. Industrial agriculture (which includes plantations and processing) spurs the concentration of productive resources, land, and labor in the hands of corporations and local elites. Many trade-investment deals provide private corporations and research institutions access to agricultural and natural biodiversity, and traditional/local knowledge with the possibility to claim intellectual property rights (IPR) over products derived from them. Profits from such patents accrue to the prospecting corporations and institutions, not to the people who have nurtured these commons for generations. Such bio-piracy is a matter of great concern to rural communiies everywhere, especially indigenous peoples. Women, who are the savers of seeds in most peasant farming communities, are generally the first to be displaced from new agricultural production packages based on 'improved' seeds.

The commons are also endangered by policy conditions attached to development financing from IFIs, and bilateral and multilateral donors, who tend to favor trade liberalization, private investor-friendly regulation, and the commercialization and privatization of natural resources and public goods and services. Industrial, chemical-intensive and mono-culture oriented agriculture and agro-forestry, large-scale commercial aquaculture and extractive industry—all of which bring commons into private property and market-based regimes--are high on the agenda of IFIs and even the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).  Not only are lands, forests and water sources given over to private companies for long periods of time (25-99 year-long leases) but also, they are polluted, contaminated, degraded and depleted through over-use, extensive application of chemicals, and the dumping of waste matter.

To further illustrate the above point, the World Bank is firmly committed to private property regimes, individualised ‘marketable’ land rights and “easing barriers to land transactions”. In World Bank parlance, “good land governance” may include strengthening women's access to land and capital, but it also includes facilitating large-scale land acquisitions for private investment, maximising the market potential of land, using land as collateral for loans, etc.[1]  The International Finance Corporation (IFC) provides financing for large-scale energy and industrial agriculture investments that often result in displacement of local populations from their territories. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) promotes rapid economic growth through private sector operations, which have repeatedly resulted in air and water pollution, land degradation and depletion of natural resources. Client governments are required to provide private companies unfettered access to land, water and other natural resources, and enact 'market-friendly' (rather than community or society-friendly) policies and regulations. There is little recognition of the complex relationship and inter-dependence between human well-being and the goods and functions that healthy ecosystems provide--especially in rural areas.

In January 2010, the World Bank, FAO, International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) proposed the “Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources” (PRAI) to ostensibly minimise the most egregious impacts of large scale, private, agricultural investments on land. However, the PRAI are geared towards smoothening the access of agricultural investors (usually large, well-endowed corporations) towards the agricultural lands and natural resources they want, rather than empowering rural communities to uphold their rights to commons crucial to present and future generations. 

Problems with Governance

Although many governments, IFIs, and regional and global institutions acknowledge the importance of the natural environment to the well-being and survival of rural peoples, they do not recognize the importance and viability of collective eco-system management with localised centres of governance and decision making. Their preferred models of governance prioritize individualized ownership and access/tenure rights that can be freely traded in markets.

States have, by and large, tended to adopt governance models that favor the interests of markets and corporations over the interests of their citizens, especially those who most rely on the natural commons for food, health, and livelihoods. In many Asian countries, lands and water bodies not under legal private ownership are designated as 'public property,’ and governments claim the ultimate authority to allocate/use them for national economic and security purposes. Thus, forests, pastures and farmlands are converted to industrial mono-crop farms; lakes and wetlands are filled for real estate projects; rivers are dammed; and lands and water bodies are sequestered for mining, drilling and other extractive industry. Exclusive forest preserves and biodiversity conservation areas are established that restrict or deny access to local communities but allow private companies to log and harvest resources through economic concessions.

The privatization and commodification of the commons have profound and long-term impacts on rural and urban societies. They shift governance of natural territories and eco-systems from local populations to private companies and free market institutions, disembedding economies from societal control and prioritising short-term profits over long term sustainability. Time tested practices of sharing, using and managing natural resources within and among communities and different user-groups are dismantled, increasing the potential for conflicts, weakening social cohesion, and diminishing the quality of eco-systems. Local people are cut off from crucial, life-sustaining spaces and resources, and the natural environment is degraded because of deforestation, land use changes, chemical contamination, diversion of water flows, and over-exploitation, which in turn negatively affect the availability and safety of wild, foraged, and gathered foods. Privatization and commodification especially disempower women, since they are responsible for most foraging activities and rely (more than men) on their immediate environment to ensure the sustenance of their families.

Communities across the world report that their traditional, informal systems of managing natural resources and territories were far more effective in conserving and regenerating lands, soils, forests, water and biodiversity than the modern, formal systems introduced by states. However, actions by communities to defend their commons from expropriation, privatization and commodification have generally been criminalized and are often violently repressed by governments.

Local governance, however, is not without problems, nor is traditional leadership uniformly good and just across communities and societies. Traditional power structures are as susceptible to corruption, abuse and capture by vested interests as modern power structures. Communities in much of rural India tend to adhere to deeply entrenched discriminatory practices based on the caste system that forbid particular communities to use the same commons as others, and sequester some resources for exclusive use by historically powerful groups. Such discrimination extends across Asia even in the absence of caste systems, especially against indigenous peoples and those of different ethnicities. Sedentary farming communities often clash with nomadic pastoralist and forest peoples' communities over rights to control the use of open pasture, forests and woodlands. Socially and economically privileged commmunities make alliances with state authorities to secure access and control over land, forests and water. Even in less stratified villages, chiefs often feel well-within their bounds to sell off community lands for personal gain. Some of the worst problems arise where modern, formal, administrative hierarchies co-opt traditional leaders, driving wedges between community and government priorities. In the Philippines and Cambodia, for example, where REDD-readiness projects are implemented, the promise of economic incentives and money have led indigenous leaders to buy into such projects without broad community consultations. Further, in much of the world, patrilineal and patriarchal social-political structures deny women any voice in making decisions about how community lands and resources should be used and managed.

Women and the Commons

Historically, women have depended on access to the natural commons and have suffered the most from their enclosures, commodification and privatization. Women are the fiercest defenders of the communal cultures that European colonizers tried to wipe out and they were at the frontlines against land enclosures in England and the ‘New World’ (Federici, 2004). These realities have not changed in modern times. Women continue to rely on the natural commons and their immediate environment for their sustenance. According to the World Women’s Report (2010), 75 percent of households in Asian countries that include Cambodia, Laos and Nepal depend on firewood and biomass such as wood, agricultural crops, wastes and forest resources for their energy and livelihoods. Further, women have unique roles as food producers and providers, and are involved in every stage of food production from sowing, weeding, fertilizing and harvesting of staple crops, which are major sources of the rural poor’s diets (FAO, 2011).  Farmers' organizations across the world recognize that women have deep ties with land and that food producing commons are more likely to be reallocated to commercial use if the power to make decisions about land use lies solely with men.

With the dwindling of the natural commons, both the ability of women to cope with poverty by relying on these resources and their capacity to collectively govern them are further diminished.  These processes have led to the “catastrophic dislocation of the lives of the common people” (Polanyi, 1944: 33), because the vagaries of market supply and demand dynamics take over long-standing, stable principles of human-nature relationships.

However, like the women during England’s Enclosure movement, grassroots women from around the contemporary world are actors and leaders in protecting, restoring and defending the commons in at least two crucial ways. One, in their defense against processes that commodify, enclose, and privatize the commons despite threats of criminalization and harassment. For example, 90 percent of the protestors and leaders in the land grabbing case of Boeung Kak lake are women. Kun Cha Tha, who quit her job selling rice to devote her time to the local struggle to protect their lives and homes, said, “I live here. I have rights and I am working with the women here so we won’t have to move. I will keep on fighting here” (Lieberman, 2011). Many of them argue that there is no option but to protest and be at the forefront of the struggle. Second, in the reorganization of reproductive work, reconstructing their lives and homes as commons. There are various accounts of how women led the collectivization of reproductive work as a means to share responsibilities among the community, and protect each other from poverty and the violence of the state and individual men (Federici, 2010). The Landless Peoples’ Movement (MST) in Brazil for instance, has communalized their housework in their land struggles from encampment and land occupation to building of their communities. Further, many communities in the past and now have a deep sense of sharing responsibilities in terms of household work and caring for children. One of the authors grew up in a set-up as such where neighbors take care of each other. Unfortunately, this sense of community is being eroded more and more under the current development model.

Reclaiming and Defending the Commons

Today, the threats to the commons are greatly multiplied by the deepening financial, economic and climate crises, which are being used as opportunities by state, corporate and international institutional actors to deepen control over precious, life sustaining resources. At the same time, the commons have always been arenas of intense social-political organization, mobilization and action. As threats to the natural commons multiply, struggles of local populations intensify to defend their collective rights to land, water, forests and shared territories. These include advocacy for innovative approaches to governing, stewarding and managing natural territories. At the heart of these struggles to reclaim and defend the commons are principles of human rights, gender, social and ecological justice, sustainability, democracy, self-determination and inter-generational equity.

The commons provide a framework for governance in which individual benefit is inextricably tied to collectivity and long-term security is favoured over short-term gain. The very act of commoning is political in that it challenges established power hierarchies and the notion that the interests of a few are permitted to undermine the needs of the majority.

Commons are non-commodified systems of production and thus a direct challenge to capitalism. Commoning practices are increasing in visibility in the midst of recurring crises because they offer creative survival options in difficult times and at the same time allow people to effectively resist destructive development, economic growth and capitalist expansion. It is crucial that we not only defend existing commons from enclosures and cooptation, but also that we help shape new commons to respond to challenges and crises, and to give expression to the regenerative capabilities of people and nature.

As a necessary building block in shaping another and better world, the defense, protection and (re)construction of the commons and various acts of commoning, therefore, remain an urgent collective political and social project that everyone must be part of. 

References

De Angelis, Massimo (n.d.).  “Crises, Capital and Co-optation: does capital need a commons fix?” http://wealthofthecommons.org/essay/crises-capital-and-co-optation-does-capital-need-commons-fix (last consulted: 29 June 2016)

Federici, S. (2004) The Caliban and the Witch, Brooklyn, Autonomedia, 1^st edition.

Federici, S. (2010) “Feminism and the Politics of the Commons” http://wealthofthecommons.org/essay/feminism-and-politics-commons (last consulted: 23 June 2016)

Food and Agriculture Organization (2011) “The role of women in agriculture” http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/am307e/am307e00.pdf (last consulted: 25 June 2016)

Liberman, A. (2011) “Cambodia: Women fight land grab around Phnom Penh's contested lake” http://news.trust.org//item/20111228223200-wtp7l?view=print (last consulted: 27 June 2016)

Linebaugh, P. (2010) “Some Principles of the Commons” http://www.counterpunch.org/2010/01/08/some-principles-of-the-commons/ (last consulted: 29 June 2016)

Polanyi, K. (1944) The Great Transformation: the political and economic origins of our time, Boston, Beacon Press.

United Nations (2010) The World's Women 2010: Trends and Statistics, New York, United Nations.

Photograph by: Ridan Sun

This article was originally published in 2016 by CETRI in French as part of their quarterly publication, Alternatives Sud 

Background

Focus on the Global South (Focus) is a non-governmental organisation with offices in Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines and India. Focus combines policy research, advocacy, activism and grassroots capacity building to generate critical analysis and debates among social movements, civil society organisations, elected officials, government functionaries and the general public on national and international policies related to corporate-led globalisation, neo-liberalism and militarisation. 

Focus recently received a two-year grant for its emerging Power and Democracy (P&D) programme which was introduced in 2015 to address the exercise of different types of power, and how they affect democracy, citizenship, justice, well-bring, peace and rights.

The Sombath Initiative (SI) is a leading component of the P&D programme. The SI was established in December, 2014, continuing earlier efforts resulting from the disappearance of Sombath Somphone in Laos in 2012. The SI aims to increase awareness about the human rights and development contexts in Laos, maintain pressure to address these issues, including the case of Sombath’s disappearance, and to build networks of solidarity to further this work.

Focus now seeks a Communications Officer to support the SI and Focus’ broader work, and to build synergy between them. 

Key Responsibilities: The Communications Officer will work under the direct supervision of the Focus Executive Director and in close coordination with related staff in all Focus offices. 

The Communications Officer will:

• Work with the Focus Communications Team to develop and implement an effective organisational communications strategy.
• Assist in the development and maintenance of the sombath.org and focusweb.org websites and related social media, building links between the SI and Focus outreach.
• Identify and develop content for the above.
• Work with Focus staff in all offices to ensure that the outreach/media aspects of campaigns are appropriately addressed, including editing, layout, and translation of materials, etc.
• Build relationships with mainstream, traditional and new media in the region and internationally.

Qualifications

• At least five years’ experience in communications, with a focus on Southeast Asia and/or advocacy.
• Demonstrated experience in the design and implementation of communications action plans and campaigns.
• Excellent English writing and editing skills; the ability to work in contemporary Lao, including reading and writing, will be a significant advantage.
• Basic knowledge of Publications Layout, Video and Image editing (Adobe Photoshop, Adobe Indesign, Adobe Premier or Final Cut)
• Knowledge of content management systems: Wordpress and Drupal.

This is a full-time position based at Focus’ Bangkok office. The post offers a salary commensurate with experience and comparable to those of other regional organisations.

Applications should be in English and include a cover letter, CV, writing samples and contact details of at least two referees. Please send applications to jobs@focusweb.org with “Communications Officer” in the subject line.

The deadline for applications is 29 July 2017.

Background

Focus on the Global South (Focus) is a non-governmental organisation with offices in Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines and India. Focus combines policy research, advocacy, activism and grassroots capacity building to generate critical analysis and debates among social movements, civil society organisations, elected officials, government functionaries and the general public on national and international policies related to corporate-led globalisation, neo-liberalism and militarisation. 

Focus recently received a two-year grant for its emerging Power and Democracy (P&D) programme which was introduced in 2015 to address the exercise of different types of power, and how they affect democracy, citizenship, justice, well-bring, peace and rights.

The Sombath Initiative (SI) is a leading component of the P&D programme. The SI was established in December, 2014, continuing earlier efforts resulting from the disappearance of Sombath Somphone in Laos in 2012. The SI aims to increase awareness about the human rights and development contexts in Laos, maintain pressure to address these issues, including the case of Sombath’s disappearance, and to build networks of solidarity to further this work.

Focus now seeks a SI Programme Officer to undertake the overall planning, coordination and implementation of the SI as part of the broader P&D programme.

Key Responsibilities: Under the direct supervision of the Focus Executive Director, and with the support of the SI Project Advisor and related Focus staff, the SI Programme Officer will:

• Conduct research and ongoing monitoring on the intersection between development and human rights, civil society and democratic decision making, and foreign aid and investment in Southeast Asia, with particular focus on the Lao PDR.
• Explore and document the work of Sombath Somphone, including that on youth, education, and environment, and equitable, sustainable development.
• Build networks with people and organisations in support of the above.
• Produce reports, briefings, press statements, and internet postings, etc., on the above issues.
• Assist in the identification, planning and implementation of various fora and events.
• Strengthen networking with human rights and development organisations at the regional and international levels.
• Represent the SI with the above organisations and at related events,
• Take the lead in project coordination, monitoring and reporting, and assist with fundraising and financial monitoring.

Qualifications

• Seven or more years’ experience in development, human rights, and advocacy issues in Southeast Asia, with a focus on Laos.
• Demonstrated ability to coordinate and build relationships with a wide variety of individuals and organisations.
• Demonstrated ability to conduct research and produce outputs, particularly in English.
• Demonstrated ability to work in contemporary Lao, including reading and writing, will be a significant advantage.

This is a full-time position based at Focus’ Bangkok office. The post offers a salary commensurate with experience and comparable to those of other regional organisations.

Applications should be in English and include a cover letter, CV, writing samples and contact details of at least two referees. Please send applications to jobs@focusweb.org with “SI Programme Officer” in the subject line.

The deadline for applications is July 29, 2017.

originally posted on ileia.org

What does the term ‘climate justice’ actually mean?

For us at Focus (Focus on the Global South) we see climate justice as intrinsically linked with other forms of justice – social justice, economic justice, political justice, justice between genders, and definitely environmental justice. So, climate justice is not about securing rights that are alienated or separated from other struggles for rights. The struggles of local communities against forced evictions, industrial agriculture, extractive industry and large dams, and to protect their lands, territories, seeds and breeds are all struggles for climate justice.

One of the most important tenets of climate justice is that those who have done the least to bring us to this point of the climate crisis continue to suffer the worst burdens of the crisis. And, they also have to take the most drastic actions in response to the crisis, with the fewest resources and the least amount of ‘official’ support. Ethically and morally this is one of the biggest failures of our society and economy. Any solution to the climate crisis must address these injustices appropriately.

In terms of climate justice, what is at stake for small scale food producers?

Small scale food producers are literally at the frontline when the big waves come crashing down, during droughts and floods, when crops fail and fish and livestock die, and when prices of food are manipulated and there are shortages. They are tremendously vulnerable to both, environmental and economic shock. And the climate crisis, as we’ve seen, has created huge economic shocks. For example, natural disasters – floods, landslides earthquakes, droughts, tornadoes, cyclones, increased variability and unpredictability in weather, etc. –  have huge economic impacts, including destruction of homes, entire communities, water supplies and other infrastructure, and destruction of the fields and crops that farmers earn their living from.

The types of food production that small scale food producers are engaged in have the smallest climate footprint

At the same time, the types of food production and the kinds of food provision that small scale food producers and providers are engaged in have the smallest climate footprint. From an environmental, economic and social perspective, this is some of the most sustainable food that’s produced. It’s seasonal and the food miles are few. Many small scale food producers provide food that directly supports communities in rural areas in terms of actually feeding them, as well as providing employment, purchasing goods and services, etc. This type of production is also extremely important in terms of preserving local food cultures and food systems that are resilient to shocks. Besides keeping the planet cool, small scale food producers make significant positive contributions to tackling hunger and malnutrition.

Local farmers sell what they grow and gather from the forest in Ta-Oiyy district, Salavan Province, Lao PDR. Photo: Shalmali Guttal

What is the role of today’s development paradigm in  exacerbating climate change and inequalities for small scale food producers?

The development paradigm that’s dominant across Asia is obsessed with economic growth. In this paradigm anything goes as long as it results in financial benefit for ruling elites. People’s rights, nature, dignity, public health, employment, etc., do not matter; everything is sacrificed at the altar of economic growth. Over the past two decades, the main strategies to achieve this kind of development have been enabling large scale private investment, especially in physical infrastructure, and privatisation of just about everything. Governments, international financial institutions and corporations have colluded in allowing corporations to gain control over different aspects of our lives, and nature.

Many communities across Asia say that that they do not want this type of development because whenever there is ‘development’, their resources are extracted, nature is destroyed, and they are displaced. Before this so-called ‘development’, their territories were managed through customary tenure and law. Communities of food producers and providers shared rights and responsibilities to use and to protect local land and water resources. They were able to find ways to adapt to environmental, social and economic changes. But ‘development’ brings the language of property rights, alienable titles and trading rights for elements of nature such as soil, land, water and carbon. As a result, almost anything is up for grabs and is put onto the market in order to generate profits for whoever is able to invest. In the end, there is no value left in the local area because it is extracted and sold in another market far away.

Inequalities and inequity are deepening for small scale producers

Look at the results. What benefits have the economic growth development model yielded for local communities? Forests, lands and water sources are sold to corporations that invest in industrial agriculture, mega infrastructure projects, build dams and extract natural resources. These corporations are supposed to provide, or at least contribute to jobs, social services and local infrastructure in rural areas. Where are those jobs and services? Inequalities and inequity are in fact deepening for small scale producers and rural peoples. They have no safety nets, they have nothing but the territories that they protect and that is what is being extracted and expropriated.

What are some of the tricky arguments you face when challenging this economic growth-obsessed development?

Today, the role that industrialisation, deforestation and excessive use of fossil fuels plays in causing climate change is widely accepted. But in many parts of Asia now, there’s a push to industrialise and ‘modernise’ in the same way, and to catch up with the west’s high-consumption lifestyles. The fact that the planet just cannot bear any more of this doesn’t hold as an argument because if the richer countries enjoy high-consumption lifestyles, why shouldn’t Asian and African countries be able to? For us (i.e., Focus), this presents a huge dilemma because on one hand, there are huge global inequalities and inequities in the distribution of so-called benefits of development. Those most responsible for the climate crisis—wealthy, industrialised nations—must take proportionate responsibility for reparations. At the same time, at the national level in much of Asia, economic growth and development are not delivering benefits for the majority of the people. The elites and a small proportion of middle classes are getting richer at the cost of the working class, peasants, small scale producers and the poor.

Also, when small scale food producers say, “we cannot survive like this!” and demand fair prices which cover the costs of production, their efforts are countered with arguments from policy makers and corporations about the need for ‘cheap food’ for the poor. This is very unfortunate because, rural and urban ‘poor’, small scale producers and workers, are all being oppressed by the same forces of capital. By dividing these people, their potential to organise and demand regulation that benefits urban and rural citizens, food producers and workers equally are weakened.

Why do activists from different movements need to work  together when talking about food and climate change?

We have no choice but to work together because the issues are too huge, too complex and they are interconnected. The case of the aftermath of the Super Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines in January 2014 illustrates this well (see page 42). The typhoon itself is a climate issue. Yolanda victims had their land taken away from them in the post typhoon reconstruction – this is land grabbing. Those who had been displaced became refugees, creating a social protection issue. Many of the victims don’t have access, even today, to adequate food and nutrition – this is a food and nutrition issue. Moreover, in Cambodia, large scale investment projects result in deforestation, destruction of water bodies and displacement of rural communities. The list of issues in one case include: food and nutrition, land grabbing, climate, environmental and social protection.  On top of this, whether it’s in the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand or India, when small scale farming, fishing, herding and indigenous communities defend their lands and fight against predatory capital, the military and police are called in, they are beaten up, they are arrested and jailed. These are human rights and justice issues. So, with all these aspects coming up simultaneously, I can’t actually see how we could not work together.

I think if we work separately from one another, we are dividing and weakening ourselves.  This is a time for us to come together and pool our resources, strengths and capacities. Big companies and big capital always come together to get what they want. We should not give them additional power through our fragmentation. This doesn’t mean that we don’t focus on sectoral priorities, but that we must make connections across sectors, constituencies, spaces and levels.

Can you talk about a few  heartening initiatives that are advancing climate justice?

I think La Via Campesina is brilliant. I’ve known them for many years and when you’ve accompanied, worked and allied with a movement for 20 years you see a lot of change. I’m just so heartened when I see members from La Via Campesina hold their own in national policy debates and international policy spaces. They articulate the links between small scale food production, peasant agroecology, cooling down the planet and building food sovereignty so well. They do this through their own practice, through federating, through making alliances with other movements, and also reaching out to the public. So, for me this is a very inspirational movement.

Another movement that is becoming stronger, at least in Asia, is the World Forum of Fisher Peoples. The risks that they face, including their vulnerabilities because of climate change and the development model we talked about, are huge. And they also are holding their own by articulating the issues, doing their own research, and mobilising and reaching out to people.

Many small scale food producers provide food that directly supports communities in rural areas in terms of feeding them as well as providing employment. Photo: Shalmali Guttal

Another movement that I see growing across Asia, especially in India, Thailand and the Philippines, is amongst small scale vendors who practice what they call a low circuit economy. They source food from marginal producers, either urban gardeners or peri-urban gardeners and local fish mongers. They process and sell this food locally. In this way, they are really building bridges between producers and consumers, and between producers and processors. These types of urban/rural movements are powerful because they bring people together, they reduce alienation in urban environments and they show how interconnected we are. The National Hawkers Federation in India is a very good example.

What I don’t understand is why governments, financial institutions and large foundations aren’t learning from these examples. This is a crucial question: why is the enormous potential of these and other similar movements in addressing climate change and related issues such as hunger, poverty, malnutrition, not being recognised? Instead, governments, financiers, multilateral institutions and many large NGOs continue to promote false solutions that are very dangerous because: a) they do not address the root causes of the climate crisis; b) they create opportunities for corporations and wealthy people to profit from the crisis; c) they undermine genuine resilience of communities to disasters/shocks and the potential to build such resilience; and d) they give the illusion that the climate crisis is being appropriately addressed when in fact it is not, and the crisis is actually worsening.

Interview by Madeleine Florin

Shalmali Guttal is the executive director at Focus on the Global South. She researches, writes and advocates for ecological and social justice in Asia. In this interview, Shalmali explains how the economic growth-obsessed model of development is worsening the climate crisis, particularly for small scale food producers. She highlights that, for advancing justice, the most powerful social movements are strengthening their own practice, but also reaching out to other movements and citizens.

by Mary Ann Manahan; originally posted on ileia.org

On Sicogon Island in the Philippines, farmers and fisher folk were displaced from their land and fisher folk were displaced from their land and livelihoods after the Typhoon Yolanda. Opportunistic land grabbing after a climate disaster is yet another example in which those least responsible for climate change suffer its gravest consequences.

Super typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan hit the Philippines in November 2013. It was the fourth strongest typhoon in recorded history. On Sicogon Island, Iloilo Province, one of the areas hardest hit by the typhoon, around 1000 farmers’ and fishers’ homes were damaged or destroyed by Yolanda. The devastation that prevailed was aggravated by internal displacement and loss of livelihoods due to land grabbing permitted by the government’s probusiness approach to reconstruction.  Private companies laid claim to the land previously occupied by farmers and fisher people to develop tourism infrastructure along the coast. As the residents of the island began to rebuild their lives, they had to first reclaim their land rights.

Tourism trumps farmers

After the typhoon, President Aquino declared a 40-meter-nobuild-zone policy along the coastal zones of the country, including where people used to live.  This created confusion and outrage among local governments, civil society groups, and communities affected by Yolanda who wanted to move back onto their land. On the other hand, it was the moment that Sicogon Development Corporation (SIDECO) had been waiting for, to turn Sicogon into a tourism destination.

In 2014, SIDECO entered into a joint venture partnership with the private company Ayala Land to undertake a ‘Sicogon Island Redevelopment Project’. The project was a long-standing initiative that had been accompanied by an equally long-standing land struggle for the local communities – spanning almost four decades. Before the typhoon hit, the communities’ campaign for land brought them national and international allies, including national senators, NGOs and church and human rights advocates. The Department of Agrarian Reform’s confirmation that 335 hectares of land on the island would be placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) was a huge feat for the communities. But the typhoon changed the balance of power  in this struggle once more.

On Sicogon Island around 1000 farmers’ and fishers’
homes were damaged or destroyed by Typhoon
Yolanda. Photo: Mary Anne Manahan

Amelia dela Cruz, a farmer leader from Sicogon Island explained how the owner of SIDECO made an opportunistic move to permanently displace people from their lands and their livelihoods. Amelia said: “SIDECO took advantage of this tragedy. Yolanda has been their ally. They gave us three options: first, they would give us Php 150,000 (approximately US$ 3000) if we would leave; second, they would relocate us to another island with free housing, water, and electricity; third, if we wouldn’t agree with any of the options, they would demolish our communities.” Some families were relocated but Amelia is amongst those who decided to stay.

Farmers and fishers stand their ground

Five months after being left homeless by Yolanda, on April 12, 2014, members of the Federation of Sicogon Island Farmers and Fisherfolk Association (FESIFFA) protested the living conditions on Sicogon Island through a camp-out in front of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. More than 200 Sicogon families had settled in a portion of a 282-hectare public forest land area in  Buaya, Sicogon as a last ditch effort to rebuild their homes and lives. FESIFFA President Raul Ramos explained: “With no options left to rebuild our communities, we were being forced by the government and by SIDECO to occupy public forest lands as a resettlement site, even without support and approval from official authorities.” Both SIDECO and its allied officials in the local Department of Environment and Natural Resources filed cases against FESIFFA farmers for their occupation of the public forest lands.

Climate justice and land grabs  
 
The case described in this article is, unfortunately, not an unusual one. Stories of land dispossession and displacement have been repeated in the wake of many disasters caused by extreme weather events, geophysical hazards, and manmade conflicts: many New Orleans residents were displaced after Hurricane Katrina and Rita; extensive drought in Northern Sudan in the mid-1980s was the excuse to force the Hawaweer nomadic group off of their lands; after an earthquake in Pakistan and India in 2005, tenants in rural and urban areas were prohibited by landowners from re-establishing their rental rights.
 
These are cases of injustice in which disaster capitalism dispossesses the people living on the land. Social movements such as the one described here are crucial for reclaiming rights and livelihoods.
 
Source: Uson, Maria Angelina. Natural disasters and land the Hawaweer nomadic group off of their lands; grabs: the politics of their intersection in the Philippines after an earthquake in Pakistan and India in 2005, following super typhoon Haiyan.  2017.  Canadian Journal tenants in rural and urban areas were prohibited of Development Studies.

Seeking support

The residents engaged in dialogues with government agencies and gathered significant public, media, and social movement support for their cause. The National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), in particular, stepped in to assist in the dialogues, and provided housing for the residents. International groups, such as ICCO Cooperation, a Dutch NGO, also provided support to FESIFFA members for rebuilding their livelihoods.

Months after their camp-out, threats against them still lingered in various forms: orders to vacate the island, prohibition to repair and rebuild their houses, legal cases against them by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for forest occupation, and legal cases against their leaders. At some point, Ayala Land stepped in and offered various packages that were unacceptable to FESIFFA.

This is not a story of defeat; Sicogon’s farmers have stayed on the island to rebuild their livelihoods

One year after Yolanda, FESIFFA members  were ‘put on the spot’ to sign an alleged ‘win-win’ solution. FESIFFA, the residents of Sicogon, SIDECO, and Ayala Land signed a compromise agreement, which would allow the development of Sicogon into an eco-tourism area, on one hand, and on the other, would allow the farmers and fisher folk to continue living on the island without further harassments and intimidations by the developers. The compromise stated that FESIFFA members would be granted ‘collective titles’ to land upon forming a homeowners association. The land would be donated by SIDECO and Ayala, which meant that, in practice, the farmers with claims under the agrarian reform programme would have to withdraw them.

This compromise was perceived to be an unjust resolution by many and divided FESIFFA. It was perceived that SIDECO and Ayala Land ended up with most of the land that they wanted. And, those who had to withdraw their land claims under the agrarian reform programme would lose the rights that they had previously fought for.

Resisting and rebuilding

Nevertheless, this is not a story of defeat. Sicogon’s farmers have stayed on the island to rebuild their fishing and farming livelihoods, albeit in a limited way. None of the land reforms favouring the farmers that were agreed on in the compromise have been delivered yet, and this has motivated FESIFFA to resume its advocacy work for their land rights. In April 2017, yet again leaders went to the capital and organised a camp-out and protest in front of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They plan to intensify their campaign this year with renewed resolve to seek justice and secure rights to land and resources for their farming and fishing livelihoods.

Mary Ann Manahan (mbmanahan@focusweb.org) is a Senior Program Officer at Focus on the Global South.

Walden Bello's Keynote Speech to the Forum on European Union-Latin America Trade Relations, Brussels, June 28, 2017 (by Skype from Tokyo)

7 July 2017

Focus on the Global South

Pablo Solón, the Director of Fundación Solón, former Executive Director of Focus on the Global South, and former Bolivian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), is being targeted by the Bolivian government for his vocal criticism of the government and the construction of two hydro-electric projects, El Bala and El Chapete in the Amazonian region. Based on the studies done by Geodata, an Italian company hired by the government to identify where the dams will be built, Solón says they will “inundate an area five times larger than the city of La Paz, displace more than five thousand indigenous peoples, deforest more than one hundred thousand hectares and will not be profitable for the country with the current prices of electricity in Brazil.”

Send your message of support and solidarity to Pablo here

Solón resigned as Bolivia’s UN Ambassador in June 2011, and was succeeded by the Deputy Permanent Representative, Rafael Archondo. Archondo a very well known journalist, served as the interim representative for 14 months, until Sacha Llorenti, who was Minister of Government in September 2011 during the repression of the indigenous peoples’ march in defense of the National Park and Indigenous Territory of TIPNIS, was appointed as the new UN Ambassador. The Vice Ministry of Transparency and Anti-Corruption has now decided to bring criminal charges with jail sentences of up to 4 years against Solón and Archondo, alleging that Solón “illegally appointed” Archondo and that Archondo committed the crime of “prolonging functions.” Both the accused have publicly responded showing that Archondo was appointed by the President of Bolivia as Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN and that he did not prolong in his functions.

Why such charges are being brought against Solón and Archondo now, six years after their tenure in government, is clear. The Bolivian government aims to harass, intimidate and criminalize those who dare to challenge the government’s policies and strategies. As Solón has stated: “The news [of the criminal charges] was not a surprise. Following our critical analysis of the mega hydroelectric plants at El Bala and Chepete, several friends had warned me that they would leave no stone unturned to accuse me of something, intimidate me, and silence me.”

Despite the threat of imprisonment, Solón has re-affirmed his commitment to voice his opinions. He says, “we will not lose hope for a different Bolivia, where the Rights of Mother Earth and Vivir Bien are a tangible reality.”

We strongly condemn the efforts of the Bolivian government to harass and intimidate Solón for standing up for the rights of indigenous peoples, nature and public interest. We urge the Bolivian government to withdraw the sham charges against both Solón and Archondo. We stand in solidarity with them as they challenge these trumped-up allegations, and continue to fight for justice and nature. 

Image credit: Democracy Now! 

22-26 July 2017

Hyderabad, India

The Government of India will host the 19th trade round of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) from 17-28 July 2017 in the city of Hyderabad. The RCEP is currently the world’s largest mega regional Free Trade Agreement (FTA) under negotiation between 16 countries in the Asia Pacific region[1]. More than 700 negotiators are expected to meet behind closed doors at the Hyderabad International Convention Centre (HICC) to further deregulate policies on agriculture, industry and the services sector in an attempt to advance free trade and foreign investment.

India is hosting the RCEP round at a time when 25 years of neoliberalism and corporate globalisation have devastated the lives and livelihoods of millions of peasants and workers across India. The agrarian crisis shows no signs of abatement as peasant suicides continue to mount. Telangana, the host state of this RCEP round is a tragic testimony to this. The manufacturing sector is witnessing the phenomenon of jobless growth and the few lakh jobs that are created each year are mostly informal, contractual and in the unorganised sector with abysmal wages and poor working conditions. In the services sector, while IT (Information Technology) growth and jobs are plateauing, the privatisation and corporatisation of essential services such as health and education have been a disaster in terms of quality, access and accountability. India’s trade deficit is reaching alarming proportions. In 2016, it was more than $ 84 billion just with RCEP countries.    

Given this poor record of economic reforms, the key question is: Why is India continuing to participate at the RCEP? Will the RCEP address the agrarian crisis and create decent jobs in manufacturing and services?  Further, the RCEP is being negotiated in secret with no parliamentary scrutiny; though several components of the texts under negotiation have been ‘leaked’ online and have been analysed. The analysis indicates that the RCEP will impact critical sectors of the economy and undermine social, economic and environmental justice. It is therefore important to #BreaktheSilence of the Government and communicate the implications of the 23-plus RCEP chapters to common people.

RCEP also raises concerns about pushing ‘WTO-plus’ issues on developing countries, including binding rules in the new arena of the internet economy and e-commerce. This is when there is evidence of how existing WTO commitments in intellectual property, agriculture and foreign investment measures have adversely impacted policy space and livelihoods. RCEP also raises constitutional challenges at the state level where many of the sectors under negotiation fall under state jurisdiction.

People across the Asia-Pacific region have already felt the brunt of liberalisation through earlier trade agreements, such as the WTO, China-ASEAN FTA, India-ASEAN FTA and other FTAs. In India, we have experienced the surge of imports of oil seeds and cash crops, closure of the machinery and electronics manufacturing sector leading to loss of employment, imports of cheap steel leading to loss of production within the country, increased import dependence for production of pharmaceutical and other goods, and increased cost of medicines due to more stringent patent rules, to name a few.

As part of the people’s mobilisations against RCEP, a wide spectrum of mass movements and local groups are gathering in Hyderabad. We invite you to join us for the People’s Convention on July 23^rd Sunday, public meeting and rally on July 24^th Monday, and for Thematic Workshops on July 24th, 25^th and 26th on issues such as Access to Medicines, Dalits and Free Trade, Public Services and RCEP, Agriculture, E-commerce, Social Security, Manufacturing Policy and WTO. The detailed Schedule of Events is given below. 

Issued by: People’s Resistance Forum against FTA’s and RCEP.

For more information please get in touch with:

Kiran Vissa: kiranvissa@gmail.com Tel. 97017 05743

Charles Meesa: nationalalliance2007@gmail.com 94907 55411

Forum against FTAs: tradetalks2017@gmail.com

LIST OF EVENTS

 New Delhi

19 July 2017. Wednesday. Press Club of India

Press Conference on RCEP. 3pm

Hyderabad

22 July 2017.  Saturday. (Venue to be announced)

·       Free Trade, RCEP and Dalit perspectives. 10.30-5pm                              

·       Doctors without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontiers workshop on IPRs. 10.30-5pm

23 July 2017. Sunday    10am to 5.30pm

People’s Convention against FTAs & RCEP @ Sundarayya Vignana Kendram (SVK)

24 July 2017. Monday

[Official Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) of RCEP starts for the week @ HICC]

Public meeting (Venue to be announced)

Press Conference @Hyderabad Press Club. 2pm

Parallel Workshops @SVK. 2-5.30pm

25 July 2017. Tuesday

Parallel Workshops @SVK                    SLOT 1: 10am-1:30pm & SLOT 2: 2-5:30pm

Official Stakeholder Consultation            2:30pm to 4pm in Hall No.3, HICC

Press Conference                                  5pm

26 July 2017.Wednesday

Parallel Workshops @SVK                    SLOT 1: 10am-1:30pm & SLOT 2: 2-5:30pm

You are requested to be part of this people’s process.

Please indicate your interest in joining, whether as a co-organiser and as participant or even as a Volunteer. Also, do share this announcement with others in your network.          

JOIN IN!

RAISE YOUR VOICE AGAINST FREE TRADE AND CORPORATE GLOBALISATION

[1] RCEP members include Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) i.e. Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam

Attac France have released a statement (in French), in support of Pablo Solón. 

Mardi 11 Juillet 2017, par Attac France

Nous apprenons avec effroi que Pablo Solón, ambassadeur de la Bolivie aux Nations unies de 2009 à juin 2011, et Rafael Archondo, journaliste connu en Bolivie, sont sous le coup d’une accusation du gouvernement bolivien, qui pourrait aller jusqu’à leur emprisonnement.

Pablo Solón est un activiste, dans le domaine du social et de l’écologie. Il a été ministre du commerce extérieur, ambassadeur de Bolivie pour l’intégration et le commerce (2006-2008), et ambassadeur aux Nations unies (2009 – 2011). Il est à l’origine de l’adoption par l’Assemblée des Nations unies de plusieurs résolutions dont la reconnaissance du Droit humain à l’eau et de la déclaration de la Journée Internationale de la Terre-Mère. Il a été responsable pour la Bolivie des négociations climatiques aux Nations unies. Après avoir été directeur exécutif à Bangkok de Focus on the Global South ((2012-2015), il est actuellement directeur de la Fondation Solón créée à La Paz en 1994, pour promouvoir l’œuvre et la pensée de l’artiste bolivien Walter Solón Romero (1923-1999). Cette fondation est engagée sur les questions de l’eau, du changement climatique, de l’énergie, des accords commerciaux et des alternatives systémiques.

Il a joué un rôle important dans les années 1990 en participant aux mouvements sociaux boliviens, en particulier les « guerre de l’eau » contre les privatisations à Cochabamba et Los Altos. Actuellement Pablo Solón, conscient des impasses de l’extractisme et d’un développement productiviste, soucieux du devenir des sociétés d’Amérique Latine, est fermement engagé contre la construction des méga-barrages de Chepete et El Bala. 

Comme ambassadeur aux Nations Unies, Pablo Solon a démissionné en 2011 pour marquer son désaccord avec la répression des peuples indigènes du parc Tipnis, mobilisés contre la construction d’une route traversant leur territoire. Il est accusé d’avoir « illégalement » nommé Rafael Archondo pour le remplacer auprès de l’ONU alors que celui-ci avait été nommé par le président Evo Morales suppléant de Pablo Solon auprès des Nations-Unies. Rafael Archondo est, lui, accusé d’avoir prolongé illégalement son mandat, ils risquent tous les deux quatre ans de prison.

Face au ridicule de cette accusation « politique » visant l’intimidation et la réduction au silence d’opposants, ils ont le soutien de la population et de nombreux mouvements sociaux en Bolivie. Attac-France exprime sa solidarité avec les accusés et avec tous ceux qui aujourd’hui, en Bolivie, se conforment à la Constitution instituant le « Vivir Bien » et font vivre des voies alternatives sans sacrifier les humains, la Terre et la démocratie.

Pablo est notre ami et notre allié. Il a joué un rôle essentiel dans la compréhension des négociations climatiques et se bat avec nous pour faire émerger et vivre une justice climatique. Il est engagé dans un combat que nous soutenons pleinement : inventer des voies de sortie d’un système qui sacrifie à la fois les humains et la nature, contester le capitalisme et le néolibéralisme en même temps que le productivisme et l’anthropocentrisme. Avec le soutien financier du CCFD-Terre Solidaire, et avec l’ONG Focus on the global South, la Fondation Solón est notre partenaire pour une initiative visant à faire émerger des alternatives systémiques. Pablo Solón a participé à plusieurs de nos universités d’été et sera à Toulouse au mois d’août pour l’université des mouvements sociaux organisée par le réseau Attac.

Nous demandons au gouvernement bolivien de retirer ses accusations contre Pablo Solón et Rafael Archondo et d’assurer les conditions d’un débat démocratique sur ses grands projets d’aménagement, en accord avec la Constitution bolivienne.

Activists from around the globe are sending their messages of support and solidarity to Pablo Solon, who is being persecuted by the Bolivian government for his criticism of the mega-projects, El Bala and Chepete, in the Amazonian region. Solon and Rafael Archondo, a well-known journalist, are facing sham charges with up to 4 years imprisonment.

Join hundreds of activists around the globe in supporting Pablo and Rafael. Download the poster, print, take a photo and submit using our form

Pablo Solón is being persecuted by the Bolivian Government, and is facing fabricated legal charges because he dared to challenge two mega-hydropower projects in the Amazonian region, El Bala and El Chepete. Both Solón and Rafael Archondo, a well-known journalist, are facing up to four years imprisonment.

Take action! Contact the Bolivian Government

We urge you to write to the Bolivian Government to ask them to drop the sham charges and investigate the contracts between the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad (ENDE) and the Italian company Geodata in relation to the hydro-electric project, El Bala.

Messages can be sent to Evo Morales, the President of Bolivia, at:

Fax: +591-22202321

Email: correo@presidencia.gob.bo

Twitter: @evoespueblo

Other actions:

Solidarity photos: Print the attached poster, take a photo with it and post on websites, Facebook and Twitter, tagging @MinJusticiaBol and @Minenergias, and using the hashtags #WeAreWithSolon and #StopElBalaChepete. Please also post on the Fundación Solón Facebook.

Send a solidarity message to Pablo Solón and Rafael Archondo: https://focusweb.org/content/message-support-pablo-solon

Send a letter to and/or visit your nearest Embassy or Consulate of Bolivia

More information about this case and El Bala and Chepete projects:

Fundación Solón website and Facebook page for latest updates (mostly in Spanish) https://fundacionsolon.org/category/pacha/el-bala/ and https://www.facebook.com/pg/Fundación-Solón-863600320418959

Focus on the Global South statement (English): https://focusweb.org/content/bolivian-government-must-stop-persecuting-t...

Pablo Solón’s request to the Ministry of Institutional Transparency to investigate the ENDE-Geodata contracts (in Spanish): https://fundacionsolon.org/2017/07/11/denuncia-posible-dano-economico-al...

Short piece on Pablo Solón and El Bala case (in English): https://woborders.blog/2017/07/04/pablo-solon-el-bala/

Why Pablo Solon is being tried - article by a former colleague of Solón/former Bolivian Defense Minister (in Spanish) http://www.opinion.com.bo/opinion/articulos/2017/0707/noticias.php?id=22...

Short video features (in Spanish) on El Bala and El Chepete projects https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GknLrcs0v3Y and why they are unviable economically https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-EFI80gS8w

Dossier on the El Bala and El Chepete projects (in Spanish): https://funsolon.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/tunupa-100.pdf

Editorial

Advancing the paradigm of Food Sovereignty

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the historic International Forum on Food Sovereignty that was held Mali in 2007. The Forum brought together more than 500 peasants, shers, pastoralists, indigenous peoples, workers, migrants, women, youth, consumers, researchers and press/media from 80 countries to build a global movement on food sovereignty. The Forum was named Nyéléni, as tribute to and drawing inspiration from a legendary Malian peasant woman.

Nyéléni has since become a space of praxis, to convene, synergise and build forces to strengthen the different conditions for food sovereignty. These include defending and protecting land, water, territories, seeds and biodiversity; re- distributive agrarian reform; secure access to land, territories and resources; agroecology and sustainable peasant agriculture; cooperative production and marketing; preventing corporate domination, capture and control over seeds, lands, water, technology, knowledge, markets and policy-making; resisting privatization; dismantling neoliberal trade-investment regimes; stopping the criminalization of frontline communities and rights defenders; and upholding the rights of small-scale food providers and workers.

As the paradigm of food sovereignty has expanded, so too have threats against it. The convergence of climate, nance, economic and energy crises over the past decade have triggered an explosion of large scale infrastructure projects, mining, oil and gas extraction, logging, industrial tree plantations, luxury re- sorts and property development, Special Economic Zones, and bogus climate ‘solutions’ such as REDD, blue carbon and soil carbon trading. Rural popula- tions are losing their lands and territories, and facing escalating criminalization, violence and militarization as they organize to protect the very foundations of their lives.

New generation free-trade agreements (FTAs) threaten food sovereignty through extreme tariff cuts, changes in domestic regulation that remove sup- ports for small-scale producers, and mechanisms for investor ‘rights’ protec- tion that give corporations unfettered access to critical sectors such as food, agriculture, retail, medicines and public health. Equally dangerous are policies that enable corporations to control the production, use, price and marketing of seeds, promote genetic engineering, and to patent seeds and plant varieties (many of which are derived from bio-pirated materials).The mega-mergers of six corporations--Bayer + Monsanto, Dow + Dupont and ChemChina + Syn- genta—will increase corporate control over seeds, agricultural technologies and equipment, undermining the productive potential of small-scale food pro- ducers worldwide.

These threats are being confronted at multiple fronts and levels by the growing global movement for food sovereignty. The recurring crises the world is facing are inherent to capitalism which is adept at re-inventing itself to maintain struc- tural power. Tinkering with the wiring of the capitalist model will do little good. What is needed is deep systemic change, a complete paradigm shift from com- petiveness to solidarity, from extractivism to respect and from exploitation to dignity. This is the paradigm of food sovereignty, which the global movement is advancing through diverse knowledge, capacities, resources and social bases.

Shalmali Guttal, Focus on the Global South

Click here to download the English edition or read it directly in the website at www.nyeleni.org !           

For any further information, please contact info@nyeleni.org

Image: Angelo Monne - www.angelomonne.com 

Declaration of the “The Community of International Academics” 
13th International Conference on Thai Studies 
and Scholars on Thai Studies
“Return the Space of Knowledge, Rights, and Civil Liberties to Thai Society”

Since the coup by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) in 2014, the rights and freedom of the Thai people to access information, news, facts, and knowledge have been greatly suppressed and derogated. A significant number of those who hold opinions different than the state have been harassed, threatened, and arrested and detained in contravention to judicial principles and process. Although this situation has emerged in Thailand, it is not only a matter of concern for those inside the country. This is because Thailand is a member of the international community that accepts the foundational principles of respect for rights and freedom in accessing information, expressing opinions, learning, and basic human dignity, without division by ethnicity, race, sex, language, religion, political opinion, nationality, birthplace, or other factors. 

“The Community of International Academics” present at the 13th International Thai Studies Conference, and scholars on Thai studies, whose names are listed below, realize the importance of rights and freedom to express opinions and search for knowledge through exchange and debate upon a foundation of the recognition of difference and diversity of thought, belief, and ideology. Therefore, we view the suppression of freedom of thought in Thai society at present to be of concern because it will result in the deterioration of knowledge as it renders the people unable to access the truth and search for information to move forward. Further, the arbitrary exercise of power by the state to violate the rights and freedom of the people who think differently has caused a decline in human rights in both Thai society and the international community. We therefore make the following demands:

1. The state must respect academic freedom by returning the space of knowledge in which the people can access different kinds of information and facts, as well as allowing the exchange of knowledge without suppression, control or distortion. For example, the facts about the 1932 transformation from absolute to constitutional monarchy in both the past and the present, the facts about social institutions that are connected with political problems in Thailand, etc. These facts constitute important raw material for creating diverse knowledge that will benefit intellectual progress and the development of Thai society and politics as well as the global community.
2. The state must respect rights and freedom in the people’s expression of opinion and other forms of expression by returning freedom to prisoners of conscience who have been arrested and detained simply because they hold different opinions than the state. This includes, for example, prisoners in Article 112 cases and prisoners in cases related to the political demonstrations in 2010.
3. The state must swiftly return the sovereignty to the people in line with democratic principles, such as through free and fair elections.
4. The state must reform important institutions in Thai society, especially the judiciary and the military, which often exercise power freely without any regard for the people and partly led Thai society and politics to the current crisis.

“The Community of International Academics” and scholars on Thai studies holds that actions in line with these four demands constitute the minimum necessary for Thai society to achieve harmony, reconciliation, and peace. These actions are also the minimum necessary for true reform of Thai society -- reform informed by consciousness and the power of knowledge -- rather than the raw and crude exercise of power to suppress and dominate the space of knowledge taking place at present.

With faith in learning with freedom
“The Community of International Academics” at the 13th International Conference on Thai Studies and scholars on Thai studies
17 July 2017
Chiang Mai International Exhibition and Convention Center

Signatories

1. Aim Sinpeng
2. Alexander Horstman
3. Andrew Alan Johnson ( Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, Princeton University)
4. Chris Baker
5. Coeli Barry
6. Diptendu Sarkar
7. Edoardo Siani
8. Erik Kuhonta
9. Hara Shintaro
10. Irene Stengs (Meertens Instituut Royal Netherlands Academy of Art and Sciences Amsterdam The Netherlands)
11. Jonathan Rigg NUS
12. Karin H. Zackari 
13. Katherine Bowie
14. Mark Heng (ISEAS, YUSOF ISHAK Institute, Singapore)
15. Mary Mostafanezhad (University of Hawaii)
16. Matthew Phillips
17. Megan Youdelis (York University)
18. Niabdulghafar Tohming
19. Noah Viernes 
20. Paul Chambers
21. Peter Jackson 
22. Peter Vandergeest
23. Philip Hirsch
24. Rachel Harrison
25. Rosenun Chesof (University of Malaya)
26. Sarah Bishop (ANU College of Law, Australian National University)
27. Shalmali Guttal (Focus on the Global South)
28. Taylor Easum
29. Tyrell Haberkorn
30. Vanessa Lamb
31. Walden Bello
32. กนกรัตน์ สถิตนิรามัย
33. กนกวรรณ มะโนรมย์
34. กฤดิกร วงศ์สว่างพานิช
35. กฤติธี ศรีเกตุ
36. กันต์ฌพัชญ์ อยู่อำไฟ
37. กาญจนา เหล่าโชคชัยกุล
38. กิ่งกร นรินทรกุล ณ อยุธยา
39. กิตติ วิสารกาญจน
40. กิตติกาญจน์ หาญกุล
41. กุลธิดา รุ่งเรืองเกียรติ
42. เก่งกิจ กิติเรียงลาภ
43. เกรียงไกร เกิดศิริ
44. เกษม เพ็ญภินันท์
45. เกษียร เตชะพีระ 
46. เกียรติศักดิ์ บังเพลิง 
47. คารินา โชติรวี
48. เคท ครั้งพิบูลย์
49. งามศุกร์ รัตนเสถียร
50. จณิษฐ์ ฟื่องฟู
51. จักรกริช สังขมณี
52. จิราพร เหล่าเจริญวงศ์
53. ชลัท ศานติวรางคณา
54. ชลิตา บัณฑุวงศ์
55. ชัยพงษ์ สำเนียง
56. ชัยพร สิงห์ดี
57. ชัยศิริ จิวะรังสรรค์
58. ชาญณรงค์ บุญหนุน
59. ชาญวิทย์ เกษตรศิริ
60. ชำนาญ จันทร์เรือง
61. เชษฐา พวงหัตถ์
62. ไชยณรงค์ เศรษฐเชื้อ
63. ไชยันต์ รัชชกูล
64. ณฐพงศ์ จิตรนิรัตน์
65. ณรุจน์ วศินปิยมงคล 
66. ณีรนุช แมลงภู่
67. เดชรัต สุขกำเนิด
68. ตะวัน วรรณรัตน์
69. ถนอม ชาภักดี 
70. ทับทิม ทับทิม
71. เทียมสูรย์ สิริศรีศักดิ์
72. ธนศักดิ์ สายจำปา
73. ธนาวิ โชติประดิษฐ 
74. ธเนศ อาภรณ์สุวรรณ
75. ธเนศวร์ เจริญเมือง
76. ธีรวัฒน์ ขวัญใจ
77. ธีราภา ไพโรหกุล
78. นภาพร อติวานิชยพงศ์
79. นฤมล ทับจุมพล
80. นาตยา อยู่คง
81. นิติ ภวัครพันธุ์
82. นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์
83. บดินทร์ สายแสง
84. บัณฑิต ไกรวิจิตร
85. บัณฑิต จันทร์โรจน์กิจ
86. บารมี ชัยรัตน์
87. บุญเลิศ วิเศษปรีชา
88. บุญส่ง ชัยสิงห์กานานนท์
89. เบญจมาศ บุญฤทธิ์
90. เบญจรัตน์ แซ่ฉั่ว
91. ประจักษ์ ก้องกีรติ
92. ประภาส ปิ่นตบแต่ง
93. ประสิทธิ์ ลีปรีชา
94. ปรีดี หงษ์สต้น
95. ปวลักขิ สุรัสวดี
96. ปิ่นแก้ว เหลืองอร่ามศรี
97. ปิยะ เกิดลาภ
98. ผาสุก พงษ์ไพจิตร
99. พรพรรณ วรรณา
100. พฤกษพรรณ บรรเทาทุกข์
101. พวงทอง ภวัครพันธุ์
102. พศุตม์ ลาศุขะ
103. พสิษฐ์ วงษ์งามดี
104. พิชญ์ พงษ์สวัสดิ์
105. พิชิต ลิขิตกิจสมบูรณ์
106. พิพัฒน์ กระแจะจันทร์
107. พิพัฒน์ สุยะ
108. พิภพ อุดมอิทธิพงศ์
109. พีรพัฒน์ โกศลศักดิ์สกุล
110. ไพบูลย์ เฮงสุวรรณ
111. ภัควดี วีระภาสพงษ์
112. ภัทรภร ภู่ทอง
113. ภาสกร อินทุมาร
114. ภูวิน บุณยะเวชชีวิน
115. มูฮัมหมัดอิลยาส หญ้าปรัง
116. ยิ่งศิวัช ยมลยง
117. ยุกติ มุกดาวิจิตร 
118. รจเรข วัฒนพาณิชย์ 
119. รังสิมา กุลพัฒน์
120. รัฐพงศ์ ภิญโญโสภณ
121. ราม ประสานศักดิ์
122. รุ่งธิวา ขลิบเงิน
123. ลลิตา หาญวงษ์
124. วรรณภา ลีระศิริ
125. วสันต์ ปัญญาแก้ว
126. วัฒนา สุกัณศีล
127. วันรัก สุวรรณวัฒนา
128. วิเชียร อันประเสริฐ
129. วิริยะ สว่างโชติ
130. วิศิษย์ ปิ่นทองวิชัยกุล
131. วีรบูรณ์ วิสารทสกุล
132. เวียงรัฐ เนติโพธิ์
133. ศรยุทธ เอี่ยมเอื้อยุทธ
134. ศรัญญู เทพสงเคราะห์
135. ศรีสมภพ จิตติภิรมย์ศรี
136. ศักรินทร์ ณ น่าน
137. ศิริจิต สุนันต๊ะ
138. ษฐรัมย์ ธรรมบุษดี
139. สธน วิจารณ์วรรณลักษณ์
140. สมชาย ปรีชาศิลปกุล
141. สมฤทธิ์ ลือชัย
142. สมิทธิรักษ์ จันทรักษ์
143. สร้อยมาศ รุ่งมณี
144. สันติชัย ปรีชาบุญฤทธิ์
145. สามชาย ศรีสันต์
146. สิริพรรณ นกสวน สวัสดี
147. สุภัทรา นีลวัชระ วรรณพิณ
148. สุรัช คมพจน์
149. สุริชัย หวันแก้ว
150. เสาวนีย์ ตรีรัตน์ อเลกซานเดอร์
151. โสรัจจ์ หงศ์ลดารมภ์
152. หทยา อนันต์สุชาติกุล 
153. อนุสรณ์ อุณโณ
154. อภิชาต สถิตนิรามัย
155. อภิชาติพงศ์ วีระเศรษฐกุล
156. อภิญญา เวชยชัย
157. อมต จันทรังษี
158. อรทัย อาจอ่ำ
159. อรรถจักร์ สัตยานุรักษ์
160. อรรถพล อนันตวรสกุล
161. อรศรี งามวิทยาพงศ์
162. อรอนงค์ ทิพย์พิมล
163. อรัญญา ศิริผล
164. อรุณี สัณฐิติวณิชย์
165. อัครพงษ์ ค่ำคูณ
166. อัจฉรา รักยุติธรรม
167. อัจฉริยา ชูวงศ์เลิศ
168. อัญมณี บูรณกานนท์
169. อันธิฌา แสงชัย
170. อาจินต์ ทองอยู่คง
171. อานันท์ กาญจนพันธุ์
172. อิสระ ชูศรีสุทธิชัย งามชื่นสุวรรณ
173. อุเชนทร์ เชียงเสน
174. เอกพลณัฐ ณัฐพัทธ์นันท์
175. เอกพันธุ์ ปิณฑวณิช
176. เอกรินทร์ ต่วนศิริ

By Joseph Purugganan

Very few people know about them, but new generation free trade agreements have become powerful instruments in shaping how development is pursued in the 21^st Century. And rapidly growing Asia has become a major hub of FTA engagements.

PDF version available here

On May 10, 2017, more than 30 members of civil society and sectoral groups converged inside the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) in Manila to participate in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) “Stakeholder Engagement” – a dialogue with trade negotiators from the 16 RCEP negotiating countries. The meeting, which ran for almost three hours, was an opportunity for civil society organizations (CSOs) to air not just concerns, but their collective opposition to RCEP. The fear from civil society is that the highly ambitious trade and investment agreement will impact negatively on jobs and people’s livelihoods, on health services and access to affordable medicines, on farmers’ rights to seeds, and on small fishers’ access to marine resources.

Concerns were also raised on broader issues like investments and the threats to public policies and regulations from the investor-state-dispute-settlement provisions in RCEP.

Another fundamental concern raised was the lack of transparency and the democratic deficit hounding the negotiations themselves. While a stakeholder engagement process was initiated recently in the RCEP talks, the reality is that people are shut out of the process. There has been no public disclosure of negotiating texts, and campaigners rely on leaked documents and texts from previously concluded agreements as bases for their analysis and interventions.

Very few people know about them, but new generation free trade agreements (FTAs) have become powerful instruments in shaping how development is pursued in the 21^st Century. And rapidly growing Asia has become a major hub of FTA engagements.

The rise of mega FTAs

What trade campaigners are up against is a whole landscape of so-called mega regional trade and investment agreements.  All the major trade powers- the United States, the European Union, China, and Japan- are aggressively pushing these deals to secure their respective economic and political interests.  Over the past couple of years however, negotiations for these big trade deals have been faltering, prompting one analyst to declare that “the era of the big trade deal is certainly in hibernation. The question now is whether it is dead altogether.”[1]

The difficulties in seeing these negotiations through can be attributed to a combination of factors.  There is the complexity of the trade deals themselves—covering so many chapters, and dealing with varying sets of rules, across several countries and continents. The negotiations for these mega FTAs have also been affected by changing tides in domestic politics, with the election of Trump in the US causing the greatest disruption.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal was the erstwhile gold standard among these mega agreements. Negotiations among 12 Pacific-rim countries (US, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Chile, Peru and 4 ASEAN member states- Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam) resulted in a comprehensive agreement containing 30 chapters covering goods, services, intellectual property rights, investments, government procurement, regulatory coherence, e-commerce, among others. After 19 formal negotiating rounds and several more ministerial meetings dating back to 2010, the negotiations were completed in October 2015 and the comprehensive and highly ambitious deal was signed and sealed by all parties in February 2016.

To take effect however, the agreement had to undergo ratification by February 2018 by at least six countries that account for 85% of the group's economic output. TPP countries account for around US$ 27.6 trillion of global GDP, with the United States accounting for close to 57% at $15.7 trillion. This means that the US would definitely need to be on board to meet that last condition. And so with a stroke of his pen, US President Donald Trump formalized the exit of the United States from the deal that successive US administrations before him had carefully steered for close to a decade.

Japan however, wants to revive the TPP and has suggested that some sort of alternative deal may be possible without the US.  Japan Finance Minister Taro Aso was quoted in the Financial Times saying “(W)e will start talks on an eleven-member TPP, minus the US at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in May.[2]  Finance Minister Aso’s statement represents a U-turn from the earlier pronouncement of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in January of this year where he said that “TPP without the US - and its market of 250 million consumers - would be meaningless.”[3]

Whether or not the TPP can be revived without the US or whether a new deal among the 11 countries (minus the US) can be forged is still not clear. What is clear though is that RCEP has since gained much significance in the wake of the TPP debacle and is now being seen as a platform to put in place rules and standards agreed upon under the TPP.

RCEP, the biggest game in town

The RCEP, a mega-regional free trade agreement being negotiated by the 10-member ASEAN regional bloc and its FTA partners, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, held its 18th round of talks from May 2-12 2017 in Manila, Philippines.  

The economies of the 16-country RCEP account for around $22.8 trillion, or roughly around 30% of the global economy.[4] The aggregate figure however, belies the asymmetry that exists within RCEP. 

In terms of Gross National Income (GNI), China with its $10.83 trillion economy is easily the biggest in RCEP. A distant second is Japan with $4.9 trillion, followed by India with $2.08 trillion. In comparison, the economies of the three least developed countries in ASEAN- Myanmar (0.57 %) Cambodia (0.15 %) and Lao PDR (0.10 %) - account for less than half of one percent of China’s huge economy.[5]

In terms of per capita GNI, Australia tops all RCEP countries with per capita income of $60,050. This is closely followed by Singapore ($52,090), New Zealand ($40,020), Japan ($38,840), and Brunei ($38,010).  Based on GNI figures from the World Bank, seven countries in RCEP (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, and India) are classified as low-middle income countries, while three countries (China, Malaysia, and Thailand) fall within the upper-middle income classification. Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, Japan, and Korea on the other hand are classified as high income economies.

This development asymmetry poses the biggest challenge for governments in RCEP. How parties can forge an agreement that is ambitious enough to satisfy the needs of the high and middle-income economies while also recognizing the development agenda of the poorer and smaller economies.

Compared to the TPP, the RCEP had largely been viewed as a more moderate agreement, although as we will discuss later, the RCEP agenda has also moved closer and in certain areas even going beyond the TPP standards.

Previously seen as a China-led FTA, the continuing talks have revealed that negotiating positions of the 16 parties are gravitating towards key alliances.[6]

Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand comprise the so-called TPP 4; the group pushing for TPP+ provisions in RCEP on many issues from intellectual property rights to investments and e-commerce.

India represents a lone voice raising particular concerns related to further opening up of trade in goods, particularly in the agricultural sector. While raising some concerns as well on certain aspects of the talks like goods and e-commerce, China is seen as pushing for a more ambitious investment chapter seeking to protect its growing investments across Asia and the Pacific.

ASEAN on the other hand is forging regional unity around key issues guided by common principles and objectives, and asserting the centrality of ASEAN in the RCEP talks. In the recently concluded ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila last April 2017, governments from the 10-ASEAN countries came out with a declaration articulating its collective stand on RCEP.

They welcomed the progress made in the RCEP negotiations and the “need to achieve a modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial RCEP Agreement, which has the potential to boost global economic growth, deepen regional economic integration and facilitate equitable economic development for all RCEP Participating Countries (RPCs).” Finally, the Heads of States of ASEAN “instructed (our) Ministers and negotiators to redouble efforts building on the good momentum achieved thus far and reiterated our call to uphold ASEAN Centrality in finding resolutions to outstanding issues.”

Furthermore, ASEAN governments reiterated their “commitment to work together in a cooperative manner in line with the Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the RCEP towards the swift conclusion of the RCEP negotiations.”[7]

Aside from asserting ASEAN centrality in the talks, the guiding principles and objectives of ASEAN in negotiating RCEP also include a principle that could very well temper the push of Japan, Korea and others to increase the ambition of RCEP.

ASEAN governments stated that being cognizant of “the different levels of development of the participating countries, the RCEP will include appropriate forms of flexibility including provision for special and differential treatment, plus additional flexibility to the least-developed ASEAN Member States, consistent with the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs, as applicable.”[8]

The Philippines, as Chair of ASEAN for 2017, will play a key role in the RCEP talks. After the 18th round of negotiations, the talks will move to Hyderabad, India, for the 19th round in July, before moving back to the Philippines in September for a Ministerial Meeting, and then to South Korea in October for the 20^th round of talks, where parties are hoping to finally conclude the negotiations.

How the various groupings in the talks are able to muster and consolidate support for their positions will determine whether the RCEP talks will produce a TPP-like highly ambitious agreement, or a more moderate agreement that takes into consideration the asymmetries that exists among the parties.

FTAs as threat to Human Rights and Sovereignty

The most critical issues are around the most ambitious elements of these mega deals, the ones that distinguish them from older generation free trade agreements.

Intellectual Property Rights

The first issue is on intellectual property rights (IPR).  The IPR chapter in new generation agreements is often referred to as TRIPS+, in reference to the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS) under the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO TRIPS Agreement inserted intellectual property rights as an integral component of trade agreements. By doing so, the TRIPS Agreement, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), “introduced global minimum standards for protecting and enforcing nearly all forms of intellectual property rights (IPR), including those for patents.” [9] WHO adds that by signing on to the agreement, “WTO member countries including over 40 countries that did not grant patent protection for pharmaceutical products prior to TRIPS, were now required, with few exceptions, to adapt their laws to the minimum standards of IPR protection.”[10]

Even these so-called minimum standards on IPR protection, are viewed as having led to “significant loss of policy flexibilities especially for developing countries in regulating the grant and use of pharmaceutical patents and controlling the cost of medicines.”[11]

The TRIPS+ IPR chapter in RCEP and new generation FTAs will force developing countries to comply with even more stringent IPR standards beyond commitments made under the WTO.  Given the clear disparity among RCEP countries in the existing levels of IPR protection, it is not hard to see why IPR is such a contentious element of these agreements.

Among the RCEP countries, Singapore (4th), New Zealand (6^th), Japan (14^th), and Australia (16^th) rank highest in terms of IPR protection.  While Thailand (121^st), Cambodia (130^th) and Myanmar* (134^th) are at the tail end of the global rankings.[12]

Source: Compiled by author from the Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017. Klaus Schab, Ed. World Economic Forum. www.weforum.org/gcr.   Myanmar’s ranking is based on the 2015-2016 report.

Stronger IPR protection in trade agreements has been criticized across Asia as a serious threat to access to medicines and public health. A 2012 report by the UN Development Program and UNAIDS on the potential impact of free trade agreements on public health issued a strong warning to state leaders against trade agreements that inflate the price of medications and deny access to lifesaving treatments for poor citizens across the globe.

The report thus concludes that:

“To retain the benefits of TRIPS Agreement flexibilities, countries, at minimum should avoid entering into FTAs that contain TRIPS-plus obligations that can impact on pharmaceuticals price or availability. Where countries have undertaken TRIPS-plus commitments, all efforts should be made to mitigate the negative impact of these commitments on access to treatment by using to the fullest extent possible, remaining public health related flexibilities available.”^[13]

The IPR chapter is also seen as undermining farmers’ rights.  The IPR chapter in RCEP will force countries to comply with UPOV 91[14], an international convention that has been highly criticized by farmers organizations and support groups for “eliminating the right of farmers to save privatized seeds and also limited what other plant breeders can do with that seed.”[15] Focus on the Global South analyst, Afsar Jafri, sees this as part of a strong push towards corporate agriculture and agribusiness, and a concerted effort to undermine farmers’ rights.[16]

Among the 16 RCEP countries, only five countries (Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam) are parties to UPOV 1991. China and New Zealand are members of the UPOV but have not signed on to the 1991 Act of the convention, while the remaining 9 countries (Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand) are not even members of UPOV.

Countries that are not a party to UPOV and UPOV 1991 however, are being made to ratify or accede to UPOV 1991 and or comply with UPOV 1991 standards.  In the case of the Philippines for example, the Department of Agriculture sought from UPOV Council an examination of conformity to UPOV 1991 of the country’s Plant Variety Protection Act of 2002.  The Council was then asked to “advise the Government of the Philippines that the Law incorporates the majority of the provisions of the 1991 Act, but still needs some clarifications and amendments, as provided in this document, in order to conform with the 1991 Act; once the above clarifications and amendments are incorporated in the Law, the Government of the Philippines is invited to request the examination of the amended law as provided in Article 34(3) of the 1991 Act;[17]

The Philippine experience, and those of other countries that are being made to amend their national laws, shows the tremendous influence that international standard setting conventions like UPOV have on domestic policies, with far reaching implications on how a country can pursue development of its agriculture sector and secure the livelihoods of its farmers and food producers.

Investor Protection and Right to Regulate

Another major issue across the region is the investor state dispute settlement mechanism, or ISDS, a provision in the investment chapter of RCEP and all new generation FTAs. 

In its intervention during the RCEP Stakeholder Engagement in Manila, Focus on the Global South (Focus) outlined the main points of criticism against ISDS, to wit:

“RCEP through ISDS will give corporations--many of which have annual revenues bigger than the GDPs of most countries in ASEAN, and therefore have more economic power compared to governments in these countries-- the right and even more power to sue governments over public policies and regulations in secret, ad-hoc tribunals.  These tribunals or more appropriately, corporate courts, have handed down million dollar rulings that have penalized governments over regulatory actions to defend public health, pursue more inclusive development, protect the environment, and public interest in general.”

Focus highlighted “the dramatic increase in the number of ISDS cases” over the last decade, and that in 2016, investors initiated 62 known ISDS cases- a figure higher than the 10-year average of 49 cases from 2006-2015. UNCTAD estimates that the total number of publicly known arbitration cases against host countries has now reached 767.”[18]

Within RCEP, all countries with the exception of Brunei have at least one ISDS case under its name. India tops the list with a total of 25 cases (21 as a respondent state, and 4 as host country of claimant). Indonesia has 7 cases, followed by Malaysia, Korea, and China with 6 each, Philippines with 5 cases, and Vietnam and Australia with 4 cases each. Singapore and Laos have 3 a piece, although in the case of Singapore, all three cases are as home state of claimant.  Japan has 2 cases, while Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia have one case each.[19]

A 2016 civil society report pointed out that “foreign investors have claimed at least 31 billion USD from RCEP countries. This amount is 7 billion USD more than India’s entire health budget for 2015.[20]

The report adds that “of the 31 billion USD claimed by investors, 81% has been claimed from just four countries, India, South Korea, Australia and Vietnam. The largest known amount paid to a foreign investor by an RCEP country is 337 million USD as part of the settlement in the Cemex versus Indonesia case.”[21]

Focus asserted in its intervention that “the signing of more investment treaties, including FTAs with more expansive investment chapters like RCEP, are partly to blame for the rise in ISDS cases. Clearly these agreements have emboldened the corporations to use this mechanism to challenge the States’ right to regulate.  More than 60 % of awards handed down by these tribunals in favor of corporations are between US10 million to over a billion. Add to this the enormous cost of litigation, it is not hard to surmise the tremendous strain these cases exact on public budgets and therefore the ability of governments to support development goals and the public welfare.”[22]

Focus adds that “ISDS is a tool only for corporations. There is no recourse available for communities that face the negative impacts of these investments to challenge these corporations in the face of human rights violations, destruction of the environment, loss of livelihoods resulting from these investments.”[23]

The rising number of cases has caused the governments in certain countries to review their existing bilateral investment treaties that give such power to corporations. In the Focus intervention, we “commended the efforts of India, Indonesia and the Philippines, in pushing for processes that aim to rebalance the need for investments and for policy space anchored on the governments’ right to regulate. These efforts show that governments are now taking a more balanced and cautious approach towards trade and investment treaties; and that public policies are paramount to corporate interests. RCEP therefore with its expansive investment chapter and ISDS will constitute a step back from these progressive efforts.”[24]

A new proposal on ISDS has apparently been tabled by Indonesia and the Philippines, and this proposal has been cited as a factor causing further delays in the RCEP talks.  According to insiders, the proposal touches on the consent provision and is anchored on the idea that investors must seek the consent of States to any ISDS case brought against it. In the ASEAN FTA with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines took a position that “the submission of a claim under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings shall be subject to a written agreement between the disputing parties in the event that an investment dispute arises.”[25]

Beyond the text

In order to fully understand the significance and implications of these mega deals, one needs to look at the bigger picture and see how these deals fit into what many have referred to as the 21^st Century trade and investment regime.

Connectivity

There is a big push in Asia for the agenda of connectivity.  Two big regional blocs, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN have formulated their respective blueprints or framework documents on connectivity, outlining the agenda for physical connectivity involving infrastructure projects in the field of regional road and transportation networks as well as big energy; institutional connectivity involving structural reforms, trade facilitation, modernizing customs, and improving supply chain performance; and the third aspect of people to people connectivity which includes agenda on tourism development, labor mobility, student exchanges among others.

Connectivity underlines as well the Belt and Road Initiative of China, a highly ambitious development project meant to spur economic development across Asia and beyond anchored on massive infrastructure investments estimated to cost as much as $900 billion.  The Belt and Road Initiative is also seen by some analysts as China’s “geopolitical gambit in order to boost China’s regional clout at a time when Donald Trump’s US looks to be stepping back from Asia.”[26]

Governments across the region seem to be taking their cue and have stepped up infrastructure spending, utilizing various public-private partnership schemes and financing arrangements with China in particular.

In the Philippines for example, the Duterte administration has rolled out an economic agenda, branded as Dutertenomics, which is anchored on massive infrastructure spending.  According to Budget Secretary Benjamin E. Diokno, the Philippine government is planning to spend a total of P8.4 trillion or $175 million during the six-year Duterte administration so that the share of infrastructure spending in the gross domestic product would rise from 5.4 percent this year to 7.4 percent in 2022.[27]

The enthusiasm for these proposed million dollar projects are tempered by growing concerns on how these projects will be financed and their impact on the country’s foreign debt.  An article in Forbes Magazine by political risk analyst Anders Corr underscored the dangers posed by these massive infrastructure deals.  According to Corr, (the infrastructure projects) “could increase current Philippine national government debt of approximately $123 billion to as much as $452 billion, bringing Philippines’ debt to GDP ratio to 197%, second-to-worst in the world.”[28] 

Corporate Control

Another key element of the global trade and investment regime raising a lot of concerns is the corporate capture of economic policies.  The mega FTAs represent a key tool pushing the corporate agenda.  Trade Justice Pilipinas, a broad campaign platform on trade and investment policies in the Philippines, underscored its critique of the corporate agenda underpinning RCEP and other new generation trade and investment agreements.

“RCEP like TPP is advancing a corporate agenda that would threaten public health and peoples access to medicines. The strong push from Japan and Korea for TPP-provisions on intellectual property rights in the RCEP negotiations will make it harder for poor people in the region to access affordable medicines particularly life-saving drugs, and for governments to advance public health policies for the benefit of the poor.

“RCEP like TPP is advancing the corporate agenda by pushing for an investment regime that will give corporations the right to sue the government over policies and regulations. Under the infamous Investor State Dispute Settlement Mechanism or ISDS, corporations are given the power to take legal action against the State in private and exclusive investment arbitration courts.  ISDS, which has been highly criticized in the context of TPP negotiations, should be strongly rejected as well by governments across Asia as an instrument for weakening the right of State to regulate investments in the name of the greater public interest.

“RCEP like TPP will further curtail the power of governments to use public policies to advance development agenda by putting in place prohibitions on performance requirement such as policies on domestic content and export restrictions, policies that favor employment of locals over foreign workers or even those that push for technology transfer.”[29]

Human Rights

Trade and human rights issues have also been in the spotlight in the wake of worsening human rights conditions across much of Asia.  This has prompted trade advocates to work more closely with human rights networks in pushing a trade and human rights agenda that includes calls for a comprehensive human rights impact assessment of trade and investment agreements.  Civil society concerns have been echoed by Alfred de Zayas, a United Nations Independent Expert, on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order. De Zayas notes that “It is high time to mainstream human rights into all trade agreements and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and regulations, so that trade representatives and dispute-settlers know that trade is neither a 'stand alone' regime nor an end in itself.”[30]

People’s Resistance

Over the years, we have seen people’s resistance to trade deals undergo major ups and downs. In Asia, there have been a number of key moments where social movements, CSOs, and academics have come together under broad people’s platforms against the WTO.  These include the Indian Platform Against the WTO and the Stop the New Round Coalition in the Philippines, that have mobilized thousands of workers, farmers, fishers, women, and spearheaded the public debate on the WTO and its impacts on people’s lives. 

The actions around the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong in 2005 were also a watershed moment for the anti-globalization movement in Asia, as activists from across the region joined a concerted effort to push back on the Doha Round negotiations. 

While the trade campaigns across the region have waned since then, as groups grappled with the challenge of confronting threats coming from multiple fronts, including the barrrage of bilateral and regional FTAs, as well as growing concerns over climate change, the push for mega FTAs ironically gave the movement a new reason to consolidate and heighten the resistance.  We have seen a revitalization of trade campaigns across Europe, anchored on the oppostion to the Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement (TTIP), and the Canada-EU FTA (CETA), as well as across North America and the Pacific with the TPP, and across Asia and the Pacific with RCEP.

National and regional campaigns are drawing the interest and participation of various sectors and movements working on specific issues and thematic concerns.

The right to health and access to medicines have become major concerns of civil society networks monitoring various negotiations for free trade agreements in Southeast Asia. Various multi-stakeholder platforms that include trade campaigners, health advocates and practitioners, consumer groups, and social movements have emerged across the region to spearhead concerted campaigns and actions against these provisions and to assert the right to public health.[31]

Farmers’ and fishers’ groups have continued to articulate issues around the impact of trade deals on agriculture, the aggressive push of corporate agriculture, and the efforts to undermine farmers’ rights.  The international peasant movement La Via Campesina, has been at the forefront of trade campaigning across Asia. La Via Campesina members have not only spearheaded campaigns against the WTO at national and regional levels, they continue to be an integral part of the current efforts to push back new generation FTAs, and perhaps more importantly continue to put agriculture and food issues on the agenda.  The peasant resistance to these trade deals is also anchored on a proposal for an alternative: agroecology towards food sovereignty.  La Via Campesina continues to advance agroecology as a “key form of resistance to an economic system that puts profit before life.”[32]

In May 2016, the office of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (UNSRIP) organized a consultation among indigenous groups and trade campaigners in the Asia-Pacific region on international investment agreements.  UNSRIP Victoria Tauli-Corpuz had earlier submitted a report to the UN Secretary General on the impact of international investment and free trade on the human rights of indigenous peoples.  The report drew attention to the fact that “investment clauses of free trade agreements and bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, as they are currently conceptualized and implemented, have actual and potential negative impacts on indigenous peoples’ rights, in particular on their rights to self-determination, lands, territories and resources; participation; and free prior, and informed consent.”[33] An increasing number of indigenous peoples organizations and networks continue to be engaged in RCEP and other trade campaigns.

Broad campaign platforms at the national level have also emerged, such as the Forum against FTAs in India, FTA Watch in Thailand, and the Trade Justice-Pilipinas in the Philippines, which serve as mechanisms for social movements, sectoral groups and CSOs to consolidate positions, engage governments across a wide-range of issues, initiate public education, and lead national campaigns against these unjust agreements.

Asian movements are also active players in global campaigns such as the Global Campaign to Reclaim Peoples Sovereignty, Dismantle Corporate Power and Stop Impunity, a network of over 200 social movements, networks, organizations and affected communities resisting the land grabs, extractive mining, exploitative wages and environmental destruction of TNCs in different global regions, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The campaign is advancing on another front: that of resisting corporate power, and pushing for a legally binding instrument to regulate the power of TNCS.

Focus on the Global South has organised a forum entitled "A Year of Dutertismo: Unpacking its Policies, Vision and Direction" on 18 July 2017 at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. The forum aimed to provide a space for social movements and civil society to critically examine and collectively  discuss policies and direction of the Duterte administration.

As part of the 13^th International Conference on Thai Studies, Focus on the Global South (Focus) organized a roundtable discussion on 16 July 2017 to look at the role of capitalism and development in Asia, and the accompanying rise of dictatorial regimes in the region. Speakers included Walden Bello, co-founder and co-Chair of Focus; Surichai Wungaeo, Director of Rotary Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at Chulalongkorn University and Focus co-Chair; and Naly Pilorge from LICADHO, a Cambodian human rights organization. This event is one of a series that Focus has been organizing on the increasingly visible confluence of deepening neoliberalism, and the rise of extreme authoritarian and dictatorial regimes in Asia.

Shalmali Guttal, Executive Director of Focus and moderator of the event, opened up the roundtable by giving a regional overview of the current context in Asia. She described the significant emphasis that Asian governments place on economic growth, and particularly the prioritization of large-scale investment by state and corporate enterprises- much of it transboundary- through policies, laws and regulations that favour agribusiness, special economic zones, energy projects, resource extraction, and other industry and infrastructure.

Despite the rapid economic growth experienced by countries in the region, the poor have benefited very little. Instead, the e economic model adopted by Asian governments has deepened inequalities and structural imbalances. Local communities are being systematically dispossessed from their land and livelihoods, while distress migration and labour trafficking are on the rise. These trends have resulted in a redistribution of wealth from the poor and vulnerable to the rich and elites. New trade and investment agreements further reinforce and systematize such inequalities of wealth, privilege and rights. 

Guttal said that the deepening of capitalism and neoliberalism in Asia has been accompanied by a new force of extreme authoritarianism and dictatorial regimes. These regimes are either popularly elected, and/or enjoy the support of people from different classes, enabling them to remain in power. Modi in India, Duterte in the Philippines, the military dictatorship in Thailand, Hun Sen in Cambodia, and the governments of Laos and Vietnam are all such examples. While the characteristics and historical conditions of each of these regimes may differ, they do share commonalities. One common feature is scepticism of liberal democracy where all citizens enjoy equal rights regardless of class, race, caste or gender; the other is the complete dedication and perpetuation of capitalism where the few who control wealth and wealth creation, make the important economic decisions that affect the majority.

Walden Bello took the discussion to national level by examining the rise and popularity of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines. It has been just over 12 months since Duterte was popularly elected as President. This has been a year of indiscriminate killing of drug users and pushers. The murder toll of Duterte’s war on drugs has reached over 7,000, but others put the figure at over 10,000 people. Bello reminded the audience that this is a result of democratic processes and warned, “when democracy screws up big time, the consequences can be incalculable and less predictable than the usual military take-over.” 

Despite Duterte’s extreme methods, he still enjoys widespread popularity and support from across society, and particularly the upper and middle classes. Duterte astutely spotted an opportunity to gain support: by campaigning on an anti-crime agenda. Despite his singular focus on crime and drugs, people believe that Duterte will use his “iron hand” in solving other problems, such as corruption, government inefficiency, poverty and inequality.

Bello emphasized that Duterte’s rise cannot be understood without understanding the massive popular disenchantment with the liberal democratic system that reigned in the 30-year period between the overthrow of Marcos in 1986 and the elections of 2016.  It presented a fatal mix of continuing inequality, neoliberalism, and elite control of political process.

Bello called Duterte a “fascist original”: he has reversed the process by which fascists typically come to power; his style is of “blitzkrieg fascism” rather than creeping fascism; and unlike other fascist regimes, he has also been successful at bringing the traditional left into his coalition, which demonstrates that his political instincts are particularly sharp. His extremely worrying rhetoric on drug users is proving effective at justifying the killings: meth users are “the living dead”; human rights no longer apply and due process for them is a waste of time.

Opposition to Duterte remains weak: the opposition has been discredited; the catholic church is morally compromised and unpopular; and the traditional left is now part of the ruling coalition. Opposition now comes from human rights groups and new, youth-based left formations.

Bello believes that the imposition of martial law in the Mindanao region following the siege of Marawi City is the second phase of Duterte’s consolidation of dictatorship. Yet martial law may prove a double-edged sword for him, and could politicize an already demoralized army. Bello sees parallels between the Philippines and other countries in the region. The most prominent are the widespread disenchantment with liberal democracy; and related to this, the turn of the middle class towards authoritarianism or fascism. Bello pointed out that the middle class is the least studied of all classes, but that it is incredibly important to pay close attention to the behaviour of the middle class, since its volatility can lead to unpredictable outcomes.  

Surichai Wungaeo followed by examining the situation in Thailand, which is caught in a cycle of military coups, authoritarianism, and short-lived democratically-elected governments. Surichai emphasized that this is not only a crisis of democracy and human rights that Thailand is experiencing, but a greater crisis of knowing and understanding Thailand as a nation. He called for greater introspection of Thai peoples’ responsibilities and personal engagement in democracy, and to take a longer-term view in understanding how to solve the crisis of democracy, both of which are inextricably tied with a crisis of identity of Thailand as a nation state. He also warned against looking at Thailand in isolation without examining its actions and influence regionally. This is important given the economic role that Thailand plays, especially in regard to its investments in the energy sector, which are causing social and environmental problems in the Mekong region, and as a destination for migrants, who  end up in exploitative and dangerous work, such as in the fishing industry.  

Wungaeo talked of the important role of social movements in Thailand as a means of redefining democracy from the ground. He believes we can learn a great deal from these struggles for justice and create space for genuine engagement between the local and national. 

Naly Pilorge gave the final presentation, and talked of the current situation in Cambodia. She said that while most non-Cambodians remember Cambodia for the Khmer Rouge period or Angkor Wat, they have little idea of what is happening right now. Tourists see smiling faces and Starbucks cafes in a beautified Phnom Penh, but beneath this façade lies increasing violence, suffering and a population still not recovered from the upheaval of the 70s and 80s. Cambodia also has the fastest rate of deforestation in the world; is often listed as most corrupt; and is in the top-ten of most lawless countries. The garment industry has flourished in the country, with foreign countries and companies calling this “job creation”, while in fact it is more like modern enslavement.

Pilorge said that the Cambodian leadership can be described as a dictatorship, but the extreme concentration of wealth in the Hun family means that the situation is actually more convoluted. She believes that the government is a military regime masquerading as a democracy. The army is called in to quell dissent, and threaten critics. Prisons have become the main tool to address both social issues and silence the opposition. Like other countries in Asia, civil society is being squeezed, with the government seeing civil society groups as anti-government and aligned with the opposition. Pilorge believes that hope lies in the new generation of Cambodians. Over 60% of the population is under-35, and the youth are getting more exposed to new ideas by travelling more outside of the country, or accessing information online.

Pilorge showed the audience a moving video, “The Human Cost of Development in Cambodia” (available to view here) which gives voice to people directly affected by development in Cambodia. The video interviews labour leaders, community members and activists whose testimonies and experiences show us the destructive force of development in Cambodia.  

Some common points and observations could be drawn from the presentations of the speakers. One is the strength of these ruling regimes; that they are able to forge consensus to exercise extreme power among different classes - from poor to elites, and particularly among the middle classes.  Secondly, propaganda and rhetoric play a large role in both the rise and rule of these regimes. We can observe social media becoming a new terrain of battle, and a force for widening polarization. Dangerous rhetoric is becoming mainstream and accepted, which includes the de-humanisation of particular groups, and denunciation of groups who do not embrace the “nationalist” project as defined by the ruling regime. As a result, these groups are deemed as less deserving of full citizenship and due process by law, a view that is gaining popular buy-in. In regard to resistance struggles and hope, it is clear that the assorted social, economic and political, environmental struggles must unite in order to challenge these trends, and that the future of democracy is perhaps found in these movements. Further hope is possibly found in the youth and future generations.  

23 July 2017--Hyderabad, India

We join hands to resist RCEP and Free Trade Agreements which are an Onslaught on the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of the Majority of Indians and on the Nation’s Sovereignty

At this People’s Convention on 23 July 2017 in Hyderabad, more than 600 of us have gathered from across India, not only as individual citizens but also as representatives of various organisations and communities. We represent peasants, agricultural workers, animal rearers, plantation workers, women farmers, fishworkers, trade unions, industrial and mining workers, street vendors, informal workers, sex workers, insurance and bank employees, public services employees, students, IT engineers, science teachers, lawyers, environmental and social activists, HIV-positive persons, women’s organizations, Dalits, adivasis, and Denotified-tribes. Together, these diverse sections make up a vast majority of Indians.

When we evaluate the impact of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and RCEP on each constituency, it is clear that they are an onslaught on our lives, livelihoods and rights. In particular, RCEP is the world’s largest mega-FTA and its impact will be enormous and widespread. When farmers are agitating across India for better prices for crops and committing suicide, RCEP would remove import tariffs, pushing them further into crisis with cheaper imports of crops and milk products. Local manufacturing will take a hit, with workers losing their jobs and wages, getting pushed into unorganised sector. With stronger patent rights for big pharma companies, RCEP will increase the costs of medicines and damage India’s manufacture of generic drugs. Public services such as health and education will be even more privatised, making it prohibitive for the masses to access and putting additional burden on women who have historically been involved in survival work. It will also facilitate free access to Indian data by global big business, giving them control over every sector.

As we share the experiences of over two decades of corporate globalisation, it is clear that the most vulnerable sections such as Dalits, adivasis, small farmers, unorganized workers, denotified tribes, minorities, women and children stand to lose the most in this game. Those who gain will be the big corporations. The latest anti-democratic weapon is the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism which obligates the government to protect the safety of investments of foreign companies rather than the rights and interests of its citizens foremost. Most importantly, the agreements undermine the sovereignty of our government to make its own laws and policies. It is shocking that such far-reaching agreements are being negotiated without discussion with the public and in the Parliament, State legislatures and local self Governments.

We assert the following:

 We strongly oppose the onslaught of corporate globalization by which policies and laws of the country are being made to suit the interests of multinational corporations. We want democratic governments to retain the sovereignty to make laws and policies in the interests of the citizens, particularly the more vulnerable sections - whether it is import tariffs, subsidies, minimum wages or protections for its people and environment.

 India should immediately halt RCEP talks and negotiations on other FTAs. Indian government should place all details of the negotiations before the public and hold extensive and meaningful consultations on FTAs with people’s organisations including farmer unions and trade unions.

 The government should immediately debate RCEP and other FTAs in the Parliament, and hold consultations with state governments and local self-governments.

 India should adopt a law that no international trade agreement should come into force without ratification by the Parliament.

 All state governments and political parties should declare their stand on RCEP and other FTAs.

All the diverse groups at this People’s Convention stand for social, economic and environmental justice. We stand for a new vision of development and trade that creates dignified jobs, sustainable farming, quality public services, respects democratic decision-making and the principles of substantive equality, socialism, and of federalism enshrined in the Constitution of India.